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ABSTRACT 
Crime in the Caribbean consists of drug and human trafficking, weapons smuggling 
and terrorism, and is fuelled by this region’s physical location as a gateway to the 
United States (US). Significant challenges to effective policing are transnational (TN), 
making the region an ideal testing ground to study transnational police cooperation 
(TNPC). Current cooperation is seen as reactive and hindered by the Caribbean’s 
topography, cultures, legal systems, nepotism and territorialism. 
 
Using a phenomenological perspective, this qualitative study investigates TNPC in the 
Caribbean region, focusing on Puerto Rico (PR) and the Dominican Republic (DR), 
assessing how TNPC works within this region, current structures and operations in the 
Caribbean.  Other researchers such as Malcolm Anderson and Ethan Nadelmann have 
established the theoretical research base upon which this study is built. However, as 
empirical research is limited around this particular study, this paper primarily draws 
upon interviews with law enforcement agents in PR working for the High Intensity 
Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program, administered by the White House Office of 
National Drug Control Policy. This study investigates stakeholders’ perspectives and 
the various methods of TNPC with the aim of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of multi-agencies towards a practical model, as embodied by HIDTA.  
 
This research is the first of its kind, offering a new direction for theory and research.  
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PREFACE 
The globalization of crimes has emerged as a significant economic, social 
welfare, health, and governance issue over the last two decades. The issues that are tied 
up in globalization and the globalization of crime are fast-moving and constantly 
evolving and, as a result, theories of the best way to deal with this type of crime are 
somewhat understudied. New types and characteristics of crime require different 
policing approaches, different philosophies and innovative use of technology. The 
limited research in this field has become not only increasingly focused on global crimes 
and criminals but on those who attempt to police the transnational crimes and criminals 
(Bowling & Foster, 2002; Cain, 2000; Reiner, 2000). Transnational policing has 
become a very real practical possibility: as borders and boundaries blur for criminals, 
so too must policies intended to fight crime. Many agencies established or reviewed 
within the last twenty years have recognised the need for policing of crime that crosses 
national borders and becomes a matter of international jurisdictions: the concept of 
extradition is just one example of this. Change within and among law enforcement 
communities is imperative if the fight against crime is to evolve sufficiently to match 
the change in criminal patterns, methods and activities.  
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the US 
provides a prime example of the need for law enforcement agencies worldwide to 
collaborate in countering transnational criminal activity. Put simplistically, members of 
criminal networks in one country had carried out an act of terror in another country, 
which killed nationals of a wider variety of countries and effected economic functions 
throughout the world. From the perspectives of punishment, prevention and 
intelligence, ideologically, change within law enforcement communities is crucial. 
However, it is telling to note that in the years since “9/11”, no strong, international or 
formal policy has been employed in terms of nurturing cooperative efforts. In reality, 
then, policing communities have shown themselves largely incapable of initiating and 
delivering change. Transnational cooperation relies on an ability of local policing 
systems and agencies to initially adapt and evolve within a more local context, and, in 
many instances, they have not been able to do this effectively. As a common practice, 
transnational policing (TNP) is still far from being mastered, suffering from a lack of 
consistency, codes of best practice, or guidelines for recommended conduct. With the 
exception of the pioneering research of Anderson, Nadelmann, Andreas, Sheptycki, 
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Bowling, Kline, Harriott and Griffith, all who have laid an important foundation and 
framework, over thirty years, on which to build upon, there is still a substantial lack of 
empirical data on TNPC.	  As such, in order to really assess the best practice, in practical 
and applicable terms, evidence-based research needs to be conducted.  
To date, most studies on TNP have concentrated primarily on structural 
features, like comparative policing, courts, and corrections, or on transnational crimes 
or regional issues (Hill, 2005; Ortiz, 2005; Roth, 2004), failing to capture a practical or 
multi-disciplinary approach to cooperation. There are a number of factors and issues 
involved with the actual practice of Transnational Police Co-operation (TNPC) that 
needs to be considered in detail if and real progress is going to be made. Indeed, studies 
on TNPC need to be holistic in addressing issues and in providing a multi-disciplinary 
approach (Braithwaite, 2001). This study adopts this more complete methodology by 
examining different societal contexts and the social psychological features (e.g. 
competition, motivation, coercion, or trust) in various environments which affect 
TNPC.	  Social psychology has been defined as “the scientific investigation of how the 
mental, emotional, and behavioural characteristics of individuals are influenced by the 
physical or implied presence of others” (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002, p.2). The application 
of strategic social psychological elements in an analytical TNPC framework could 
theoretically emphasise ways to create and implement methods of improved TNPC. A 
social psychological framework could be practical and helpful in elucidating a law 
enforcement individual’s behaviours, attitudes and beliefs in the context of his/her 
culture and/or group and in assessing what the impact of these components might have 
on transnational cooperation. Issues, such as motivation, competition, coercion and 
trust might prove to be essential elements in finding paths to improved cooperation. 
Certain attitudes, beliefs, or cultural characteristics of the TNP community (that is, the 
various organisations that are charged with TNP issues) could, for example, explain 
what are individual and group beliefs and/or attitudes towards cooperation. One could 
then suggest customised training that would articulate the research findings in practical 
and applicable terms. Ideally, creating, managing and progressively developing a 
program that addresses the issues found in the current research may contribute a unique 
and valuable perspective. In theory, improved universal legislative agreements could 
stem from social psychologically based research findings in behavioural or cultural 
processes used by individuals, groups or management in TN police agencies. 
Challenges such as bureaucratic inertia, cultures of authority and the suggested 
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unwillingness of change to the established methods of operation, all deny any real 
reform in policing. It could be argued that, in the utopian world of police cooperation, a 
universal, or a two-way, interactive political communications system (Deosaran, 1992) 
could be developed based on the foundation of the simplest of concepts - unity in the 
diversity itself - to value the uniqueness and importance of each individual and societal 
context. Social psychological influences are the building blocks to such unity. These 
issues have been touched on within the literature (Gambetta, 1988) but this relatively 
limited focus is not thought to be sufficient for such a potentially crucial area.  
 Assessing the effectiveness of existing organisations will allow a consideration 
of good practice and areas that can be improved. An organisation that will be 
interesting and relevant to consider is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
(HIDTA) Program. Run by the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
the HIDTA Program is a drug-prohibition enforcement initiative. A 'HIDTA' refers to a 
geographical area (such as a major city or border crossing) that is seen to be a major 
area of international drug trafficking. The HIDTA Program is an ideal example to focus 
on, since it embodies a practical and pragmatic approach to transnational and regional 
co-operation, based on an understanding that in order to achieve its aims – to disrupt 
and dismantle major drug trafficking organisations – a seamless cooperation between 
all law enforcement agencies is required. The HIDTA website 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/high-intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program) 
states that it assists law enforcement agencies with training, technical assistance, crime 
mapping, intelligence analysis and program evaluation. Analysis focusing on such 
initiatives are critical in developing a better understanding of TNPC and how programs 
should be run to obtain the most collaborative and effective outcomes. HIDTA analysis 
will provide one element of the way in which the research questions are approached.  
As well as honing in on a particular organisation, there is a need to locate this 
research geographically. The criminal “hotspot” regions of Puerto Rico (PR) and the 
Dominican Republic (DR) are interesting settings in the context of criminality across 
borders. The crimes that occur in these areas are overwhelmingly related to drug and 
human trafficking and this has become a particular issue in terms of transnational 
policing due to PR’s location as a gateway in the US. Evidently, the consideration of 
the HIDTA program is relevant here. The designation of PR as a HIDTA in 1994 is due 
to the area’s high attractiveness to drug trafficking organisations based on the 
aforementioned geographic and strategic considerations. In considering all of these 
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factors, it seems that PR would benefit strongly from a strategic approach to 
cooperation that involves all law enforcement agencies in the region. As such, HIDTA 
is a highly appropriate model to apply here. 
Indeed, PR is arguably one example of an ideal setting for international 
cooperation and therefore provides an exceptionally relevant area to locate research in 
this topic: it is a protectorate of the US, which affords its citizens the right to get on a 
US-bound plane or mail guns to the States with no more than a driver’s license. The 
island is also privy to US funding and utilization of the US legal system, with the 
region (along with the US Virgin Islands - USVI). The PR’s HIDTA designation, 
mentioned earlier, owes to the area being a haven for drug trafficking organisations by 
being very central and having many coves, with the island’s over 900 miles of coastline 
very difficult to police. Complicating matters is PR’s status as a major container port 
with high levels of tourism and, therefore, transience and ability to trade with relative 
ease. Lastly, only 450 miles from the South American coast and being a Spanish-
speaking culture with low per capita regional incomes and a high influx of illegal 
migration further contribute to TNP difficulties. Surrounded by multicultural islands 
and having South American connections, PR is an international hub for police working 
for agencies from a number of countries. PR offers a global model of cooperation with 
other Caribbean nations worthy of examination, often those with long cultural ties to 
their mother European countries, plus close cooperation with Central, South, and North 
America. With the Caribbean region repeatedly ranked as one of the top five dangerous 
drug regions in the world (DEA, Drug Intelligence Brief, 1999-2003), it is a “hotspot” 
of transnational crimes such as money laundering, terrorism and the trafficking of 
drugs, weapons and humans. These issues and challenges make the island a natural 
home base for transnational police efforts. 
Moreover, using these areas will be an opportunity to offer an explanation of 
crime in a context that is currently not illuminated or solved by presumptuous Western 
ideals or theories (Anderson, 1989; Brogden, 2005; Cain, 2000). It has been said that 
there is a “Wild West” or “catch me if you can” attitude towards law enforcement on 
the island of Puerto Rico, known also as la isla del encanto (the island of enchantment). 
This view of the existing law enforcement in this region is the result, in part, of a lack 
of coordinated efforts in catching international criminals. Hence, research, in the form 
of conversations, on the detailed ways in which DEA agents working for HIDTA (on 
special assignment in PR) perceive and experience TNPC, specifically the social 
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psychological factors impeding or facilitating success, is needed to add depth and 
clarity to the general understanding researchers have of TNPC.	   An in-depth approach 
to the study of how TNP agencies cooperate, and the components influencing such 
cooperation, can prove to aid the TNP community towards reformation of social policy 
and legislation at the government and international levels. Ultimately, this investigation 
provides evidence-based recommendations involving the barriers, facilitators and social 
psychological components that lend themselves to ideal TNPC; to identify and then 
examine barriers to and facilitators of effective cooperation within crime fighting 
models like HIDTA, particularly the social psychological components influencing such 
cooperation, which could potentially then act as catalysts to a more globally linked 
police network. 
 This research begins with an investigation assessing the situation qualitatively, 
with efforts describing and analyzing agents’ perceptions of and experiences with 
transnational cooperation, within the context of an individual’s culture and group, 
through semi-structured interviews. A concerted effort is made to understand how law 
enforcement officers working for HIDTA, in certain Latin Caribbean offices, 
collaborate or how they would like to collaborate within the region and across borders. 
Key social psychological influences that articulate good practice lessons, facilitating 
the implementation of the HIDTA model within this region, are examined in-depth. 
The social psychological factors to be explored are: personal, social, cultural, 
regulatory and political. As well, influences of potential barriers and facilitators such as 
motivation, trust, betrayal, coercion, leadership, integrity, power, resources, 
competition, race/ethnicity, and gender are investigated. The investigation is based in 
PR, and seeks to highlight the challenges and approaches faced there, as well as in the 
DR. 
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Research Quest ion 
Does this study examine the barriers and facilitators to the use of HIDTA as a model of 
TNPC on a global scale? 
 The questions posed in the Topic Guide (see Appendix D) during the semi-
structured interviews focused on stakeholders’ perspectives on transnational crime and 
policing in PR and the DR, the role and contribution of the DEA and HIDTA Program, 
and the perceived barriers and potential improvements in TNPC in PR and the DR. The 
investigation sought to assess the TNPC approaches and challenges in PR and the DR 
by: 
1. Analyzing the perspectives on the crime problem, the contextual factors 
involved and how TNP tackled the current problems in PR and DR. 
2. Analyzing the role and value of the DEA and HIDTA Program in addressing 
these challenges. 
3. Identifying perceived barriers and potential improvements in TNPC. 
4. Articulating the good practice lessons to enhance cooperation in TNP and to 
examine options for implementing realistic change in the future. 
Limitat ions  
 Given that the analysis of TNPC is undoubtedly difficult to undertake, this 
primary research approach is unique and thus limited in having no comparisons. 
Further limiting the applicability of results is the fact that the definitions of “crimes,” 
“policing,” and “cooperation” differ greatly between regions, making comparisons 
difficult. While there was success in gathering over 80 hours of data on tape, data 
collection issues pose limitations to the research. Practical problems of language and 
translation may have been at play since interviews were conducted in English, a second 
language for some respondents. Participants’ heavy accents were, at times, hard to 
understand, making transcribing difficult. Spanish was used in the interviews when it 
was sensed there may be potential problems with racist attitudes between the English-
speaking interviewer and the Spanish-speaking interviewee. Yet another issue was that, 
given the protective culture of policing, participants may have also felt hesitant to speak 
freely and openly, revealing the inside workings of their corner of law enforcement, 
despite reassurances of anonymity. 
Finally, the applicability of findings is limited in that each police agency has its 
own values and philosophies. Cultural differences in attitudes also influence how 
agents view crime, how it should be policed and how agencies should cooperate. 
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Delimitat ions 
The delimitations of a study are those characteristics that limit the scope (define 
the boundaries) of the inquiry as determined by the conscious exclusionary and 
inclusionary decisions that were made throughout the development of the proposal. 
This study’s parameters were set, based on participants, data collection and 
findings. The study was limited to the experiences of one group of HIDTA agents, who 
appeared to be a very heterogeneous group. Since research interviews were the primary 
method of data collection, findings are also delimited to what was verbally 
communicated during interactions with participants and the investigator’s impressions 
of the interview experiences. The data is further restricted in that the findings reflect 
participants’ perceptions of their experiences, as was asked of them. 
Structure of  Thesis  
Chapter One discusses challenges and approaches to transnational policing, as 
well as the nature and trends in transnational crime and the emergence of and 
approaches to transnational policing. This is followed by discussion of the 
implementation of TNPC in PR and DR, so as to provide a cultural context for the 
study. 
Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework used in this study and 
discusses cooperation and its role in transnational policing. It discusses the elements 
and impact of cooperation in TNP organisations. This is followed by forms of 
cooperation in transnational policing, specifically in PR and DR. The contextual and 
social psychological influences are then examined as barriers and facilitators in 
transnational policing.  
Chapter Three presents a detailed description of the research design, the 
investigator’s rationale for decisions made regarding research methods, data collection 
techniques, the researcher’s role in the research process and methods for verification 
and analysis.  
Chapter Four begins with an introduction to the stakeholder’s narratives and the 
approach to analysis. The focus of this chapter is TNP and Caribbean links, examining 
stakeholders’ perspectives on the crime problem, including contextual factors and how 
the crime problems are being tackled.  
Chapter Five looks at the role and contribution of the DEA and the HIDTA 
Program in PR and the DR. It considers the extent and nature of cooperation between 
the DEA and other agencies whose agents’ experiences of working for/with the DEA 
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are also taken into account. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the agents’ 
views on the HIDTA Program and their methods of cooperation. This chapter 
investigates whether the HIDTA Program, theoretically, could be implemented as a 
global model for TNPC. 
Chapter Six focuses on TNPC by looking at the perceived barriers to 
cooperation in PR and the DR and the potential ways to improve that cooperation. This 
chapter also investigates whether it might be possible to develop a transnational version 
of the HIDTA Program.  
Chapter Seven gives a complete overview of the research questions, providing a 
summary plus implications of those findings, and discussion of the overall approach 
towards enhancing cooperation in the future by understanding the barriers and 
facilitators that drive cooperation. Options for implementing change are also considered 
before concluding with final thoughts on the topic of TNPC in PR and the DR.  
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Chapter One 
Transnational Policing: Challenges and Approaches 
1.1 Introduction to Chapter One 
Accounts of transnational crime and policing in PR and the DR have been sparse in the 
literature. The following chapter provides a context to the challenges and approaches 
towards TNC. The nature of and trends in transnational crimes are introduced first, 
followed by a historical perspective, illustrating how Western law enforcement has 
imposed its culture around the globe and what implications have arisen from this 
internationalization. A brief analysis of the structure of the overlapping agencies that 
police transnational crimes follows. Lastly, how TNP is specifically implemented in PR 
and the DR is addressed to help better understand the challenges and approaches 
explored throughout this thesis.  
1.2 Transnational Crime – Its Nature and Trends	  
The nature of transnational crime (TNC) has been difficult for law enforcement, 
theorists, and researchers to define and classify (Crawford, 2011; Goldsmith & 
Sheptycki, 2007; Leishman, Loveday, & Savage, 2000; Manning, 2000; McLaughlin & 
Muncie, 2001; Sheptycki, 1998b). Before exploring the various notions of TNC, it is 
important to understand its origins. Williams & Vlassis (2001) provide a 
comprehensive analysis, noting how the, then, UN Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Division originally used the term to “identify certain criminal phenomena 
transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an 
impact on another country” (Williams & Vlassis, 2001). This definition captures the 
root concept of TNC. It is important to note that due to the complex nature of this type 
of crime, it is often viewed within the same theoretical framework as ‘organised crime’. 
Definitions of transnational crimes vary according to the needs and experiences 
of different organizations (Edwards, 2000; Garland, 2001; Halstead, 1998; Hollin, 
1999; Weber & Bowling 2002). Some theorists and researchers have concentrated on 
the structure of characteristics of crime groups (Myers, 1996; Taylor, 1999; Walklate, 
1998), while others focused on the way markets allow organised crime to flourish 
(Rawlinson, 2001). In contrast, law enforcement agencies tend to concentrate on the 
business insight and perspective of organised criminals (McFarlane, 1998). There have 
been a vast number of suggestions as to the definition of organised crime, most said to 
be largely motivated by particular agendas and concerns. However, some elements of 
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existing definitions remain somewhat constant: the crimes committed have a strong 
economic factor; the offences are of “major significance” and the groups are enduring 
in number and involvement (Morrison, 2003). By way of illustration, The United 
Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime (CATOC, 2000) defines 
an organised criminal group as “a structured group of three or more persons existing for 
a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (CATOC, 2000). Although 
broad and applicable across many cultures, types of crimes, and jurisdictions, Morrison 
(2003) further highlights that it is inadequate for the bigger debate about the nature of 
organised crime, which requires a larger framework, and is unlikely to stand the test of 
time. Essentially, the relation between transnational crime and organised crime is that 
transnational crime is an element of organised crime – a tool available to extend the 
scope of crime – and that it takes structured and strategic crime to operate across 
borders (Morrison, 1997). Morrison’s research linking these groups could aid the 
development of rational policy making and deconstruct the evident groups in 
transnational organised crime.  
Reviews regarding the changing nature of crimes indicate that there are a 
number of trends. “Myers (1996) has noted that there is an increase in the number of 
criminal organizations engaged in transnational organised crime. Some have found that 
there are increased similarities between criminal organizations and legitimate 
transnational corporations, both of which are sovereignty-free actors (Williams & 
Florez, 1994, cited in Morrison, 2003). Others have shown an increased use of 
technology by organizations that operate in legitimate and illegitimate economies 
(Morrison, 1997). It would be wrong to assume that all groups follow the same 
blueprint. Like legitimate transnational corporations, transnational criminal 
organizations differ in structure, strength, size, and range, and in the diversity of their 
illicit activities (Morrison, 2003), including fraud, embezzlement, prostitution, and 
trafficking in a variety of illegal goods” (Williams & Florez, 1994, cited in Morrison, 
2003). 
Transnational crimes have presented serious risks to societies have motivated 
governments and policymakers worldwide, to create major existing law enforcement 
agencies and intelligence infrastructures (e.g. Interpol, Eurpol, DEA) designed to 
diminish the threat (UNDCP, 2002). Deconstructing assumptions and myths about 
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transnational organised crime is a pertinent starting point to understanding how the 
TNP community can better respond to the growing concerns regarding transnational 
crimes. In general, there are two persistent, false assumptions about transnational 
organised crime: (1) organised crime groups from the same region operate either 
cooperatively as one or as a number of competing groups (Bean, 2002; Sterling, 1994); 
and (2) ethnicity is an acceptable classification when describing organised crime groups 
(Halstead, 1998). Media, journalists in particular, plays a role in sensationalizing 
existing assumptions and myths. Perhaps the most worrying concern of the 
sensationalist media is that assumptions can block rational analysis and policy 
development (Halstead, 1998; Williams & Florez, 1994). However, regardless of the 
powerful impacts of the media, the evolving nature of transnational organised crime in 
a rapidly changing world is inevitable, making it more difficult and demanding for 
those who must enforce these crimes. 
1.3 The Emergence of Transnational Policing 
 In an age where rapid global interactions intensify and complicate social 
transformations (Giddens, 2002), each society, to various degrees, faces significant 
wide-ranging change, including crime and policing (Nadelmann, 1993; Nelken, 1994). 
Indeed, the changing nature of crime has been considered and, in order to adapt to this, 
new methods and theories surrounding policing had to be developed. One need only 
look at personnel and caseload statistics for an indication of how rapidly Western 
criminal law enforcement has spread globally (UNDCP, 2000). The internationalization 
of Western criminal law enforcement, or “Americanization” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 
2006), has emerged for various reasons, including misleading, theoretical presumptions 
of Western criminology. The deep presumptions of Western theories have been 
criticised as harmful for non-Western consumers in denying the possibility of 
difference (Cain, 2000; Cohen, 1982; Crawford, 1997; Findlay, 1999). 
 Brogden (2005) concluded that the twenty-first century concept of policing is 
seen as a commodity or package that is for sale on the international market. What he 
terms “exporting” of policing, where buyers and sellers of policing commute across the 
globe, “The seller frequently fixes the price, determines the contours of the product, 
and provides installation experts trained on home ground. The buyer has little choice in 
the range of goods on offer, and, when faced with the desperate needs of the home 
market, is often too receptive to the blandishments and pressure of the producers. 
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“Designs are based on production rather than consumption priorities” (Brogden, 2005, 
p. 3). His study briefly highlights the “one size fits all” and “West knows best” 
mentalities, and concludes that generic police packages seem to suit sellers rather than 
consumers around the globe. 
 There seems to be a clear inequality between two dominant types of societies: 
democratic and transitional. (Loader, 2000) Democratic societies, like the US, are 
founded on an ideology of equality, whereby anyone can achieve regardless of their 
social background or personal circumstances. The clichéd concept of the ‘American 
Dream’ encapsulates this ideal (Cullen, 2003). There is often a feeling of superiority 
whereby democratic states feel that their involvement is essential for assisting other 
types of regime; in combating crime, democratic states seek to strengthen the 
administration of justice in societies where defence mechanisms against drug-
sponsored corruption and violence are weak. Helping governments to target, seize, and 
administer assets belonging to criminal actors is an essential aspect of deconstructing 
international criminal networks. For example, such policy tools as the annual drug 
certification process in the US can highlight problems of high-level corruption in drug 
source countries and impel their governments to take countermeasures (Loader, 2000).  
 Transitional societies, however, can be defined as a form of society 
characterised by being in the midst of transition or change within a social, cultural, 
political, economic, or business context. Often, these are the same societies democratic 
societies try to aid in the administration of justice and where defence mechanisms 
against transnational crimes and corruption are seemingly weak (Loader, 2000). The 
dichotomy most apparent in the cooperation between the two societies is the 
availability of resources. There is pressure on transitional societies to conform to 
Americanization, which is actually driving the possibility of cooperation between the 
two apart (Dixon, 1999; Muncie, 2004). This phenomenon is viewed as an increasingly 
hegemonic influence, with Newburn and Sparks (2004) stressing the major 
criminological issue as an understanding of the similarities and differences in the 
pattern of contemporary systems of crime control, as well as the movement and 
translation of commodities between and within politics and political culture. Brogden 
(2005) also argues that there is an assumption that transitional or “failed societies” 
should follow the North American way of policing, and that this model is superimposed 
without consideration of local needs. The need to pay heed to the cultural context, 
particularly in countering “West knows best” efforts, continues to be made as the 
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internationalization of Western criminal law enforcement grows (Buruma, 2000). 
Walker (2000) has warned that unless new and effective regulatory tools are devised 
that encompass solutions to the complexity of various transnational contexts, policing 
may not satisfy the current realities and criticisms of “informalism and accountability”, 
which traditionally have plagued policing history worldwide. Walker (2000) argues the 
importance of political and economic constraints within the ‘ideological matrix,’ 
stating, “the stable prosperity of the EU in the more fluid post-Cold War world order 
stands in stark contrast with the insecurity and poverty of the polities and economies to 
the South and East” (p. 93). It is imperative for all parties involved to understand the 
basic issues and wishes of transitional societies before blindly accepting or rejecting the 
importing of Western-democratic philosophies of policing. The need for such 
fundamental comprehension is exemplified in the challenges law enforcement faces in 
interdicting the cross-border movement of drugs and other forms of contraband, amidst 
the expanding global legal market for goods and services that creates a ready pipeline 
for the smuggling of illicit goods. The overall US–Mexican trade volume of $130 
billion, the hundreds of millions of legal border crossings each year, and both 
countries’ vested interest in the expansion of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) have created a pipeline for smuggling illicit goods and an almost 
impossible situation for law enforcement. Consequently, US customs officials are able 
to subject only 25 percent of the 3.5 million commercial vehicles entering the US from 
Mexico annually to a “narcotics enforcement examination”.1 Yet a single conveyance is 
capable of transporting tons of narcotics in just one border crossing while easily 
blending in with legitimate trucks. Recent law enforcement estimates suggest that 
Mexican traffickers are delivering between five and seven tons of drugs, including 
cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine, to the US each day.2 
1.4 Approaches to Transnational Policing 
Agencies  of  Transnat ional  Pol ic ing 
There are many types of agencies involved in the process of transnational policing. 
There are individual networks, law enforcement agencies, non-governmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Office	  of	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy	  (ONDCP).	  (2003).	  Enhanced	  truck	  inspections.	  Report	  to	  Congress.	  
Washington,	  D.C.	  
2	  Flood	  of	  contraband	  hard	  to	  stop,	  (1997,	  November	  2).	  The	  Washington	  Post.	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organizations (NGOs), governments, and private corporations. Bowling (2009) 
produced an effective typology of policing by categorizing and distinguishing “high” 
and “low” policing. Private and public forms of policing work were later added, “aimed 
at securing territory and work aimed at securing populations” (Sheptycki, 2000, p. 32). 
However, perhaps the most useful typology yet of TNP would be the one designed by 
Bowling and Foster (2002), who have classified formal TNP into three distinct 
categories: (1) national policing agencies operating abroad (by government); (2) 
transnational and cross-border police cooperation arrangements (between 
governments); and (3) international policing agencies above government. 
 National policing agencies would include British Military Intelligence, Section 
5 & 6 (Mi5, Mi6),	   National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in the United 
Kingdom or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US. The DEA's Intelligence 
Division has been a pioneer in endeavors	   to	  systemize	  and	  make	  the	  concept of TNPC 
relevant across the world with its Regional Information Sharing Centre concept, which 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The DEA is responsible for enforcing the controlled 
substances laws and regulations of the US, and is a model example of global 
representation, with “5,235 Special Agents, a budget of more than $2.3 billion, and 87 
foreign offices in 63 countries” (DEA, 2010). 
 Ideally, TNPC would include intergovernmental efforts, such as the formation 
of the Trevi group by the European Council of Ministers and The Schengen 
Agreement, signed in 1985 to police across European borders, enabling the right of 
“hot pursuit” across borders where governments share information on the designed 
Schengen Information System for crime and criminals. Other examples include the 
1991 intelligence exchange between European Union member states in forming 
Europol and the Law Enforcement Cooperation Program based on the Australia Federal 
Police’s liaison officer network. “Officers in the network form the link between 
countries, facilitating the exchange of information, as well as enhancing 
communication and understanding by attending international conferences and seminars, 
and by building a rapport with law enforcement officers of their host country” 
(www.afp.gov.au). The International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs), 
established, for example but not only in, El Salvador, Botswana, Budapest, and 
Bangkok, also foster cross-border police and multi-agency cooperation at the 
intergovernmental level. This institute has facilitated several US local forces in training 
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law enforcement personnel around the world. The only requirement of the academy is 
that the foreign officers be committed to incorporating and encouraging good practices 
of international cooperation in their work. The International Police Executive 
Symposium (IPES), which is composed of international police executives who meet 
and exchange information regularly at conferences with academics and other agencies, 
is yet another positive example of international cooperation.  
International agencies are typified as United Nations Security Police or UN Civil 
Police Units known as CivPol. CivPol is part of the UN peacekeeping operations. It 
was first used in the Congo in 1960, and today is operational in six countries involving 
4,720 officers from 45 countries. The International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) was formed in 1923 to act as an international intelligence network 
between self-governing members. Interpol has membership in 176 countries, but still 
does not have an international treaty of any sort (Bowling & Foster, 2002).  
Another type of cooperation, beyond government, is Private Transnational Policing. 
It typically includes private security companies employed in private buildings or airport 
security for, as an example, surveillance purposes, servicing clients like Wells Fargo, 
Securitas, Pinkerton or Kroll. There are also private militias that are used to support 
public law enforcement agencies and private corporations, such as Military 
Professional Resources, Inc. (Bowling & Foster, 2002). Lastly, Brogden (2005) 
suggests agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
have strict criteria for receiving economic assistance and loans, requiring mandatory 
improvement of current methods of policing. Bayley and Shearing (1996) would add 
that international agencies establish and govern national policing. 
1.5 Implementation of Transnational Policing in Puerto Rico and the Dominican 
Republic 
Puerto Rico 
 “Populated for centuries by aboriginal peoples, PR was claimed by the Spanish 
Crown in 1493, following Columbus’s second voyage to the Americas. In 1898, after 
400 years of colonial rule that saw the indigenous population nearly exterminated and 
African slave labour introduced, PR was ceded to the US as a result of the Spanish-
American War. Puerto Ricans were granted US citizenship in 1917. Popularly elected 
governors have served since 1948. In 1952, a constitution was enacted providing for 
internal self-government. In plebiscites held in 1967, 1993, and 1998, voters chose” to 
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retain commonwealth status (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rq.html).  
 PR is a commonwealth associated with the US and is subject to US federal 
laws. Due to its geographic location and association with the US, PR is a major 
Caribbean point of entry for large, metric-ton quantities of cocaine destined for the 
continental US. The island is also a transit point and consumer market for Colombian 
heroin. An important incentive for traffickers reaching PR, or any US overseas 
territories, is that, once they reach a US territory, illicit drugs can be transported to the 
continental US in cargo that is not subject to further inspection by the Bureau of 
Customs and Borders Protection (CBP). PR is also an attractive sea and air 
transportation site in the Caribbean due to having one of the busiest seaports in North 
America, with an abundance of commercial airline flights to the US. 
 In recent years, traffickers have made less use of go-fast boats and airdrops 
directly from South America to PR, largely due to law enforcement efforts. Instead, 
much of the cocaine entering PR is smuggled through nearby Caribbean islands. 
Traffickers also have increasingly used self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS) to 
transport cocaine from South America to Mexico. These vessels typically protrude only 
a few inches above the surface of the water, making them very difficult to visually 
detect. SPSS typically have a four-man crew and are capable of carrying multi-ton 
quantities of cocaine Traffickers operating in PR increasingly use the US Postal Service 
(USPS), especially Express Mail services, to send drugs from PR into the continental 
US. Investigators must obtain search warrants to open parcels sent through the USPS, 
which delays the packages and alerts traffickers to the fact that they have been 
intercepted (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008). 
 Cocaine smuggled into PR is often stored locally until transportation to the 
continental US can be arranged. Cocaine leaves PR via maritime bulk freighters and on 
commercial airlines, either in the possession of couriers or concealed in cargo. 
Traffickers also use commercial maritime containers to smuggle metric-ton quantities 
of cocaine, but more often hide drugs among legitimate cargo in maritime containers, a 
fraction of which are inspected. Analysis of commercial maritime seizure data for 2004 
through 2009 indicates that cocaine and marijuana are most often smuggled in 
commercial maritime vessels from Caribbean locations. The main drug smuggled is 
cocaine, although smaller amounts of heroin and MDMA (3, 4-
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as “ecstasy”) are also smuggled, 
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sometimes together with shipments of cocaine. Seizure totals and routes have remained 
relatively constant over the past few years, and the use of commercial maritime 
containers is far more common in the Caribbean than at other entry points (NDIC 
National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010). The amount of cocaine seized by Puerto 
Rican law enforcement officials almost tripled from 1,544 kilograms in 2006 to 4,414 
kilograms in 2007 (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008). 
 In recent years, Mexican drug trafficking organisations have expanded their 
operations throughout the US, including the Caribbean and Florida area, and so have, to 
some extent, taken over from Colombian organisations which were previously 
dominant in the area. However, Colombian drug trafficking organisations are still an 
active presence in drug smuggling through PR. In addition, although the Central-
America/Mexico route is now far more popular, Venezuela has become a major transit 
point for drug flights through the Caribbean, since US counter narcotics cooperation 
with Venezuela has diminished since 2005. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, the Bahamas 
continue to serve as a major transit country for both Jamaican marijuana and South 
American cocaine points (NDIC National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010).  
 Dominican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are the main transporters of 
drugs into and through PR and the US Virgin Islands (USVI); they operate extensive 
transportation networks, often using the Netherlands Antilles, other Dutch territories, 
and Hispaniola as staging areas. Dominican organisations often work closely with 
Puerto Rican organisations and sometimes include Puerto Ricans in their organizations. 
Puerto Rican organisations, though, are the primary retail drug distributors in PR. They 
also coordinate drug shipments on behalf of Colombian drug traffickers to the 
continental US and other areas. Puerto Rican drug trafficking organisations also 
maintain extended distribution cells in the continental US (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug 
Market Analysis, 2008). 
 PR is a major transhipment point for Colombian heroin destined for the 
northeastern US, principally New York City. Heroin is also smuggled into PR by 
commercial air couriers and cruise ship passengers. The couriers often conceal heroin 
internally, in luggage, or underneath clothes. Airports in PR are principal entry points 
for marijuana shipments. Marijuana is often seized in 1- and 15-kilogram-size 
packages, and is typically concealed inside checked suitcases or hand-carried items. 
However, the use of cruise passengers appears to have declined in popularity since 
2006 (NDIC National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010). Traffickers have been known to 
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route large quantities of marijuana, often with cocaine, from Mexican and Colombian 
sources through the Eastern Caribbean and PR, to destinations in Florida and along the 
US east coast. Some small-scale marijuana production also occurs in PR. 
 Like many other Caribbean islands, traffickers have begun to use PR as an 
alternate transhipment location for European MDMA destined for the US. However, 
PR is not yet believed to be a major MDMA transhipment location. Couriers transport 
small amounts of MDMA from the Netherlands to PR, sometimes via the DR, and 
likely via other Caribbean Islands, as well. Some MDMA remains in PR for local 
consumption. 
 Most of the cocaine transported through PR is intended for the continental US 
and other areas such as Europe, but a sizable amount is set aside for local distribution. 
Cocaine, crack, heroin, and marijuana are readily available in PR, and prices vary 
throughout the island. The DEA’s Caribbean Field Division has noted temporary 
increases in drug prices in PR due to the disruption of trafficker activities during 
regional law enforcement surge operations. Heroin and marijuana are the most widely 
abused illicit drugs in PR, but cocaine, pharmaceutical drugs, and other dangerous 
drugs are also commonly abused. Heroin is the primary drug identified in drug-related 
treatment admissions to publicly funded facilities in PR, accounting for 85 percent of 
all admissions in the commonwealth in 2006 (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 
2008). Marijuana is one of the most commonly abused illicit drugs in PR. The climate 
is not conducive to large scale marijuana growing, but it is widely grown in the USVI, 
and it is being grown indoors in some gated communities in PR (PR/USVI HIDTA 
Drug Market Analysis, 2008). 
 Due to its well-developed financial infrastructure and US connection, PR is an 
important centre for money laundering in the Caribbean. Drug money also enters the 
DR from PR through currency exchange houses (“casas de cambio” or “remesadoras”). 
Cells of drug-trafficking organisations that launder money in PR use a number of 
methods, ranging from financial institutions, money remitters, bulk cash smuggling, 
shell corporations and other means, such as the Colombian Black Market Peso 
Exchange (BMPE). Bulk currency moves from the continental US through PR on its 
way to Latin America. Electronic wire transfers, on the other hand, are being used less 
because the USA PATRIOT Act allows for greater scrutiny of these transfers. Asset 
substitution has become another important method used, which involves legitimate or 
semi-legitimate party purchases of used cars or boats from the continental US and then 
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resale to drug traffickers in cash at inflated prices (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market 
Analysis, 2008). 
Dominican Republ ic  
 Explored and claimed by Columbus on his first voyage in 1492, the island of 
Hispaniola became a springboard for Spanish conquest of the Caribbean and the 
American mainland. In 1697, Spain recognised French dominion over the western third 
of the island, which in 1804 became Haiti. The remainder of the island, known by then 
as Santo Domingo, sought to gain its own independence in 1821, but was conquered 
and ruled by the Haitians for 22 years; it finally attained independence as the DR in 
1844. A legacy of unsettled, mostly non-representative, rule for much of its subsequent 
history was brought to an end in 1966, when Joaquin Balaguer became president. He 
maintained a tight grip on power for most of the next 30 years, when international 
reaction to flawed elections forced him to curtail his term in 1996. Since then, regular 
competitive elections have been held in which opposition candidates have won the 
presidency. The Dominican economy has had one of the fastest growth rates in the 
hemisphere over the past decade.  
 The DR serves as a drug trafficking command and control centre, as well as an 
important transhipment point. Dominican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have 
become more and more influential in the 21st century, aided by a shift in using Mexican 
versus Colombian suppliers. This diversification of suppliers has allowed Dominican 
DTOs to expand their operations, bring down costs, and increase profit margins (NDIC 
National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010). Dominican nationals have become major 
players in the drug transportation business throughout PR and the Northeastern 
Caribbean, as well as the Eastern/Mid-Atlantic US. Dominican organizations facilitate 
transportation for most of the smuggling ventures that occur within the Eastern 
Caribbean. The DR has also become a safe haven for an ever-increasing number of 
Dominican nationals who are criminal fugitives from the US.  
 The DR is an important transhipment point for illicit drugs smuggled from 
South America and destined for the US (DEA, 2003). Cocaine is the principal drug 
smuggled through the DR; however, heroin transhipment through the country is 
increasing. As detailed above, cocaine moving through the DR is more likely to come 
from Mexico than Colombia. Drugs are smuggled into the DR via maritime vessels, 
airdrops, couriers, and overland via Haiti. Once the drugs are in the DR, traffickers 
often smuggle them in small maritime vessels to PR for transhipment into the US. One 
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of the primary methods for smuggling cocaine into the DR involves go-fast vessels that 
arrive at remote areas along the Southwest or Southeast Coast of the DR. Dominican 
crews in wooden yola–type vessels sometimes take the drug hand-off close to the 
shoreline. The majority of these originate in the Maracaibo area of Venezuela and the 
Colombian Guajira Peninsula (INSCR Country Report, 2010). Although the quantity is 
difficult to assess, it is likely drug traffickers also transport large amounts of cocaine 
overland from Haiti. Other methods used by traffickers include airdrops via general 
aviation aircraft, commercial vessels for transfers to go-fast boats or yolas, concealment 
in legitimate cargo, and the use of couriers aboard commercial flights originating in 
Venezuela, Colombia, or Panama. Multi-hundred-kilogram amounts of cocaine are 
occasionally shipped from the DR to the US via maritime containerised cargo. 
According to recent estimates, 7% of the cocaine directed towards the US transits 
Hispaniola (INSCR Country Report, 2010). 
 In recent years, heroin smuggling through the DR has increased, and, as with 
cocaine, Dominican groups have increased their operations across the US In July 2007, 
the head of a Dominican DTO was arrested; the DTO head controlled shipped heroin 
and cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela to the DR and then on to the US, 
Canada, and Europe using young Dominican female couriers. The couriers generally 
concealed between 3-8 kilograms of cocaine or 1-3 kilograms of heroin in their luggage 
per trip (New York/New Jersey HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, June 2008). 
 Since mid-1999, DEA and other law enforcement agencies have reported 
increased MDMA trafficking through the Caribbean. This information also has 
revealed the important role of Dominican trafficking groups. The Dominicans played a 
relatively limited role in international MDMA trafficking until early 2002, when 
European offices began reporting a sharp increase in the number of Dominican 
trafficking groups operating in Europe and the use of couriers on commercial air flights 
to the US. These groups, consisting of at least eight major Dominican sources of supply 
in the Netherlands, are smuggling MDMA from the Netherlands, through Germany and 
other European countries, to major cities on the US East Coast. Investigations have 
identified 160 couriers arrested worldwide and the seizure of over 2 million tablets of 
MDMA in 2002 (DEA, 2003). Cannabis is also grown in the DR, largely for local 
consumption. A raid in 2009 on a marijuana plantation destroyed ten thousand plants 
with a value of approximately $5 million (INSCR Country Report, 2010). 
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 Most of the drug money entering the DR from the US and PR passes through 
casas de cambio or remesadoras (DEA, 2003). These money exchange businesses 
facilitate the movement of money by Dominicans between the US, PR, and the DR. 
They are attractive to drug traffickers because of their large numbers throughout each 
region, their flexibility in transferring large amounts of currency, and their disregard for 
US reporting requirements. The fact that they are used by thousands of legitimate 
companies and individuals is incentive enough for drug traffickers to use these 
businesses for their illicit activities, as they provide a legitimate cover to conduct drug-
related financial transactions. In 2002, the government of the Dominican Republic 
promulgated new money laundering legislations to address this problem more 
effectively. Following the collapse of BANINTER, the third-largest Dominican bank, 
the Dominican government struggled to implement anti-money laundering legislation 
passed in 2002. The government of the DR is a member of the Caribbean Financial 
Action Task Force (CFATF3) and the Egmont Group.4 
 The Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas (National Directorate for Drug 
Control-DNCD) is the lead agency for combating drug trafficking and drug-related 
money laundering in the DR. The DNCD is made up of personnel from the National 
Police, the armed forces, and the National Department of Investigations. The 
Dominican Navy also participates in maritime drug interdiction.  
 The government of the DR has signed the major international anti-drug 
agreements, including those at the 1961 and 1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances5 and the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. Also, the government of the DR is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  Caribbean	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (CFATF)	  is	  a	  regional	  body	  developed	  to	  advance	  anti-­‐money	  
laundering	  initiatives	  within	  the	  Caribbean.	  Its	  25	  members	  include	  Anguilla,	  Antigua	  and	  Barbuda,	  Aruba,	  the	  
Bahamas,	  Barbados,	  Belize,	  Bermuda,	  the	  British	  Virgin	  Islands,	  the	  Cayman	  Islands,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Dominica,	  the	  
Dominican	  Republic,	  Grenada,	  Jamaica,	  Montserrat,	  the	  Netherlands	  Antilles,	  Nicaragua,	  Panama,	  St.	  Kitts	  and	  
Nevis,	  St.	  Lucia,	  St.	  Vincent	  and	  the	  Grenadines,	  Suriname,	  Turks	  and	  Caicos,	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago,	  and	  Venezuela.	  	  
4	  The	  Egmont	  Group,	  created	  in	  1995,	  is	  an	  international	  group	  of	  Financial	  Investigative	  Units	  (FIU)	  that	  meet	  
annually	  about	  financial	  crimes.	  According	  to	  the	  Egmont	  Group,	  FIUs	  are	  centralised	  agencies	  that,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  
receive,	  analyze,	  and	  disclose	  to	  competent	  authorities	  information	  provided	  by	  financial	  institutions	  (and	  other	  
mandated	  entities)	  concerning	  possible	  money	  laundering	  and	  other	  financial	  crimes.	  
5	  The	  1961	  U.N.	  Convention	  codified	  internationally	  applicable	  control	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  availability	  
of	  drugs	  and	  psychotropic	  substances	  for	  medical	  and	  scientific	  purposes,	  and	  to	  prevent	  their	  diversion	  into	  illicit	  
channels.	  It	  also	  included	  general	  provisions	  on	  illicit	  trafficking	  and	  drug	  abuse.	  The	  1971	  U.N.	  Convention	  
established	  an	  international	  control	  system	  for	  psychotropic	  substances.	  The	  Convention	  was	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
diversification	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  spectrum	  of	  drugs	  of	  abuse,	  and	  it	  introduced	  controls	  over	  a	  number	  of	  
synthetic	  drugs.	  The	  1988	  U.N.	  Convention	  established	  comprehensive	  measures	  against	  drug	  trafficking,	  including	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party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.6 The US government and 
the government of the DR have had a bilateral extradition treaty since 1909. In 1998, 
the government of the DR enacted legislation allowing the extradition of Dominican 
nationals. In 2005, judicial review was added to the procedure for extradition, making 
extradition procedures more transparent. The Government of DR GODR extradited a 
total of 24 Dominicans in 2009 (18 to the US), and deported 17 US and third-country 
national fugitives to the US to face prosecution; 22 of the 41 extraditions/deportations 
were narcotics-related. In addition, the US extradited one fugitive to the DR, an 
accused murderer of a Dominican police officer (INSCR Country Report, 2010). The 
government of the DR does not have a formal Mutual Legal Assistant Treaty (MLAT) 
with the government of the US, but it generally cooperates with US Government 
agencies in counter-drug and fugitive cases.7 
 During the first 11 months of 2009, Dominican authorities seized approximately 
4.4 metric tons of cocaine, 1.4010 metric tons of marijuana, 39 kilograms of heroin, 
10,166 tablets of Ecstasy, and 1.3 million tablets of pseudoephedrine. During Operation 
Firewall (a comprehensive law enforcement operation targeting criminal organizations 
involved in the smuggling of large quantities of US currency.), US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Dominican Customs confiscated $608,400 in US 
currency (INSCR Country Report, 2010). 
 The GODR cooperates with US government agencies, including the DEA, FBI, 
US Customs Service, and US Marshals Service on counter-narcotics and fugitive 
matters. The DNCD housed and manned the DEA-sponsored Caribbean Centre for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
provisions	  against	  money	  laundering	  and	  the	  diversion	  of	  chemicals	  used	  in	  illegal	  drug	  production.	  It	  helped	  
establish	  international	  cooperation	  regarding	  the	  extradition	  of	  drug	  traffickers,	  controlled	  deliveries,	  and	  the	  
transfer	  of	  case	  proceedings.	  
6	  The	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  against	  Corruption	  requires	  signatory	  countries	  to	  criminalise	  solicitation	  or	  
acceptance	  of	  bribes	  and	  other	  corrupt	  acts,	  and	  to	  eliminate	  bank	  secrecy	  or	  political	  grounds	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  refusal	  
to	  cooperate	  in	  criminal	  investigations.	  Signatories	  also	  are	  encouraged	  to	  take	  important	  preventative	  measures	  
to	  reduce	  their	  vulnerability	  to	  corruption.	  The	  Convention	  is	  limited	  to	  members	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Drug	  Abuse	  
Commission	  (CICAD).	  CICAD	  Caribbean	  member	  states	  include:	  Antigua	  and	  Barbuda,	  The	  Bahamas,	  Barbados,	  
Dominica,	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Grenada,	  Guyana,	  Haiti,	  Jamaica,	  St.	  Kitts	  and	  Nevis,	  St.	  Lucia,	  St.	  Vincent	  and	  
the	  Grenadines,	  Suriname,	  and	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago.	  
7	  Mutual	  Legal	  Assistance	  Treaties	  (MLAT)	  allow	  generally	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  evidence	  and	  information	  in	  criminal	  
investigations.	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Drug Information (CDI) at its facilities in Santo Domingo. An increasing number of 
Caribbean countries have found the CDI's intelligence analysis services useful and are 
now frequent contributors of new information. The Dominican Navy received six 
renovated patrol craft and two newly constructed 115-foot patrol ships, supplied under 
a US $25 million commercial contract with a US company. Plans were also made to 
incorporate these vessels into multilateral counter-narcotics and anti-migration patrol 
activities.  
 Dominican institutions remain vulnerable to influence by interest groups or 
individuals with money to spend, including narcotics traffickers. Corruption in the DR 
is endemic, with numerous law enforcement and military officials, many of high rank, 
being implicated in corrupt activities, including trafficking in narcotics and money 
laundering. Entire police units have been under investigation and have been removed 
from duty for suspected drug trafficking activities. 
 In 2009, the GODR attempted to reduce the influence of narcotics traffickers in 
the judicial system by focusing on internal affairs and changing the venue of judicial 
proceedings when necessary. The Dominican National Police (DNP) Internal Affairs 
office (IA) was restructured in 2009 and conducted approximately 70-90 internal 
investigations monthly against police personnel engaged in improper conduct (INSCR 
Country Report, 2010). The GODR is a party to the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption, and in 2001 signed the consensus agreement on establishing a 
mechanism to evaluate compliance with the Convention.  
 Currently, cocaine and heroin trafficking, money laundering, institutional 
corruption, and reform of the judicial system remain the US’ primary counter narcotics 
concerns in the DR. The US government and the government of the DR cooperate to 
develop Dominican institutions that can interdict and seize narcotics shipments and 
conduct effective investigations leading to arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.  
 The US has continued to provide assistance and cooperate with the DR on drug 
interdiction. For instance, during 2009, the Department of State’s Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provided equipment and 
training to maintain the drug and explosive detection canine units, support the vetted 
Sensitive Investigation Unit and Tactical Response Team, expand computer training, 
database expansion and systems maintenance support, improve the DNCD’s capability 
to detect drugs smuggled through airports, and enhance the DR’s anti-money 
laundering capacity. US Customs and Border Protection conducted two international 
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interdiction training seminars on airport and seaport cargo for the DNP, DNCD, and 
Dominican Republic Customs Authorities (Direccion General de Aduanas-DGA ).  
 The United States Coast Guard (USCG) participated in joint counter narcotics 
and illegal migrant operations, including the use of mobile biometrics to identify and 
prosecute criminals transiting the Mona Passage between the DR and PR. In addition, 
the US Coast Guard held three subject-matter expert exchange conferences for the 
benefit of the Dominican Navy, as well as providing maritime law enforcement, 
leadership, engineering and maintenance, port security, and command and control 
training to the Dominican Navy. The Law Enforcement Development Program, 
implemented by the Embassy’s, National Academy of Sciences (NAS), assisted the 
DNP with reforms aimed at completing its transformation into a professional, civilian-
oriented organization. Since the program was initiated in 2006, over 9,000 police 
investigators and prosecutors have undergone training in basic crime scene 
investigation. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) also provided 
assistance to strengthen the DR’s justice system, with a particular focus on effective 
implementation of the Criminal Procedures Code to ensure proper acquisition, storage, 
and handling of evidence and adherence to reasonable time limits for prosecuting cases 
(INSCR Country Report, 2010). 
1.6 Summary of Chapter One 
The challenges and approaches to TNP, the nature and trends in TN crime, the 
emergence of TNP, and approaches to TNP were discussed with the aim of setting a 
context to TNP in PR and DR. The nature and trends in TN crimes focuses on different 
structure, strength, size and range and in the diversity of illegal activities. The 
emergence of TNP then centred on the important mind set of the one-size fits all and 
West knows best mentalities. Western criminal law enforcement has stretched globally 
but traditionally denied the possibility of differences. It is only by examining TNP in a 
historical context that the challenges can be highlighted fully.  Therefore, exploring and 
building on the research of democratic versus transitional societies by academics in a 
historical context is critical to finding solutions that are holistic and inclusive to all 
cultures for TNP to truly be efficient. Next, the approaches to TNP were considered by 
looking at different law enforcement agencies and what their individual roles and 
responsibilities entailed. Generally it was found that there are individual networks, 
NGO’s, governments and private corporations.  
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Next the implementation of transnational policing in PR and the DR were 
introduced to better understand the local challenges and cultural contexts. PR was 
found important because of its commonwealth status, US Federal laws and unique 
geographical location. Mainly go fast boast and small vessels from DR (known locally 
as Yolas) carry the cocaine from St. Martens and the Virgin Islands. The drugs are 
stored locally until transportation to the US can be arranged.PR is also an important 
location for transhipment for MDMA from Europe. It was also geographically an 
important centre for money laundering because of its well-developed financial 
infrastructure. DR drug money is laundered through casas de cambios, money exchange 
offices in both the DR and PR. The DR was found to be more influential to Mexican 
cocaine as opposed to Columbian cocaine. 
The uniqueness of PR and the DR discussed here was clearly seen as an 
essential key factor to understand the local context and steps needed to improve 
cooperation. Overall, this chapter on the challenges and approaches taken in PR and 
DR was found to be crucial in appreciating the context and ways forward towards 
understanding better cooperation. 
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Chapter Two 
Cooperation And Its Role In Transnational Policing 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter Two 
The following chapter seeks to provide a theoretical perspective on TNPC. It 
first explores elements and potential impact of cooperation and the role of these facets 
in TNP. Examining elements such as teamwork, networking, communication, 
competition, capacity building, leadership, and trust will help provide an improved 
understanding of how cooperation exists in the TNP community. This theoretical 
approach remains open to a range of topics and perspectives that have not been covered 
in such depth at the time of writing. Forms of cooperation in TNP, such as intelligence- 
sharing, joint operations, and shared training are then investigated, as is the DEA’s 
Regional Information Sharing Centres’ (RISC) attempt at TNPC. This is followed by 
an overview of the HIDTA program, which is the largest cooperative “umbrella-
agency” in the Caribbean region. Finally, the methods and theories currently prevalent 
in the field of social psychology, as these relate to barriers to and facilitators of TNPC 
in PR and the DR, are examined in detail.  
2.2 Cooperation: Elements and Impact 
 Cooperation within organizations has become a much-debated topic since the 
1970s, as it has become increasingly clear that the most effective organizations are 
those in which all members work together to achieve their aims, rather than working 
separately. While much of the research pertains to business situations, the concept is 
also true of public services such as policing. Indeed, it is of particular relevance in the 
context of fighting crime, where the need for shared intelligence often becomes 
essential (Anderson, 1989) and trust becomes a major factor (Curral, 1995) as without 
it working as a team becomes very difficult, if not impossible. When extended to 
transnational policing, cooperation becomes of primary importance. As De Cremer and 
Van Knippenberg (2002) point out, cooperation is essential when there is outcome 
interdependence – when the outcomes rely on many people doing their parts well. This 
has never been truer of policing than it is today. Cooperation in organisations relies on 
a range of interactions, including teamwork, networking, communication, leadership, 
and capacity building. All these involve a degree of trust (Curral, 1995). Something 
else that these aspects share in common is that cooperation inherently involves risk, as 
36	  
	  
individuals carry out tasks, share information, and give up their time and efforts to aid 
others for the greater good of the group. Curral talks about trust as being a measure of 
dependence on another under conditions of risk, and it is extremely applicable to 
policing. The following paragraph will go on to expound on the idea of trust as it 
applies here.  
2.2.1 Trust.  Largely due to the risks inherent in all types of cooperation, 
effective cooperation relies very heavily on one element of interpersonal relationships: 
trust. Trust has, in recent years, become a focal point of much of the research into 
organisational behaviour and cooperation (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Anderson’s (1989; 1997) study emphasised the 
need for trust in any truly cooperative relationship. In his 1997 work, Anderson (1997) 
wrote: 
Whether the external frontier can be effectively managed and policed depends 
on how closely national authorities cooperate with one another, which, in turn, 
requires a high degree of mutual trust in police, administrative and judicial 
authorities of other member states. (p.184) 
Trust has been defined in various ways in the existing literature on the subject. 
However, the most cited and most commonly used definition is Schoorman, Mayer, and 
Davis’s (2007) understanding of trust as the “willingness to take risks for another 
person or at the hands of another person” (p. 346). Risk features prominently in many 
definitions of trust (Gambetta, 1988; Luhman, 1979; Zand, 1972) as, without risk, trust 
becomes irrelevant. Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that high levels of trust led to 
increased cooperation and increased commitment to organisations as well as reducing 
conflict within it and the tendency to leave it. Much of the literature on risk, trust, and 
cooperation discusses these issues of cooperation as they apply to a business 
environment (Gambetta, 1988; Luhman, 1979; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007; 
Zand, 1972). However, one might say that cooperation in a TNP environment involves 
even more risk as lives, as well as large sums of money and the rule of law, may be at 
risk. As such, the importance of trust becomes even more central as the perceived or 
actual risk can be even higher for those involved.  
 Trust can be further affected—both in a negative and positive way—by 
cognitive factors, such as a careful assessment of the qualities of other individuals, as 
well as by emotional or affective factors, such as positive feelings toward others. Trust 
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consists of a complex interaction of factors (Kramer, 1999). Schoorman, Mayer, & 
Davis (2007) suggest that, of the cognitive factors involved, the main aspects are an 
assessment of the other person's ability, integrity, and benevolence. For instance, in 
order for trust to be built, it is essential for one party to believe that the other has the 
ability to deliver effectively on promises. Incompetence, for example, erodes trust. 
Integrity is also a key component - the belief that the other party will stand by 
agreements made. Ability and integrity are quickly assessed during interactions and 
relationships, while benevolence (the belief that another party has one's best interests in 
mind) takes longer to build (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Anderson (1997) 
writes of the importance of trust in the context of the way in which the legal system 
operates. Indeed, if the government, police force, or other agency of one’s country has 
faith in the legal system and the values that one is dealing with, they are more likely to 
be cooperative. Glaeser (2000) writes that trust is often established using previous 
behaviour as a benchmark. Depending on the situation, this could make it more or less 
difficult to gain trust.  
 While some researchers’ writing about trust believe trust and distrust are at two 
ends of a continuum, Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) point out that trust and 
distrust can coexist; you might trust a person to do one thing but not another. This is 
where Glaeser’s (2000) understanding of previous experience may come in, as someone 
(or indeed an entire organisation) may have proved trustworthy under a particular set of 
circumstances but not under others. Interestingly, Dietz and Hertog (2006) discuss the 
idea that one’s own inclination to trust is actually a more accurate predictor of his or 
her behaviour than is the estimation of another’s trustworthiness. These authors also 
discuss the decision to trust as dependent on a complicated matrix of factors. Some of 
these are inevitably connected to the behaviours of the “trustee” (in this case, Dietz and 
Hertog refer to organisations) but urge people to look at external factors as well. The 
authors discuss various “cues” as well as the inability of individuals to process an 
infinite number of cues at one time, leading to a discussion of which cues are most 
important in establishing trustworthiness.  
Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) write about trust as consisting of 
confident positive expectations and distrust as involving confident negative 
expectations. Whether one agrees with their assessment that trust and distrust are 
separate conceptual entities (rather than ends of a spectrum), these researchers’ 
important contribution is the idea that ambivalence is very common and that one can 
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both trust a person and distrust them at the same time, depending on the situation that 
one is in at the time. For example, a law enforcement officer might trust a colleague to 
be above corruption and not to leak information to criminal networks but may not trust 
that same individual to file a report on time. The fact that trust and distrust coexist 
within relationships leads to the possibility of risking some elements of cooperation on 
trust while building in controls to reduce risk in other areas. This could involve, for 
example, encouraging the sharing of information between agents as much as possible 
and appropriate while continuing to install strong security measures on shared 
databases in order to record and monitor access to information in case trust is ever 
abused. These controls and checks involve institutionalised distrust (Luhmann, 1979), 
which can actually allow interpersonal trust to flourish.. Depersonalising distrust means 
that cooperation can continue but that safeguards are in place to reduce some of the 
risk.  
 It is possible, therefore, to achieve a healthy balance between trust and distrust 
when it comes to monitoring and controlling; in fact, Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis 
(2007) suggest that, when risk is high, control systems such as transparency may help 
to bridge the gap between trust and risk by allowing individuals to take greater risks 
based on assurance on the control system. However, too much control may also 
undermine trust in the long term, since cooperation will not be seen as evidence of 
trustworthiness, but rather as an effect of the control system (Schoorman, Mayer, & 
Davis, 2007, p. 348). Similarly, Kramer (1999) points out that some technologies that 
are intended to raise standards or improve cooperation can actually be 
counterproductive by undermining trust, either because they reduce intrinsic motivation 
to be trustworthy or because they reduce personal interaction between team members, 
managers, and staff.  
 Moving beyond the cognitive and emotional aspects of trust, Schoorman, 
Mayer, & Davis (2007) emphasise the importance of understanding trust in a cultural 
context rather than as a constant concept across cultures. For instance, they propose that 
a proclivity to trust others may be affected by the type of culture in which an individual 
is raised, as well as by one’s personal psychological makeup and life experiences. 
Similarly, 'task-oriented' cultures tend to trust and cooperate more readily on individual 
tasks than do 'relationship-oriented' cultures, in which people often take longer to build 
trust. This is an important aspect to consider with regard to TNP, and works to further 
reinforces the importance of avoiding the imposition of a US-centric TNP model on 
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cultures in which the natural proclivity to cooperation/trust may stem from different 
factors and may play out differently in day-to-day activities and decisions (Schoorman, 
Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Knack and Zak (2001) discuss the vast differences in trust 
across cultures. The authors discuss the idea of trust playing out between principals and 
agents (this can encapsulate a range of relationships, such as those between employer 
and employee, investor and investee, etc.), where the principal puts oneself at risk when 
interacting with the agent. They found cheating (breaches of trust) to be more likely 
when the social distances between agents were larger, any social sanctions in place to 
try to avoid this are not useful, the amount invested is higher, and investors’ wages are 
lower. These factors may work to explain differences, at least from one perspective, in 
how trust works across cultures. 
Trust issues related to race also exist, overlapping with issues of trust between 
cultures. Anderson (2000) considers the impact that such differences can have on trust; 
this is applicable not only to intrinsic differences but also perceived differences, and the 
author notes that, for example, European Nationalists tend to distrust non-white people 
because of the vast differences in behaviour and attitude but also because there is a 
feeling that the two groups might have very different loyalties. This is a particularly 
significant issue in TNP, terms where colonial roots and histories can factor in . 
 Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007) further suggest that, culturally, more 
competitive “masculine” cultures may place a higher value on one’s ability as a factor 
in trust. This may be relevant to not only the development of trust in Latin American 
cultures, for example, but also specifically to the internal macho 'cop culture' which 
often exists within the field of law enforcement. If law enforcement officers put a high 
value on ability and are more likely to trust co-workers who have proven themselves to 
be able and competent, it may be possible to channel this natural inclination and 
capitalising on it through team-building and networking exercises in order to speed up 
the development of trust. 
Trust is typically considered an integral element in facilitating and encouraging 
cooperation between agencies, organisations, and governments; many factors have been 
cited as crucial in the fostering or, conversely, the hampering of the development of 
trust in this context. It is also interesting to note the role of trust in gaining information 
from individuals who are directly involved in highly integrated criminal organisations 
(Kaiser & Starie, 2005). In order to gain information and intelligence, someone must 
gain the trust of an informant, and it is highly unlikely that someone from another 
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country can obtain this level of trust. Trust is an integral aspect throughout the process 
of TNP and is integral within TNP organisations.  
2.2.2 Teamwork.  Teamwork is increasingly seen as an essential aspect of 
organisational functioning, both in the business world and fields such as policing. As 
such, the need for trust in team working has become increasingly relevant. Jones and 
George's (1998) study of trust in team working frames discuss two varieties of trust: 
conditional and unconditional. They use a psychological framework based on values, 
attitudes, moods, and emotions to explain how people experience trust in an 
organisation and how it affects teamwork, incorporating an emotional as well as 
cognitive understanding of trust. 
Levin, Cross, and Abrams (2004), in their research on knowledge transfer and 
trust in an organisational setting, found that strong ties had a positive effect on receipt 
of knowledge between two parties—it impacted trust based both on competence and on 
benevolence. Additionally, there was also some evidence that, in the workplace, people 
gain useful knowledge from what these authors referred to as “trusted weak ties” (p. 5).  
Weak, in this context, refers to a tie that is characterised by distance and/or by 
infrequent interaction. The authors suggest that organisations could benefit from 
building trusted weaker ties, also adding that these are not only sometimes as useful as 
strong ties but are also easier to maintain. 
 What is known as conditional trust involves calculating returns when 
cooperating; for instance agreeing to help someone because this individual helped you 
yesterday or will help you tomorrow. While this is a perfectly acceptable form of 
cooperation for some situations e.g. when dealing with contacts from other departments 
with whom one rarely works.  When people need to work together as a team on a day-
to-day basis, however, the most effective form of cooperation is most likely to arise 
when unconditional trust is present. When unconditional trust exists, people identify 
with the group and grow to consider each other colleagues and friends instead of just 
co-workers. Positive affective states reinforce a feeling of belonging to the group, and 
members of the team develop shared values and positive attitudes toward one another. 
This translates into more willingness to take risks and make self-sacrificing efforts for 
the good of the group and in order to advance shared goals.  
 Under conditions of unconditional trust, people define their roles broadly, as 
they are willing to carry out whatever tasks are necessary to reach their team's goals, 
whereas in situations of conditional trust people are less likely to 'go the extra mile', 
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though they may cooperate with each other to some extent. In team-working situations, 
it is important that people seek help whenever they need it, as this additional 
cooperation often increases efficiency. However, if only conditional trust exists within 
an organisation, people will be less likely to be willing to seek help voluntarily, as they 
do not want to appear weak or to become indebted to another person. Within teams 
where unconditional trust is present, this concern drops away, allowing the team to 
become more efficient (Jones & George, 1998). 
Abrams, Cross, Lesser, and Levin (2003) write about informal networks as 
being the primary way many employees gain information. They write about the impact 
of tie strength on the way individuals in organisations gain knowledge. While people 
typically gain information from strong ties, there is also significant information to be 
gained from weaker ties when the dimension of trust is held constant. This study 
controlled for the effect of trust in order to explore the impact of weak ties, exploring 
the effects of benevolence and competence. The study suggests that organisations 
would benefit from a bolstering of its weaker ties (which are also less difficult to 
maintain, as a general rule). The idea is that this can facilitate smooth transfer of 
knowledge within an organisation. 
 Teamwork is an important and, some would say, necessary element of TNPC. 
The very concept of TNPC might be viewed as different organisations working as a 
team. Reichel (2002) states, ‘…transnational crimes...beg for a cooperative 
international response. Multinational collaboration is occurring, but the needed action 
requires a level of teamwork that countries of the world are only beginning to 
understand’ (p.5). Successful teamwork rests on trust and, as discussed above, useful 
transfer of knowledge between individuals within and between organisations. 
2.2.3 Networking.  Networks are an increasingly important part of social and 
organisational life, particularly as many organisations are shifting from rigid 
hierarchical structures to more level structures organised around teamwork. The social 
capital and trust engendered through networks allow greater capabilities and 
information sharing amongst members of networks. For instance, through “friends of 
friends” and weak links in the network, relationships that are not close (but may still 
prove useful, as described above) can be utilised as trust can often be created by 
belonging to the same network. This concept of “loose ties” or, as explained above, 
“weak ties” (Levin et al., 2004) is an important one, as these are the links across a lot of 
useful information can be shared (Granovetter, 1973). Within tight-knit networks, 
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information may already be fully shared (e.g. within a close-knit team of agents 
working together on a case or on similar cases). The most useful connections tend to 
exist between members of that team (“nodes” in that network) as well as with agents in 
other teams, perhaps covering different jurisdictions, who may have information or 
capabilities which those within the close-knit network lack and can make use of. When 
two networks are connected by loose ties or weak links, vital information which would 
remain isolated otherwise can be passed between the two groups and then quickly 
disseminated amongst the members of each group. In the context of policing, the ability 
to pick up the phone and ask a question of a contact with whom one does not otherwise 
have any official information-sharing is an essential element in communication and 
cooperation. Similarly, one contact in the right department can smooth over problems 
with sensitive or difficult issues such as deportations, etc. Burt (1992) describes these 
effects in terms of access, timing, and referral benefits.  
2.2.4 Communication.  Communication as an aspect of networking and 
cooperation is essential and, at a time when increased access to communication 
technology means that cooperation and networking can take place between people who 
have never met in person, the question arises of whether effective trust-building 
communication between members of a network requires face-to-face communication. 
Several studies have suggested that electronic or distance communication alone does 
not build the trust required to sustain effective cooperation (Rocco, 1998). However, it 
appears that a limited amount of occasional face-to-face contact can establish enough 
trust to make subsequent electronic cooperation effective. Rocco's 1998 indicated that, 
while cooperation in electronic environments between people who had never met 
tended to fail because of lack of trust, introducing a face-to-face pre-meeting before 
cooperation began dramatically raised the levels of cooperation. This is clearly relevant 
to transnational policing, as geographic distance plays an important role in the 
challenges facing agents working together in different countries. Particularly in the 
Caribbean, where island geography creates an additional obstacle to regular face-to-
face contact, it is important to know that even occasional physical meetings can support 
subsequent cooperation at a distance. This lends support to the reports of officers who 
suggested that they always ensure they personally meet contacts from other 
departments in order to “put a face to a name” and that occasional networking and co-
training events provide useful opportunities to build trust. Bowling (2009) talks about 
the importance of collaboration that is established not only through formal channels, 
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i.e. the cooperation that exists between various formal agencies, but also the 
cooperation that is built through friendships and informal contacts—these are often 
established through training opportunities or similar.  
2.2.5 Capacity building.  Capacity building involves the strengthening of 
organisations and draws on the field of organisational learning and change. Honadle 
(1998) evaluates the definitions of “capacity” and concludes that it involves a range of 
factors, including: having “the ability to anticipate and influence change; make 
informed, intelligent decisions about policy; develop programs to implement policy; 
attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and evaluate current activities to guide 
future action” (p.577). In order to build these capacities effectively, organisations must 
have the capacity to learn from experience. Jones (2001) refers to Revan's theory of 
learning, which claims that organisations need to ensure that their ability to learn from 
experience exceeds the rate of change, as they cannot otherwise remain effective. In 
fact, Kolb and Revan's theories of learning both emphasise learning from experience: 
the learner critically reflects on his or her lived experience, generalises from these 
reflections, and experiments with new behaviours (Jones, 2001). Therefore, effective 
capacity building is an on-going process rather than an end state; it refers to the 
continuing sustainable ability of organisations to be effective.  
2.2.6 Leadership.  Research on leadership has tended to focus on either the 
effects of middle-managers on their immediate subordinates/teams (Yukl, 1994) or, 
conversely, on leaders at higher levels, who strategically lead the business but have less 
day-to-day interaction with staff (Canella & Monroe, 1997). The bulk of the literature 
focuses on trust and emphasises the need for staff to trust their leaders. The implication 
is that leaders who are trusted will be able to encourage cooperation and will be more 
likely to engender willingness to cooperate with each other amongst their subordinates.  
 The field has gradually come to distinguish between transactional leadership 
and transformational leadership, which are sometimes described as two ends of a 
continuum but are more commonly described as two styles of leadership which can 
(and indeed should) coexist (Crossan & Dusya, 2004). Transactional leaders set goals 
and make agreements explicit within their organisation, while transformational 
leadership is charismatic, inspirational, and personally considerate – inspiring others to 
think past their self-interest and to instead work toward the good of the entire 
organisation. Ideally, a model leader will embody elements of both or will be able to 
utilise both of these styles of leadership as circumstances dictate. For instance, in 
44	  
	  
creating organisational change or encouraging cooperation, a transformational-style 
leader would be more successful, whereas the achievement of ambitious targets might 
benefit from transactional-style leadership (Crossan & Dusya, 2004). 
 According to Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007), trust in the dominant 
coalition or management team is critical to understanding organisational trust, as this 
group will determine the strategic actions of the organisation. Recognition, at a 
strategic level, of the importance of cooperation is essential, as otherwise efforts to 
cooperate will necessarily remain patchy and driven by individuals rather than the 
organisation as a whole. A more in-depth description of the ways managers and leaders 
can elicit the trust of their staff is explored by Whitener et al (1998). Starting from the 
assumption that trust involves risk, they suggest that there are broadly five key methods 
that managers can use to build their subordinates' trust: behavioural consistency; 
behavioural integrity; sharing and delegation of control; communication; and 
demonstration of concern. Consistent behaviour allows predictability and, therefore, 
builds trust over time. Behavioural integrity involves matching words and deeds. 
Delegation of control, by allowing employees to be involved in decision-making, 
allows them some control over their circumstances and builds reciprocal trust. 
Communication is critical, and it is essential that managers explain their decisions 
openly; this leads to them being increasingly trusted. Finally, a demonstration of 
concern implies benevolence.  
 Two other elements of employee-manager trust are advanced by De Cremer and 
Van Knippenberg (2002), who suggest that leaders’ abilities to promote procedural 
fairness, as well as their possession of charisma, are two inroads toward promoting 
cooperation. Procedural fairness echoes both the need for predictability and the need 
for communication; if decisions are relatively predictable, well-explained, and not 
arbitrary, employees are more likely to trust them. Managers ought to also abide by 
their decisions in order to promote their own integrity. It seems likely that procedural 
fairness and behavioural integrity in particular would promote cooperation, as a fair and 
reasonable authority overseeing cooperation is likely to reduce the likelihood of 
cooperation-sabotaging behaviours, such as free-riding (Crossan & Dusya, 2004). 
 De Cremer and Van Knippenberg (2002) also suggest that more important than 
promoting cooperation should be promoting “belongingness”, as incentivising can 
reduce the intrinsic motivation to do a job well. In comparison, encouraging employees 
to identify with each other and to work for the good of the team is a more effective 
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strategy, as is reducing the barriers to cooperation (as opposed to creating incentives). 
This is interesting in reference to policing as law enforcement officers generally have 
strong intrinsic motivation already; since the job is dangerous and not necessarily well-
paid compared to other sectors, motivation tends to come more from the desire to 
ensure the safety of society than for personal gain. De Cremer and Van Knippenberg 
(2002) report that, while procedural fairness and charisma were both effective ways of 
managing cooperation, they did not necessarily work well together and actually 
appeared to cancel out other’s effects. As charisma is a rather elusive quality, it seems 
that procedural fairness may be the more reliably effective form of management. 
 In conclusion, trust must be developed and maintained carefully in all 
relationships existing in an organisation, whether between managers and immediate 
subordinates, senior/strategic management and the rest of the organisation, members of 
individual teams and cursory acquaintances, and contacts within the network. 
Cooperation relies on the ability to trust others enough to brave the risks of sharing 
often-sensitive information. In the case of TNP, these risks can be quite high, so trust 
needs to be correspondingly high.  
2.3 Forms of Cooperation in Transnational Policing 
The greater the threat to national security, the greater the role of local policy in the US 
(Clarke, 2006), and the more TNP becomes relevant. Forms of cooperation in TNP can 
be broadly characterised into three areas: sharing of intelligence/information, joint 
operations, and shared training. These three broad forms of cooperation are carried out 
by organisations involved in transnational policing, which range from local 
organisations linked with those abroad to those with a truly global reach. Homeland 
security policy requires cooperation at all levels of government—local, state, and 
federal (Caruson, 2007).  
Intelligence Sharing 
 Sharing of information on criminal activities and organisations is probably the 
most highly developed form of cooperation between policing organisations worldwide. 
This applies also to sharing information across multiple jurisdictions (Caruson, 2007). 
However, there are still major limitations to the amount and type of information that is 
shared, both because of the secrecy built into police culture and because of legal 
constraints. As Aldritch (2004) points out, there are serious contradictions between the 
need to share information in a highly networked world, where criminal operations are 
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global, and the culture of policing in the West, which values the protection of sources 
and consists of highly compartmentalised agencies. Security requires the cooperation of 
many of those compartments (Caruson, 2007), but this does not necessarily always 
come naturally.  
 Within the EU, the establishment of Europol has created a clear central hub for 
information sharing across the region, from constant daily analysis to larger scale 
analysis, such as the European Organised Crime Threat Assessment and the EU 
Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, published annually (Europol, 2010). While 
sharing within the EU is typically relatively smooth, one major problem with 
information sharing outside of regional organisations is that legal constraints based on 
privacy laws can vary drastically. In particular, sharing information on criminal and 
terrorist suspects on a bilateral level between the EU and the US has proved more 
difficult because EU assumptions around privacy are stricter than those allowed for by 
the US (Townsend, 2003).  
 However, as a facilitator of information sharing on a global level, International 
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) plays a similar role to Europol in ensuring 
the smooth sharing of information and facilitating cooperation between national 
agencies. For instance, the secure Interpol search facility I-24/7 offers access to 
virtually all of Interpol's police databases, including those recording lost and stolen 
travel documents, fingerprints, stolen vehicles, and even stolen works of art. Interpol 
also uses notices to alert police worldwide to fugitives, suspected terrorists, and 
criminals, and nominal data on hundreds of thousands of crimes (Interpol, 2010). 
Joint Operations 
 Cooperation through joint operations is also common, though the continuing 
importance of legal jurisdiction in policing means that generally only state officials will 
be able to carry out arrests within that state, and representatives of other states' law 
enforcement agencies must remain in an advisory capacity rather than active. However, 
joint operations can be effective when each national agency focuses on activities 
occurring within their own borders, but it is less common for international or global 
organisations to carry out investigations, due to sovereignty and jurisdictional 
constraints. Europol, for instance, acts only as a support agency for national policing 
agencies, facilitating cooperation, and does not carry out its own investigations within 
member states, or arrest suspects. It does, however, facilitate joint operations between 
member states' agencies, often at internal borders between member states where it is 
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highly advantageous to have both law enforcement presences cooperating closely 
(Europol, 2010).  
Despite the growing need for cooperation and information sharing, there still 
appears to be a gap in how this plays out. Billions of dollars have been spent by the US 
each year in order to prevent terrorism in the wake of 9/11, yet these gaps remain 
(Squires, 2009). Gutierrez (2004) writes that, before 9/11, the national intelligence 
apparatus was highly flaws; these include, according to this author, issues in 
information sharing, conflict between agencies, and autonomous operations. In the 
wake of 9/11, national agencies realised the need for change at all levels.  
Shared Training 
 Training is a highly developed form of transnational cooperation between 
policing organisations. For instance, the five International Law Enforcement 
Academies, founded by President Clinton in 1995 and operating in Budapest, Bangkok, 
Gabarone, Roswell, and San Salvador, train and share knowledge on a range of TNP 
issues, including human trafficking, narcotics, and financial crime. Each Academy is 
designed to provide training that particularly relates to the policing challenges faced in 
that region. Part of the explicit remit of ILEA is to build links between law enforcement 
agencies throughout the world, which reinforces the importance of training as a way of 
building contacts and trust between agents from different countries (ILEA, Budapest, 
2010). In ILEA Budapest, for example, an international visiting faculty, rather than a 
static resident faculty, allows even more diversity and networking.  
 Interpol also has a remit for training and conducts over 140 training courses per 
year, training over 4500 participants from 165 countries. It also runs a number of other 
training programs, including the web-based Interpol Global Learning Centre (Interpol, 
2010). The UN Police Division (UNPD), in addition to patrolling in peacekeeping 
zones throughout the world, provides training and advice to local police, helping to 
maintain the rule of law in conflict-torn areas (United Nations, 2010). 
 In conclusion, there is substantial transnational cooperation occurring across the 
world, both through global or regional organisations geared specifically toward 
facilitating that cooperation, or through agreements and sharing between national 
forces. While it is essential for the success of policing in a world where criminal forces 
are globally connected that that cooperation continues it does raise questions about 
accountability and oversight, particularly on occasions when personal data is being 
passed around the world.  
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2.4 An Attempt at Transnational Police Cooperation: Regional Information 
Sharing Centres  
 The DEA's Regional Information Sharing Centres (RISC) model is based on a 
“practical approach” toward transnational cooperation. For some time now, the DEA 
has recognised the need to adapt in order to face the rapidly emerging challenges 
surrounding crime and globalisation. For example, the southwest region of the US has a 
serious drug trafficking problem and has been designated a “High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area” (Harrison & Kennedy, 1996). This is one area where cooperation and 
sharing information, in order to better understand the bigger picture of what is going on 
in the region, would be useful. The authors found that, in actuality, despite the 
designation, there is little actual data available on drug use in the region and that rates 
of use in the region were similar to those in other parts of the country.  
Given the need to adapt to ever-present challenges, the DEA's Intelligence 
Division has led in codifying and applying the concept of TNP across the world. In 
fact, the DEA's Intelligence Programme lists “strengthening information sharing and 
intelligence coordination along the continuum of transnational policing” as one of its 
five “Strategic Goals and Objectives.” The DEA's approach assumes that, in order for 
law enforcement to be successful, “threats of mutual concern, joint planning, 
information sharing, operational coordination, and maximixation, allocation, and 
utilization of resources against targets of mutual interest” (www.dea.gov) must be 
emphasised. Joint “efforts, such as the International Drug Enforcement Conference 
(IDEC) and…INTERPOL already exist and are quite effective at facilitating 
cooperation and communication…But, as effective as they may be at the regional level 
and intra-regional levels, they lack an essential daily interface” (www.dea.gov) 
necessary for success at an international level and do not include mechanisms capable 
of building a truly worldwide information-sharing network.  
 The DEA has had liaison officers stationed abroad in order to facilitate 
information sharing and support investigations for many years (Brown, 2008). More 
recently, this has been enhanced by the development of bilateral working groups 
designed to focus cooperative efforts further through enhanced information sharing, 
common targeting, and joint investigations. These liaison efforts and joint targeting 
operations are effective to a certain extent, but the results are often too inconsistent, 
erratic, and short-lived.  
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 The DEA sees the creation of both the strategic RISCs and predetermined 
regional cooperative goals and objectives as embracing the TNP concept and taking it 
to the next level. At present, all multilateral international cooperative efforts are devoid 
of a steady information flow to tactical centres. A RISC will serve as the organisational 
nucleus and will provide the operational services required to share targeted information 
throughout a defined region. The DEA intends the RISC model to form a worldwide 
network of regional information warehouses, where the sole purpose of each will be to 
facilitate cooperation between law enforcement agencies across the globe.  
2.5 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Overview 
The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program (HIDTA) was established 
in 1988 and intended to, as stated on the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) website, 'provide assistance to Federal, state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug-trafficking 
regions of the US (ONDCP website, 2012). HIDTA was originally established as a 
means of facilitating cooperation amongst all of the agencies who have a role in 
preventing drug trafficking – ‘Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies’ 
(ONDCP website, 2012). As stated by Gutierrez (2005) and Squires (2009), in post 
9/11 US, people increasingly realised the importance of cooperation between agencies 
and the weight of its absence.  Whether this applies to drug trafficking or the cessation 
of terrorist activities, the import of cooperation remains constant.  
At present, there are 28 HIDTAs, including approximately '16 percent of all 
counties in the US and 60 percent of the US population' (ONDCP website, 2016)  The 
structure is designed to aid cooperation, with the local HIDTA branches being 
controlled by executive boards with an equal number of regional, federal, and non-
federal groups.  Below this, a director and deputy director work control the HIDTA 
taskforces, the people who are involved more directly with the issues as they stand 
within the local environment. Each group has the responsibility to assess the threat of 
drug trafficking in that area, and the jurisdiction to develop appropriate strategies for 
dealing with that threat in that specific area. This is thus an ideal example of TNPC: the 
crime itself is transnational and, in order to attempt to combat it, organisations and 
nations must come together to deal with the problems at their root. HIDTA is indeed a 
program embodying a pragmatic approach to transnational and regional cooperation, 
based on an understanding that the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking 
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organisations requires seamless cooperation between all law enforcement organisations 
and jurisdictions. Its existence stems from the recognition that particular areas of the 
US are subject to highly concentrated levels of drug trafficking which, in turn, have a 
serious impact on other pivotal areas. The intention in creating designated areas is to 
attempt to increase federal assistance to these areas and to focus and coordinate efforts 
between various federal agencies and local forces; the idea is that this will better 
combat the problem. HIDTA’s main goals nationally include disrupting the market for 
illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and money laundering 
organisations (advocating a proactive approach to combating drug crime) and 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives.  
HIDTA’s model implicitly (and indeed explicitly on the ONDCP website) 
recognises that neither of these goals can be achieved without completely seamless and 
practiced cooperation between agencies; its very premise is that they are single 
agencies around which relationships can develop and cooperation can be facilitated in 
this manner. Indeed, arguably one of the most pivotal aspects of HIDTA’s approach is 
co-location and commingling of the different agencies, with the aims of breaking down 
traditional barriers between law enforcement agencies and encouraging enhanced 
information and resource sharing. The principle of incorporating cooperation and 
coordination into every aspect of the organisation’s structure operates at all levels. This 
is where trust, as discussed above, becomes essential. 
 Originally, five areas of the US were designated as a HIDTA in 1990 (Houston, 
Los Angeles, New York/New Jersey, South Florida, and the Southwest Border), with 
PR/USVI and Washington/Baltimore following in 1994. The designation of PR/USVI 
as a HIDTA is due to its attractiveness to drug trafficking organisations based on 
geographic and strategic considerations. As such, HIDTA is a highly appropriate model 
to apply here. The aim is that the PR/USVI HIDTA program will act as a coordinating 
umbrella to eliminate duplicated efforts, maximise resources, and improve information 
and intelligence sharing. To this end, the PR/USVI HIDTA funds taskforces are run by 
different agencies within the region, but these are located within specific HIDTA 
facilities rather than within offices belonging to the lead agency. This co-location of 
agents within taskforces is a fundamental principle of HIDTA’s organisational 
framework and an integral aspect part of its strategy. 
2.5.1 Cooperation and foreign partners.  HIDTA in the Caribbean is intended 
to improve cooperation and coordination, particularly between the different 
51	  
	  
jurisdictions of PR and the US Virgin Islands (USVI), namely St. Thomas, St. Croix, 
St. John, and surrounding smaller islands. With only 14 miles distance between the two 
jurisdictions, there is a substantial need for effective cooperation. While HIDTA is 
generally designed as a regional model to encourage participation between otherwise 
potentially rival agencies, rather than as a truly transnational program to integrate the 
law enforcement efforts of foreign states, the PR/USVI HIDTA has unique features that 
replicate some of the circumstances involved in truly transnational cooperation. By 
2006, the PR/USVI HIDTA had developed relationships with 24 federal and non-
federal agencies, with over 815 state, local, and federal law enforcement and support 
personnel co-located within HIDTA's taskforces. In addition, PR/USVI HIDTA was 
able to refer 17 investigations to other HIDTA regions or other agencies, creating a 
larger web of cooperation extending across the US (Strategy Document, 2006).  
 Based on the success of HIDTA’s model with regard to integrating federal 
agencies with local forces in the PR/USVI region, it does not seem unwarranted to 
suggest that it could make a similar contribution to cooperation on a transnational level. 
The most important principles of HIDTA’s methodology, in relation to smoothly 
combining transnational forces, include the idea that participation in the program is 
entirely voluntary and, even more importantly, that cooperation is conducted with the 
assumption of complete equality between agencies. The emphasis is on equal 
partnerships, allowing all partners involved in taskforces and operations to work 
together on a “level playing field” and promoting a co-equal atmosphere (Strategy 
Document, 2006). This, along with the essential component of co-location of staff, 
could help to reduce territorialism and mistrust between different agencies, facilitating 
the creation of relationships and, therefore, better use of information and resources. 
 The equal sharing of responsibility, involvement, and decision-making capacity 
extends to the highest levels of the organisation, with the executive board made up of 
10 representatives from federal agencies and 10 from local agencies (although the 
distribution of representatives from PR and USVI is not similarly equal, with 16 from 
PR and only four from USVI) This stems from the focus HIDTA places on integrating 
federal and local forces. In the case of a truly transnational HIDTA, there could be 
increased emphasis on ensuring parity of representatives from separate 
countries/jurisdictions rather than from federal/local agencies. 
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2.5.2 Regional agreements and logistics.  On a daily basis, the logistical 
operation of HIDTA focuses on creating effective coordination of law enforcement in 
the region to ensure maximum efficiency in combating drug trafficking organisations in 
PR and the USVI. At the top level of HIDTA, the executive board both embodies the 
principles of cooperation between agencies comprised, as it is, of members across 
participating agencies, and deals with decision-making and top-level coordination of 
the PR/USVI HIDTA program. The role of the board covers both organisational and 
strategic functions. On the strategic side, it identifies drug trafficking organisations to 
be targeted, provides a forum to share crucial trends in drug trafficking, and gathers 
information on which drugs are being distributed throughout the region. However, in 
addition to acting as a forum to discuss strategy and trends, the board allocates 
resources and ensures that operations are prioritised in a manner that guarantees 
cooperation and a joint approach to all investigations (Gutierrez, 2004). Consisting of 
20 members, half drawn from federal agencies and half from local agencies, the 
executive board meets annually to review HIDTA goals and outputs and to assess 
performance. It also operates an Intelligence Subcommittee that advises on issues 
surrounding intelligence, including on technology and training. 
 However, on a day-to-day basis, the Director of HIDTA is responsible for 
dealing with administrative and operational support to the HIDTA taskforces. Acting as 
brokers between the different taskforces/initiatives, the Director and Deputy Director 
facilitate multi-agency cooperation, a crucial role in an organisation where integration 
and coordination are essential elements of daily business. They also support the 
Executive Board with policy development and in carrying out directives, as well as 
managing technology development for the taskforces. Strategically, the Director acts as 
a linking conduit for information between the executive board, the Initiative (taskforce) 
Supervisors, and the ONDCP.  
 Within each taskforce, one agency takes the lead on operational activities, such 
as conducting investigations. The managers and agency supervisors from whichever 
agency is leading supervise the taskforces. Despite the need for one agency to take a 
lead role in each taskforce, the intention remains for all agencies to have equal status 
and to operate on a level playing field, as mentioned above. In order to increase 
communication and coordination between the different taskforces, the supervisors of 
each taskforce initiative, and federal and state prosecutors, meet monthly in PR as part 
of a Case Management Committee. This is separate from the constant intelligence 
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communication and deconfliction (the activity where the ISC track cases, operations, 
and investigations to avoid both the wastage of resources through duplicating 
investigations, and the loss of lives through disastrous clashes of undercover 
operations) that goes back and forth between the taskforces and the ISC. Through the 
committee, the supervisors are able to promote improved information sharing, identify 
ways to share resources when conducting day-to-day operations, and gather 
information on training needs. They also report annually on whether initiatives are 
reaching goals and budgeting efficiently.  
 Individual taskforces within HIDTA fit within one of four areas: investigation, 
interdiction, intelligence and management/administration. Within the investigative area, 
there are several geographically separate taskforces involved in investigating major 
criminal organisations. These include Ponce Major Organisations Investigations (MOI), 
Fajardo MOI, San Juan MOI, St. Croix MOI, and St. Thomas MOI, which are all led by 
the DEA. Other investigative taskforces include the PR Fugitive taskforce (lead by US 
Marshals), the HIDTA Money Laundering Initiative, led by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and the Safe Neighbourhoods Initiative (which focuses on firearms 
use and drug-related violent crime in PR). All of these investigative taskforces attempt 
to disrupt the work of complex drug trafficking organisations at an organisational level, 
ultimately with the aim of dismantling the organisation entirely.  
 In comparison, interdiction-focused taskforces primarily attempt to intercept 
illegal drugs and illegal migrants entering and moving through PR and the USVI. All 
interdiction personnel also have training to identify potential terrorist threats and so 
have the additional remit to be alert to homeland security threats. Interdiction 
taskforces include Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Accion - The United Forces of Fast 
Action (FURA), led by the PR Police Department, which provides (A) interdiction 
forces within the coastline of PR; (B) the Blue Lightening Strike Force (BLSF), led by 
the US Virgin Islands Police Department, carrying out a similar role within USVI 
waters in order to prevent the island being used as a transhipment point; and (C) the 
High Seas Narcotics/Migrant Trafficking Operations, led by the US Coast Guard, 
which addresses narcotics and illegal migrant trafficking, providing 24-hours a day 
coverage of the seas around PR/USVI (Strategy Document, 2006). Within support, two 
taskforces provide services to ensure the on-going smooth running of HIDTA. The 
Management and Coordination Support Initiative (led by contracted civilians) provides 
support to the executive board, director, and taskforces in administrative and logistical 
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matters, including preparing and monitoring budgets and reporting on performance as 
well as providing professional development and implementing policy and procedure. 
Separately, the HIDTA Training Initiative (led by the FBI, and previously by the US 
Coast Guard) provides appropriate training to improve the quality of investigations and 
strengthen local law enforcement in PR/USVI (Strategy Document, 2006). The 
intelligence area, however, is served by one taskforce, the Investigative Support Centre, 
outlined in detail below.  
2.5.3 Intelligence-sharing and gathering of information.  An irreplaceable 
aspect of HIDTA’s role as a coordinating body is to ensure that facilities exist to 
collect, process, analyse, and share intelligence effectively and in an timely manner 
across all the law enforcement agencies in PR and the USVI. Intelligence is crucial in 
the fight against any kind of crime – As Baker (2008) put it, 'criminals demonstrate 
considerable cleverness, operational strategies and planning. Therefore, intelligence 
data and analysis admirably serve the law enforcement mission'. (Baker, 2008, p.4) 
Intelligence is essentially information: information about where a crime is going to be 
committed, who has committed it, and other related information. In order to prevent 
crime, one must understand how it operates and intelligence enables this to be 
established. Intelligence is arguably the most important ingredient in ensuring that 
efforts to combat drug trafficking organisations are accurate, well timed, and achieves 
effective prosecutions and convictions, as well as mere arrests. To realise this aim, the 
Intelligence aspect of HIDTA’s brief is fulfilled by the Investigative Support Centre 
(ISC), an FBI-led initiative including agents and analysts from 12 separate agencies, all 
co-located within the same facility to ensure maximum integration. In addition to the 
ISC as the central functional source of intelligence information (Gutierrez, 2004), an 
Intelligence Subcommittee set up by the executive board supports all the PR/USVI 
HIDTA initiatives and their participating agencies on issues ranging across a number of 
areas, such as intelligence, training, and computer technology (HIDTA Strategy 
Document, 2006).  
 The ISC aims to collect, evaluate, analyse and disseminate timely intelligence 
on a wide range of areas, from drug distribution to drug-related firearms trafficking, 
homeland security targets, money laundering, and violent crime organisations and those 
who commit them. The ISC, since 9/11, has changed the way that it shares information 
(Guttierez, 2004). Providing a full range of tactical, operational, and strategic 
intelligence support, it has a number of functions, including event deconfliction, 
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case/subject deconfliction, post-seizure analysis, analytical case support, and strategic 
intelligence. The ISC provides these services not only to other HIDTA initiatives and 
taskforces but also to all participating agencies and other appropriate law enforcement 
and intelligence community organisations. It further attempts to exchange information 
and coordinate with other HIDTAs across the US It is worth noting that these issues are 
extremely important elements of the intelligence gaining and sharing process, 
particularly in relation to trust: deconfliction in particular, which refers to the need for 
intelligence gathering organisations not to be overly involved in each other’s 
operations, and to stick to their own ‘territory’, and in ensuring that each organisation 
knows the plans of the other, so that they do not conflict. (Best Jr., 2010) 
 Intelligence is usually considered the most important aspect of being proactive 
in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organisations. Without it, it is impossible 
to build investigations, carry out operations, and achieve convictions. Certainly in a 
situation where there are finite budgets for law enforcement, it is essential that 
operations be carried out in a highly efficient way, which means having the knowledge 
of where resources can be most effectively utilised at any given time. In 2004, 133 
operations were aided by intelligence from the ISC; the aim in the strategic report for 
HIDTA 2006 was to have every operation underpinned by the ISC’s intelligence 
(Strategy Document, 2006).  
 Made up of 52 intelligence analysts and agents from most of the HIDTA 
participating agencies, the ISC provides a range of intelligence services and aims to 
produce instant, organised intelligence products which meet agent-informant 
requirements and can be used to build investigative or law enforcement operations. The 
ISC also uses the Racketeering Enterprise Investigation (RICO) concept which derives 
from the RICO Act on organised crime (note – the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (1970) made it 'unlawful to acquire, operate or receive income from 
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity’ (Albanese, 2010, p. 297). The 
technology ISC has at its fingertips is advanced and includes advanced technology 
databases, advanced hardware and software, and new communication devices, such as 
the Title III (TII/S2 system). In addition to these functions, the ISC also houses the 
DEA Forensic Laboratory support, which provides additional forensic support, ensures 
that evidence is processed and analysed quickly and effectively, and ensures that expert 
witnesses are always available to support successful prosecutions. 
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 However, far from only collecting information about the operations of drug 
trafficking organisations, one of the most important services provided by the ISC for 
the taskforces within HIDTA is to collect information regarding their own operations 
i.e. deconfliction, as defined earlier.  The ISC also acts as a conduit to the Fusion 
Center for information sharing, which is essential to information exchange (Guitierrez, 
2004).Where coordination between separate taskforces and agencies is not thoroughly 
carried out, or where information about operations and cases is not available in a 
suitable and timely manner, it is possible that clashes between separate operations can 
result in injuries or death from ‘friendly fire’ simply because agents were in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.  
 This is, understandably, considered to be an unacceptable risk, and, therefore, 
deconfliction is not only an important contribution toward improving effective use of 
scarce resources but also a basic safety measure to ensure that officers are not injured 
by the operations of their own counterparts from other agencies or taskforces. Even in 
cases where no injuries occur, failure to deconflict can result in disruptions and 
setbacks through compromises to investigations. The PR/USVI Strategy document for 
2006 states that “one cannot put a price on how valuable such services can be,” and this 
is, no doubt, an accurate characterisation of how law enforcement agencies view the 
service (Strategy Document, 2006, p. 30). For instance, in 2004 alone, there were over 
5,000 submissions to the deconfliction service within ISC; every single participating 
agency chose to use its services (Strategy Document, 2006). Beyond processing 
information, another function of the ISC is to provide one central location for all law 
enforcement agencies’ intelligence services so that participants are commingled (as is 
general HIDTA policy) in one intelligence sharing environment. As such, all PR/USVI 
HIDTA taskforces enter data into the HIDTA computer system, ensuring that the ISC 
always has access to data from all arms of HIDTA.  
2.5.4 Research development and training.  The efforts of all these taskforces 
are supported by the HIDTA Training Initiative, an FBI-led taskforce (previously led 
by the US Coast Guard) providing training courses and professional development to 
officers involved in HIDTA taskforces. Good training is essential to ensuring that law 
enforcement continues to be effective and to constantly improves and, as such, it should 
be regarded as playing a key role in strategy. However, despite this pivotal role, 
acknowledged in the HIDTA Strategy Document (2006), the HIDTA training initiative 
was cut in 2004 from 14 full-time staff to two part-time coordinators. These remaining 
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members of staff were forced to perform extra duties in addition to their normal duties, 
whilst the HIDTA training initiative lost its entire budget, equipment, and 
transportation. The HIDTA Strategy Document for 2006 suggests that, “This occurred 
primarily due to the development of a more cost-effective approach to training that 
would focus on securing/coordinating free or reduced costs training resources. The goal 
was to focus strictly on training officers assigned to HIDTA Initiatives/Task forces, and 
thus reduce the reliance on the limited HIDTA funds, thereby allowing for their 
redirection into needed operational areas” (p. 31). 
 However, while it claims that no major losses have occurred, it belies the stated 
importance of training to effective cooperation and law enforcement and raises the 
question of whether the HIDTA Training Initiative can continue to be quite as effective 
on as few resources. In 2004, training was provided to 904 students (totalling 2,454 
classroom hours) at an average cost of $360 per class/student. All the training was 
provided free of charge to personnel and participating agency staff. The 2005 cuts, 
while clearly necessary due to the on-going decline (in real terms) of HIDTA's budget, 
seem likely to have had an effect on either the quality or availability of training. 
2.6 Barriers and Facilitators in Transnational Policing: Contextual and Social 
Psychological Influences 
 The challenges to TNP often seem endless. Reiner (2000) highlights the 
fragmentation and diffusion of the police function, and many modern police 
organisations feature as manifesting a new stage of social development, with the 
‘police’ originally a specialised body for safeguarding security, which was then forced 
to become more universal. Newburn and Sparks (2004) have also noted the tensions 
between “macro-level concerns of globalization – and its related concepts and 
processes – and those which are more concerned with the meso and micro-level issues 
of governance and governmentality” (p. 12). This tension of analytically separate but 
tangled conceptualisations of uniform and diverse approaches to crime control is 
perhaps the most significant barrier that needs to be overcome in future years.  
 Morrison (2003) argues that transnational cooperation, such as extradition 
arrangements, with other countries ,has seemingly increased over the years but has 
failed to synchronise national laws significantly. In 1998, the United Nations General 
Assembly called for a Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, but fell 
short in failing to define a timeframe for implementing the obligations of the treaty, 
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and, hence, a clear indication as to when different jurisdictions would create or adapt 
laws and procedures to bring nations in line with the Convention’s spirit (UNDCP, 
2000). The creation of this Convention does not guarantee the power of some 
governments to effect change or even reach a consensus towards organised crime. The 
need for further and more extensive international cooperation became apparent. Like 
any social phenomenon, transnational crime continues to evolve in response to a 
constantly shifting legal, economic, and political environment. Given these concerns, 
governments need to develop more effective counter measures against transnational 
criminal actors. Certain obvious prescriptions include improving cross-national police 
cooperation, sharing intelligence on criminals and crimes in progress, rationalising and 
integrating national and international laws against serious crimes, and decreasing 
loopholes within the international financial system (Bigo, 2000; Rawlinson, Gregory & 
Brooke, 2001; Sheptycki, 2002). Contextual influences, such as economic and 
legislative constraints, particularisms, and police culture are multifaceted challenges, 
which will be explained in more detail in the following section (2.6.1). This will be 
followed by an examination of social and psychological influences such as cultural and 
behavioural influences, including factors such as competition, motivation, coercion, 
and trust.  
2.6.1 Contextual influences. 
Economic constraints.  Police forces in many societies struggle to cope within 
the context of poverty and economic constraints. Johnston (2000) defines the resource 
predicament as: 
…the politics of resources concerned with trying to ensure that all citizens are 
provided with a fair share of available policing goods; something that requires 
attention both to the unwarranted ‘over’ (or overly invasive) policing of 
particular individuals or social groups, and to the inability of (disadvantaged) 
citizens and communities to acquire a proportionate level of such goods (p. 10).  
Limited resources affect policing as an institution and as a practice. Training, 
intelligence, equipment, and communication all suffer without appropriate funding and 
leave little funding for mechanisms of global cooperation. Some researchers argue that 
desperate societies looking for solutions to their crime crisis reach for any cure 
available, especially if funded by ‘experts’ or ‘exporters’ (Brogden, 2005; Held, 2000). 
Brogden (2005) notes that police forces in transitional societies tend to contain 
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elements of both disciplinary extremes of policing, highly centralised and militarised, 
and are practically undirected because of the exigencies of poor pay, resources, and 
training; this is often quite different from democratic forces. Economic needs 
ultimately convolute problem-solving policing. In a study on Governmental Legitimacy 
and Policing Styles, Bennett (2004) highlights the important issue of economic 
constraints and the destructive consequences of corruption that undermine policing and 
transnational cooperation. Others have argued that there must to be a change in 
economic priorities within the police on a universal scale (Newburn, 2003; South, 
2003). South (2003) holds that, in the future, police, customs, and security services 
liaison officers will likely enhance their roles and will also have increased powers in 
international anti-drugs and anti-terrorism operations.  
South (2003) argues that, given the volume of drugs produced for the 
international market, modest improvement in enforcement effectiveness may make 
little difference to availability. This author’s overall view is that, in order to increase 
enforcement effectiveness, some shift of prioritisation away from the street and up the 
chain of supply is required. As Farer, (1999) noted: 
 …fighting narcotics businesses requires breaking up large criminal cartels that 
export illicit drugs, and wiping out the cultivation and refining of these substances in 
some countries. An alternative strategy, is to diminish the attractiveness of such 
businesses to criminal groups by simply decriminalizing or legalizing the production 
and sale of drugs (p.26).  
Indeed, getting the target right and attempting to increase the effectiveness of 
where the resources are focused ultimately would have the result of managing 
economic constraints if the resources available are used in the most appropriate 
manner. South’s (2003) consideration of different methods of approaching the problem 
is key here; as Farer (1999) considers:  
…much of the so-called economic crime in Russia, for example, can be 
eliminated by rationalizing tax codes and export control regulations; current 
confiscatory tax schedules strangle business productivity and encourage unhealthy 
collusion between businessmen and criminals to evade taxes…( p.26). The message 
here is that economics and effectiveness go hand in hand.  
Legislative constraints.  One of the most difficult challenges in TNP is 
legislative constraint (Weber & Bowling, 2002). Criminals and organised crime groups 
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are at a major advantage in the new millennium as travel allows easy access to an 
infinite number of locations for committing crimes and hiding from the consequences 
of these crimes. For example, international migration flowing from the US to Latin 
America, whether in the form of post-war return migration or deportation, seems to be 
an increasing factor in gang formation, drug trafficking, and organised crime (Rodgers, 
1999). One concern is that returnees bring with them a violent gang culture that they 
assimilated as gang members while in the US. The Nicaraguan media alluded to this 
potential consequence of international return migration in mid-1997, before President 
Clinton signed an amnesty for illegal Nicaraguan migrants in November of that year 
(Rodgers, 1999). The travel mode of ‘indigenisation’ of crime policies, a term 
borrowed from cross-cultural psychology, appears increasingly important (Karstedt, 
2001). This implies that concepts are adapted and blended into the existing culture of 
control, on the one hand, and that indigenous concepts or ‘blended’ travel from the 
periphery to the centre, on the other hand (Garland, 2001). 
 While criminals are relatively free of “rules and policies”, law enforcement 
officers struggle with jurisdictional and legislative restrictions known as the ‘Ambit of 
the Criminal Law’ (Bantekas & Nash, 2003; Hirst, 2003). Regarding cross-frontier 
offences, Hirst (2003) reviews what is known as the “Terminatory Theory 
Jurisdiction.” This refers to the idea that a crime is regarded as “committed” only when 
it is completed, or where its last constituent element takes place. This theory has been 
challenged and criticised by many, especially Williams (1994), who offered a simpler 
method of resolving transnational jurisdictional issues (Williams & Florez, 1994, cited 
in Morrison, 2003). He expounded on the theory by giving a subjective or ‘initiatory’ 
approach to territorial questions in the hope that this would detangle the ‘purely legal or 
metaphysical’ aspect of the current law (Hirst, 2003). William’s theory is frequently 
cited in transnational cases, but judges rarely rely directly on it when making decisions. 
Twin concepts used by law Lords, instead, are ‘conduct crimes or result crimes’ (Hirst, 
2003). The problem of identifying and classifying relevant acts of appropriation is a 
grave concern domestically as well as on an international scale. 
 A relevant example illustrating extradition complexities was the arrest of three 
suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists, who faced possible extradition from the U.K. to the US, 
on charges alleging conspiracy to murder US citizens within US jurisdiction The 
alleged conspiracies were formed outside of the US and were primarily related to 
murders committed by attacks on US diplomats, peacekeeping forces, or other citizens 
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in the Middle East and Africa, although they did include possible offences on American 
soil (Hirst, 2003). Hirst questioned whether or not these conspiracies could be said to 
involve offences within the jurisdiction of the US, as required under the extradition 
treaty of 1972 (and Extradition Act, 1989). The House of Lords held that it would 
suffice if such conspiracies were: (1) triable as extraterritorial offences under US law; 
and (2) would equally have been triable as extraterritorial offences under English law, 
had the U.K. been the requesting state and British nationals the target of the alleged 
conspiracies (Hirst, 2003). 
 It is clear that these complex legislative difficulties exist even between Western, 
democratic governments, which are often held up as “role models” for other societies. 
TNPC is a far cry from being an ideal, cooperative, and universal system. Creating such 
a system is a task beset with seemingly insurmountable hurdles. Divergent legal 
systems, different law enforcement strategies, and the increasing diversity of 
transnational criminal activity combine to hamper effective police cooperation. Walker 
(2000) pioneers the thought-provoking issues of sovereignty and the growing tensions 
rising with the emergent order. He contends that we must try to understand trends in 
cooperation not only in relation to the shifting balance of sovereign authority but also 
against a background of increasing challenges to the very idea of sovereign authority. 
According to Bowling (2009), the world is becoming increasingly interconnected 
(socially, politically, etc.) and this will require that all aspects of policing adapt.  
Particularisms.  A third challenge to TNP is particularism, which can be 
thought of as two dimensional (Brogden, 2005). On one level, police officers display 
significant variation from country to country – and often within countries – in terms of 
their organisation, structure, logic, dynamics, and activities. On another level, and more 
importantly, this heterogeneity is partially linked to the specific national and local 
circumstances within which cooperation can develop and operate (Anderson, 1991; 
Griffith, 1997; Harriott 2000; Harriott 2002; Tulchin & Espach, 2000). Levels of 
cooperation are linked to country-specific factors. The political culture and civil strife 
characterising specific countries, for example, will inevitably play a role in explaining 
levels of cooperation.  
 A culture of violence is illustrated in countries such as Columbia, Israel, and 
Pakistan, which are countries with long histories of war and strife. From a policy 
perspective, the particularism of different societies obviously has important 
implications. The specific local conditions within which police officers emerge and 
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operate must be taken into account, with programs varying according to different 
contexts and circumstances as well as the heterogeneity of the officers themselves. The 
notion that “West knows best and has all the solutions to rising crimes is promoted 
internationally almost entirely without recognition of the exigencies of the local 
context” (Brogden, 2005, p. 26) supports the idea that each community’s particularisms 
seem to have been left out of the equation. Without a concise, universal definition and 
legislative structure in place for cooperation, fragmentation sets in and a variety of 
practices begin to spread aimlessly. By following only a Western police agenda and 
including only members of respectable groups, it permits little room for critiques of 
policing accountabilities or practices. Brogden (2005) compares it to the colonial era, 
“They serve to support existing place practices in their local elite composition. They 
speak only for a local minority. Policing, as in the past with colonial rulers and now in 
the hands of new-colonial elites serves the interest of the prosperous and the powerful” 
(p. 27). This opens the door for theoretical debates on ethics and human rights. Many 
have argued that effective cooperation requires a mega-supranational system of 
accountability, with a commitment to long-term sustainability, yet the reality in both 
Western and transitional societies is that the legal and safeguard frameworks are not yet 
in place (Anderson, 1995; Bowling & Phillips, 2002; Sheptycki, 2000). 
Police culture.  Research into “cop culture” as an aspect of policing has been 
conducted over the last 40 years (Foster, 2003; Reiner 2000) and is relevant example of 
how organisational cultures can act as persistent inhibitors to change and, in this case, 
contribute to poor TNPC. Culture, as defined earlier, may also be used to explain a 
broad range of characteristics within a particular group or organisation. Schein (2004) 
defined “organizational cultures” as the “deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs 
that are shared by members of an organization that operate unconsciously” (pp. 6-7).  
In some respects, there is a perception that “cop culture” refers to one means of 
an operation that is applicable to policemen and women worldwide. Indeed, some 
researchers suggest that police culture is it is often singular, monolithic and unchanging 
(Chan, 1996; Foster, 2003). If this were the case, TNPC would be arguably extremely 
straightforward, as regardless of nationality, location and background, the similarities 
of operation that (supposedly) exist purely by virtue of being in one profession would 
allow a high level of universal understanding. However, the situation is much more 
complex. There are two main elements of “cop culture” considered within the canon of 
63	  
	  
literature: attitude and means of operation, both of which carry different implications 
for TNPC. 
 Reiner (2000) argues that police culture is a “subtle and complex intermingling 
of police officers’ sense of mission, action-oriented behaviour and cynicism where the 
emphases on danger, suspicion, isolation, solidarity, pragmatism and authority are all 
core elements of ‘cop-culture’” (p.87). Machismo, intolerance, prejudice, and 
conservatism are also regarded as key characteristics of police culture. This has led 
researchers to explore whether these characteristics are intrinsically present in 
individuals who choose a career in policing or whether these behaviours are acquired 
after joining the police and are linked with the nature of police work itself. It is, of 
course, possible that a combination of the two is accurate of some individuals, with 
their career exacerbating elements of their natural tendencies. Research suggests that 
new officers might begin with high ideals about public service but soon reassess their 
values and sense of identity, beginning to conform to concepts of “crime control” or 
move from “autonomy” to “solidarity” (Fielding, 1988). Reiner (2000) sums up the 
development of some forms of cop culture as a “patterned set of understandings that 
help officers to cope with and adjust to the pressures and tensions confronting the 
police” (p. 87).  
 Researchers have also suggested that gender plays an important role in police 
culture and that male officers tend to be more competitive and perhaps less cooperative 
than female officers. An Australian study (Braithwaite & Brewer, 1998, cited in 
Newburn, 2003) found that male officers were directly more competitive in their 
encounters on the street and used control tactics, threats, and physical actions in order 
to exert control over citizens. This led to both verbal and physical resistance. On the 
other hand, female officers, even if they adopted the tactics of their male colleagues, 
did not experience similar responses. Male officers tended to be frequently placed at 
risk of physical confrontation while females were generally more supportive of citizens, 
preferring tactics heavy on mutual power in the interaction. Females were further found 
to use coercive tactics less frequently and in different contexts than males, resulting in 
less verbal abuse during their discussions with members of the public and the 
avoidance of physical resistance. Waddington (1999), cited in Newburn (2003), 
suggests that women directly challenge the fundamental task of policing as one that is 
undertaken by “real” men who need to use “coercive authority” and physical strength to 
maintain control of the streets. However, despite recent changes in policy and 
64	  
	  
recruitment, the police service remains a largely male, Caucasian, and heterosexual 
organisation, in which those who are perceived as different by virtue of their race, 
gender, or sexuality have reported significant problems in gaining acceptance and, in 
some cases, have been officially recognised as being disadvantaged. As there is little 
research currently available on the relationship between gender, race, and sexuality in 
policing, we can only speculate on what the actual relationship between these factors 
might be. However, it is likely that there is a “complex melding of multiple factors 
rather than one dominant element” (Miller, 1999, p. 155). Additionally, there is even 
less research on what impact gender, race, and sexuality have on cooperative behaviour 
specifically in the police. The real challenge in changing negative cultural 
characteristics is not forming policies but ensuring that these are put into practice. In 
his book, Nadelmann (1993) discusses the extension of US efforts beyond the country’s 
borders and the impact this has on policing. He also discusses the various challenges of 
internationalisation and how policing has responded to these. He argues that this 
internationalisation has actually contributed to what he refers to as an 
“Americanization” of criminal justice systems worldwide.   
The way in which different police professionals, and indeed police forces, 
operate on a practical level can be significant in TNPC terms. Sheptycki (2000) 
considered, for instance, how every police agency has its own operational culture in 
response to the different cultural settings in which they operate. He cites the carrying of 
arms and routine identity checks (Sheptycki, 2000) as areas where there might be some 
difference between locations. Indeed, police culture as a response to local cultural 
difference is extremely significant in two ways: first, when police agencies with 
different cultures have to cooperate with each other, the cultural differences provide a 
potential barrier that should be pre-empted and understood in order to allow the two 
organisations to work effectively as a team. As Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) talk 
about the age of globalization and its effects on policing; indeed, the globalization of 
policing might be seen as an extension of policing in general. Just as differences 
exist—and must often be bridged—between worldwide organisations, so must they be 
when it comes to police culture and transcending difference in order to work together. 
The second principle discussed by Sheptycki (2000) is the idea that a police agency 
whose method of operation is in line with the culture of its location is likely to be more 
effective in certain areas, such as intelligence gathering. Porta et al. (2006) cite an 
example of police culture being incompatible with local culture, which illustrates 
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(albeit in a negative way) the importance of this issue. They write that 'the root of many 
instances of disorder triggered or escalated by the police is found...in the cultures and 
subcultures of police institutions' (Porta et al, 2006, p.54). It is interesting to note that 
HIDTA groups operate under the organisational culture of the US and its legislative 
bodies but have the autonomy “on the ground” to adopt whatever culture and strategy 
they see fit.  
Cultural factors.  Just as Western criminal law enforcement has inadvertently 
underestimated the impact of local culture, many security experts today may have 
miscalculated the influences that social psychological factors could have on TNPC. 
Social psychologists define culture as “the social habits of a community” or as 
“systems of shared meaning” (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002, p. 607). Definitions of culture 
vary, but they share a similarity in the reflection that “culture is an enduring product of 
and influence on human interaction” (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002, p. 607). People tend to 
use their own cultural standards to interpret the behaviours of those who are culturally 
different from them, despite manifestations of culture, such as social behaviour, 
attributional style, conformity, and social practices varying dramatically from one 
culture to the next (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). People also make causal attributions for 
their own and others’ behaviour (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002), constantly taking account of 
consensus, consistency, and distinctive information in deciding whether to attribute 
behaviour internally (to personality traits) or externally (to environmental factors). 
There may be individual differences in tendencies to make internal or external 
attributions. In general, most social psychologists agree that people are poor at making 
attributions (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002).  
 Bias is another challenge. This is the tendency to protect one's self-image by 
attributing one’s failures to external factors and successes to internal ones. Attributions 
for the behaviour of people as in-group or out-group members tend to be ethnocentric 
and based on stereotypes. This bias is affected by the real or perceived nature of inter-
group relations (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Therefore, in terms of police cooperation, 
stereotypes may originate in a need for groups or TNP agencies to attribute the causes 
of failed operations or terrorist attacks to out-groups that have stereotypical properties 
causally linked to the events. People resort to causal attributions only when there is no 
readily available social knowledge (social representations, cultural beliefs, or scripts) 
automatically present to explain events (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). This could be 
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applicable to attributions within the TNP community and might be relevant to 
analysing methods for improved cooperation.  
 Asch’s (1951) famous study of variations in conformity, conducted in a meta-
analysis of studies, used statistical procedures that combined data from multiple studies 
to measure the overall reliability and strength of specific effects, concluding that there 
is extensive cultural variation in conformity to group pressure (Foster, 2003). There are 
an overwhelming number of studies regarding conformity and group pressure within 
the police community (Foster, 2003; McIlveen & Gross, 1999; Reiner, 2000). There is 
no reason to believe that this would not also apply to the TNP and the impact group 
pressure could possibly have on cooperation or lack thereof. Socialisation in cultures is 
also extremely important to consider. For example, a machismo culture is paramount to 
consider in TNP, where challenges, maltreatment, or even difference of opinions could 
be met with abuse or violence. Much of the Latin Caribbean shares a machismo culture, 
and it is important to consider the potential impact of this on cooperation within the 
TNP community. Tulchin and Espach (2000) talk about key issues in the Caribbean, 
including drug trafficking, migration, economic issues, and natural disasters. When 
considering these issues and how they are dealt with, it is also vital to consider the 
overall culture and how this translates into policing behaviour. 
 A further example of a difference in how people relate to each other culturally is 
evident in Eastern versus Western societies. Eastern or “collectivist” cultures tend to 
cultivate interdependence, whereas Western or “individualistic” cultures tend to 
encourage independence (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Modern organisations that 
recognise this include crucial differences in values and a different distribution of 
individualism and collectivism (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Unfortunately, not all 
systems can be considered “modern,” and there is no better organisation than the police 
to illustrate this.  
 Intercultural communication can often lead to misunderstandings in meaning 
and intentions, thereby preventing TNP cooperation. For example, “acculturative 
stress” is a common challenge noted by social psychologists. Groups such as migrants 
face different acculturative options, varying from preserving their ethnic identity to 
merging with the dominant culture (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Some social 
psychological principles can be applied across cultures and some cannot. This debate of 
universal applications or a one-size-fits-all methodology, as briefly discussed in the 
introduction to this paper, raises tensions within the TNP community and indeed across 
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a multitude of other professions as well. This is a highly relevant issue for police 
cooperation in many parts of the world, especially where there is a challenge to 
maintain cultural diversity, as is the case in the United Kingdom at the time of writing. 
2.6.2 Social psychological influences.  Theories of crime are almost 
characterised by a discussion of the social and psychological influences on those 
individuals and groups who commit crimes. Andrews & Bonta (2010) talk about the 
impact of class on crime; Schmalleger (2007) considers the need to psychologically 
profile criminals in order to understand why they committed an illegal act; Siegel 
(2011) considered the importance of religion in preventing crime. These examples are a 
tip of the metaphoric iceberg. Indeed, crime is essentially a person deciding (as part of 
an organisation or otherwise) to in some way wrong another person or organisation. 
While discussion of crime is often reduced to statistics, areas, and organisations, the 
root of criminality is always people, who are formed and motivated by social and 
psychological influences. In the context of TNPC and the issues that have been 
considered until this point, the importance of social psychological influences can be 
noted: individuals need to trust if they are to cooperate; intelligence will be given to 
certain people/organisations and not others. Social and psychological influences are 
crucial in a variety of ways, as will be examined in the following section.  
Competition.  There is some dispute over whether cooperation is needed. 
Schelling (1984) questions whether we need less, rather than more cooperation, 
especially with those who threaten us and with whom cooperating could hinder our 
own functioning. It cannot always be said with certainty that greater trust and 
cooperation are, in fact, desirable (Schelling, 1984). This author proposes that not only 
do people want less competition amongst their enemies, but also amongst friends. 
 Some may argue that a certain amount of competition is beneficial in improving 
performance, fostering technological innovation, and improving services. The rationale 
for this view is not only that those who succeed in competition benefit but that the 
positive effects of competition are likely to be more generally felt as well. The real 
problem seems to be finding an optimal balance between cooperation and competition 
rather than deciding at which extreme to converge. Cooperation and competition are 
not necessarily opposites and they can and do co-exist. However, most people within 
the law enforcement community would agree that we have yet to find the perfect 
combination of the two. One notable view is that competition may depend on 
cooperation to a large extent, especially in capitalist countries (Hirsch, 1977). The most 
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basic form of cooperation, e.g., avoiding mutual injury, is undoubtedly a requirement of 
potentially beneficial competition. Hinde (1986) points out that there is a difference 
between outdoing rivals and doing them in, as within a species. Even to compete in a 
mutually non-destructive way, one needs to trust one’s competitors to comply with 
certain rules on some level. Game theory has provided us with a better understanding of 
why cooperation may not occur, even when it would benefit most parties involved. As 
Binmore and Dasgupta (1986), as cited in Gambetta (1988), explained in their survey 
of the subject, rational individuals do not necessarily adopt behaviour that benefits the 
entire group. These authors concluded that, despite individual rationality and 
motivation, cooperation may still fail to take place. One of the most noteworthy lessons 
of game theory is that, even if motivation is not unquestioningly egoistic, cooperation 
may still encounter many obstacles.  
Motivation.  The above-mentioned lack of belief in cooperation should not be 
confused with a lack of motivation for it. The mirror image of the error of taking 
rational cooperation for granted is to infer that if cooperation does not come about, this 
is because there are no rational motives for it (Gambetta, 1988). Gambetta (1988) gives 
the example of traffic jams in cities as an example of failure to cooperate due to a lack 
of belief that there will be similar cooperation from others, e.g., that others will use 
bicycles and public transport as well. Thus, rationally motivated cooperation may not 
even emerge. More simply, it is that an insufficient number of people trust others to act 
according to these motives. Preferences, when revealed, may simply show that they are 
conditional on our beliefs. If beliefs change, preferences may change accordingly. 
Here, traditional game theory does not help, for it considers beliefs to be far more 
undetermined than they are in reality and further assumes that they are common 
knowledge. As a result, game theory loses its predictive power, for it can find more 
equilibrium, usually uncooperative, than in fact exists in the real world. Why should 
beliefs held by different individuals (or types of individuals) be commonly known? Our 
understanding of human psychology is imperfect, and we have little idea of how 
individuals actually form beliefs (Binmore & Dasgupta, 1986, as cited in Gambetta, 
1988). Among these beliefs, coercion and trust—as discussed above—are of 
fundamental importance. And, as Knack and Zak (2001) state, culture has a major 
effect on trust, which various across counties. This is important to think about when 
considering how human psychology affects the concept discussed in this work.  
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Coercion vs. trust.  Coercion, or at least its plausible threat, has been widely 
practised as a means to ensure cooperation, and is still used today to ensure submission 
and compliance (Gambetta, 1988). However, it falls significantly short of being an 
adequate alternative to trust. On the contrary, coercion exercised over unwilling 
subjects, though it requires less trust in others, will simultaneously reduce the trust that 
others place in us (Gambetta, 1988). It introduces an asymmetry, which disposes of 
mutual trust and instead promotes power and resentment. As the high incidence of 
paranoid behaviour among dictators suggests, coercion can be self-defeating, as it 
increases the probability of betrayal and defection (Gambetta, 1988). However, 
coercion does not have to be illegitimate and can be used to enforce rights that are 
commonly shared. Instead of a unilateral action, coercion may be part of a larger 
cooperative arrangement that is intended to reinforce and produce a degree of trust in 
the observance of agreements. However, even if the controlled use and exploitation of 
coercive power was considered legitimate, it would never be a substitute for trust 
(Gambetta, 1988). It would still be true that societies that rely heavily on the use of 
force are likely to be less efficient, more costly, and more unpleasant than those in 
which trust is maintained. In the former, resources tend to be diverted away from 
economic undertakings and spent instead in coercion, surveillance, and information 
gathering.  
 Cooperation is conditional on the belief that the other party is not a “sap,” i.e., is 
not disposed to trust blindly. It is also based on the belief that the other party will be 
well disposed toward us if we make the right move, maintaining equilibrium. Gambetta 
(1988) has concluded that a certain level of trust can provide a base for cooperative 
actions, depending on the constraints, costs, and benefits presented by the specific 
situation. The higher the level of trust, the higher the likelihood of cooperation will be. 
However, cooperative behaviour does not depend on trust alone, and the optimal 
threshold of trust will vary according to each occasion. What we need and what we 
believe may generate irrational responses. Confidence, of the type defined by Luhmann 
(1979), can be described as a type of blind-trust where the relationships we engage in 
depend very little on our actions and decisions (Gambetta, 1988). Confidence may also 
rise from wishful thinking and the reduction of cognitive dissonance; it would then be 
more akin to hope than to trust. Gambetta (1988) suggests that our capacity for self-
delusion far exceeds rational optimistic expectation and that we can indeed make 
ourselves and others believe something. We tend to expect rational individuals to seek 
70	  
	  
evidence for their beliefs and to offer that evidence to others. By gathering information 
about the characteristics and past records of others, we can increase or decrease our 
trust in them and try to convince others of our trustworthiness by trying to bridge the 
gaps left by asymmetric information, e.g., by enhancing our reputation for 
trustworthiness, pre-committing ourselves, and making promises (Williams & Lorenz, 
1971, cited in Gambetta, 1988). However, if evidence could solve the problem of trust, 
then trust would not be a problem at all. Even good evidence of past behaviour does not 
fully eliminate the risk of future deviance. As Luhmann (1979, as cited in Gambetta, 
1988) explained, trust itself affects the evidence we are looking for. When we search 
for untrustworthy behaviour, it is easy to find, while trustworthy behaviour is almost 
impossible to conclusively prove. Trust is a peculiar belief predicated not on evidence 
of occurrence but instead on the lack of evidence to the contrary, which makes it 
vulnerable to deliberate destruction (Williams & Lorenz, 1971). 
 In contrast, deep distrust is very difficult to invalidate through experience, 
because it either stops people from engaging in an appropriate kind of social 
experiment or, worse, leads to behaviour which bolsters the validity of distrust itself. 
Once distrust has set in, it can become self-fulfilling and therefore it is soon impossible 
to know if it was justified to begin with (Gambetta, 1988). It then becomes perfectly 
rational for an individual to behave accordingly, even if it is someone that was 
previously prepared to act on more optimistic expectations. Hogg and Vaughan (2002) 
argue that cognitive inertia may prevent people from changing their beliefs. Giddens 
(1998) argues that trust is more often seen in traditional societies through kinship 
relations, local communities, religious commitments, or what he calls “ontological 
security.” However, he and other researchers proclaim that the need to understand the 
changing nature and importance of trust in criminology has never been as apparent as it 
is today (Walklate, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995; Gellner, 1989; Giddens, 1998; Luhmann, 
1979), with calls for new solutions based on the tolerant co-existence of diverse 
cultures and the moral consensus giving group members a basis for mutual trust 
(Fukuyama, 1995; Misztal, 1996, cited in Walklate, 2000). 
 Trust can be defined as a level of the subjective probability with which an agent 
assesses that another agent (or group of agents) will perform a particular action, both 
before he can monitor such an action (or independently of his ability to be able to 
monitor it), and in a context in which it affects his own actions (Gambetta, 1988; 
O’Neil, 2002). When someone is deemed trustworthy, it is implicitly meant that the 
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probability that the individual will perform actions that are beneficial (or not harmful) 
to others is high enough for others to consider engaging in some form of cooperation 
with him/her (Barber, 1983). The conditions of uncertainty about other people’s 
behaviour(s) are central to the notion of trust. It is related to the limits of one’s capacity 
to achieve full knowledge of others, their motives, and their responses to both 
endogenous and exogenous changes. Trust is also dependent on agents having a degree 
of freedom to disappoint one’s expectations of them and has, therefore, also been 
defined as a device for coping with the freedom of others (Dunn, 1984, as cited in 
Gambetta 1988; Luhmann, 1979).Trust will be relevant when at least one party is free 
to disappoint the other, free enough to avoid a risky relationship and constrained 
enough to consider that relationship as an attractive option. Cooperation frequently 
makes some demand on trust, particularly mutual trust. Cooperation cannot exist 
between free agents who completely distrust each other (Gambetta, 1988). As explored 
by Levin (2004), the transfer of knowledge is highly dependent on trust, and this 
becomes extremely important in the context of policing. This author stresses the 
importance of different types of ties, i.e. weak or strong, and the importance of both in 
terms of trust and knowledge. Abrams et al. (2003) discusses similar themes in terms of 
formal and informal networks and their effect on trust and relationships. While blind-
trust is an incentive to deception, if trust only exists on one side, cooperation may still 
fail (Gambetta, 1988). However, depending on the degree of constraint, risk and 
interest involved, trust as a “precondition” of cooperation may be necessary to varying 
degrees. All the issues revolving around trust and cooperation are clearly in need of 
further investigation in TNP.  
2.7 Summary of Chapter Two 
Chapter 2 focused on a theoretical approach toward cooperation and its role in 
TNP. The elements and impact of cooperation were discussed, including; teamwork, 
networking, communication, competition, capacity building, leadership and trust. The 
theoretical importance of these issues was considered, alongside examples of how they 
have been applied (and why they are important) in contexts established in Chapter 1 as 
being relevant to this area, such as in the DEA’s RISC initiative and the HIDTA 
Program. 
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 General barriers and facilitators to TNPC were generally divided into contextual 
and social/psychological influences.  Contextual influences, such as economic and 
legislative constraints, particularisms, police culture, and local cultural influences were 
mostly seen as barriers. On the other hand, the social/psychological influences 
explored, such as behavioural factors, competition, motivation, coercion, and trust were 
more complex and could even be seen as both a barrier and a facilitator in some 
instances. The influence and importance of social psychological factors relating to 
TNPC were also considered.  
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter Three 
 The research approach taken in this thesis is different from many qualitative 
studies involving (for example, informative) interviews, in that not all interviews focus 
on meaning-making and the individual’s experience. Consequently, in keeping with the 
overall objective of this thesis, this Methodology chapter first explains the research 
approaches taken. The study was a detailed qualitative enquiry into transnational 
policing in PR and DR, which adopted a blended approach of qualitative interviews and 
story-telling. This is followed by the choice of methodology, discussing the research 
design, rationale for use of interviews and research objectives. 
 The sampling rationale and selection sections discuss data collection and 
techniques, as well as research participants followed by the topic guides and research 
procedure, which included recruitment of participants, reciprocity, ethics and setting. It 
also describes the piloting interviews, which took place prior to fieldwork in the 
Caribbean. The methods of analysis draw upon Creswell (1998) and Attride-Stirling’s 
(2001) research, explained further throughout the chapter, and were conducted as 
recommended by them. This section discusses the thematic analysis of interviews, the 
questions addressed and the levels of analysis. Finally, issues of quality assurance and 
reflexivity conclude the chapter. 
3.2 Research Approach: Phenomenological and Social Constructionism Influences 
Phenomenological Influences 
 Phenomenology is a complex philosophical framework that is interested broadly 
in the theme of human experience but undoubtedly there is much more to 
phenomenology than human experience, Wender (2008). With this is mind, this study 
utilised methods which have influences from phenomenology but overall was a detailed 
qualitative enquiry into TNP in PR and DR and was not strictly a work of 
phenomenology. A phenomenological perspective was chosen to help guide this 
investigation, as it reflects the lived experience of participants and the meanings people 
make of their life experiences (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). This perspective further 
allows for the multiple ways of interpreting human experience, and the meaning-
making of these experiences which define an individual’s “reality.” With reality 
“socially constructed” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Parker 1999), the 
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phenomenological researcher “collects” the participants’ realities and their 
interpretations of their constructions (Lincoln, 1990). This is done with epoche, where 
“all judgments about what is real – the natural attitude” are suspended (Creswell, 1998, 
p. 52). With the phenomenon inseparable from the individual, reality, as in a 
phenomena’s true meaning, can only be studied via the experience as described by the 
individual (Jasper, 1994).  
 The phenomenological approach further influenced the investigator to focus on 
the experience’s meaning according to the person who has lived it and who is able to 
provide a thorough, holistic description of it (Creswell, 1998). Central tenets in 
utilizing this constructivist-interpretive paradigm approach are to determine and 
accurately describe an experience’s meaning to the person who has experienced it. 
Identifying common themes amongst participants, as well as within-case themes, 
enabled the investigator to comprehend and describe the essence of the experience for 
participants (Moustakas, 1994) and the issues raised. 
Social Constructionism  
The social constructionist approach to research posits the “process of meaning 
production to be as important for social research as the meaning that’s produced” 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 4). Otherwise stated, the “how” is equally important to 
the “what.” Social constructionist thought holds that, beyond conveying factual 
information, “language always constructs particular versions of reality” (Willig, 1998, 
p. 383).  
Drawing on ideas from phenomenology and social constructionism, in-depth 
interviews were conducted through which the researcher explored how participants 
made sense of their perceptions of TNPC and its associated meanings. Through an 
interactive process involving analysis and verification by the participants, the 
researcher was able to include participants in the knowledge development process, and 
thus be aware of their own perspectives in interpreting the data. Using participant 
quotes to support themes and metathemes, evidence about good and bad practices in 
TNPC is provided in the research. 
3.3 Choice of Methodology 
Design of Research 
 Qualitative research aims to understand and describe human behavior and 
experience, especially the processes by which humans construct meaning (Bogdan & 
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Biklen, 2003). Qualitative investigations are not propelled by certain questions derived 
from operationalised variables, but are driven by qualitative research questions seeking 
to study the full complexity of topics. This includes each participant’s story, in context, 
from his/her own frame of reference.   
Qualitative research enables researchers to study and interpret the empirical 
world holistically from the participant’s point of view, not that of the investigator’s. It 
seeks to capture a phenomenon’s meanings, beliefs, thoughts, feelings and 
characteristics without controlling or manipulating events or persons under study 
(Leininger, 1985), plus stress the importance of context and multiple realities, as more 
unstructured, naturalistic inquiries (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Another strength of utilizing qualitative research methods is that such methods 
illuminate the details of the human experience in the context of a common phenomenon 
(Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). In using qualitative research in the investigation 
of TNPC in PR, and the DR, at the HIDTA Office, the investigator was able to: 
1. Comprehend data from the “insider’s” perspective by discussing a participant’s 
firsthand experiences. 
2. Take a discovery-oriented approach to the research questions that gathered a 
greater understanding than that gained in more rigid approaches as interviews 
allowed for greater flexibility.  
3. Gather the subjective data needed to understand the meaning individuals 
attached to events in their environment (Duffy, 1987). 
4. Pursue issues and topics that may not have been raised in a structured research 
design (Carr, 1994). 
Research Strategy: The Intensive Interview 
 Interviews, as a research strategy, are ideal in allowing for more complete and 
more accurate information than other techniques (Newman & Benz, 1998), with stories 
becoming the primary source of data collection and the construction of meaning. Thus, 
intensive, in-depth interviews were used as the primary data collection strategy, 
enabling the investigator to “see the world through the eyes of the person being 
interviewed” (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000, p. 58), acquire more data about 
an individual’s experience(s) and give participants a voice. Such an approach enables 
participants to express what is important to them in their own words. Since the primary 
purpose of interviews was to obtain participants’ life experiences with respect to 
interpreting the meaning of a described phenomenon, the interviewer became the 
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“student” during interviews, while the interviewee took on the role of “teacher” 
(Spradley, 1979), shaping the interview content using his or her own words (Bogdan & 
Biklen, 2003). 
 Interviews vary in structural design and may be open-ended, guided by general 
questions, and/or may focus on particular topics (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 
2000), as this allows for structure, focus and flexibility to co-exist in the interview 
process. This investigation’s interview process was semi-structured, providing 
opportunities for data to emerge somewhat spontaneously from participants’ responses, 
while remaining purposeful and focused, shaped by interpretation and analysis. It 
included “intuition, past experience, emotion - personal attributes of human 
researchers” (Wolcott, 2001, p. 33). There was a collaborative exchange with 
participants to construct the picture participants wished to convey. Going beyond the 
who, what, where, when and why, this investigation sought to capture the emotional 
responses, processes involved and subsequent outcomes of the barriers and facilitators 
to TNPC. 
Researcher’s Stance  
The researcher as a primary data collection instrument holds that data is filtered 
through the investigator’s attitudes, experiences, and beliefs in addition to theoretical 
positions. Hence, the investigator’s role in the research must be acknowledged and the 
researcher’s stance stated from the study’s outset (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 
2001). This research was influenced by the investigator’s qualities of being organised, 
efficient, compassionate, friendly, outgoing, motivated, curious, conscientious, and 
driven by a strong sense of equality and justice; collectively, these traits are a 
subjectivity brought to this study. However, having previously lived in PR, the 
researcher may have become acculturated to Puerto Rican society and taken on local 
and cultural biases. Throughout the investigation, these factors had to be kept in check. 
Caution was used in not interpreting or presenting data through the researcher’s 
personal judgments. 
Expectations that the participants’ narratives would revolve around police 
culture stereotypes (i.e. “macho”, uncooperative, heavy-handed) had to be set aside. 
The study’s purpose of inviting participants to share their own perspective was also 
important to keep at the forefront. With their experiences at the heart of the 
investigation, focus was primarily on them and their stories. All of these possible biases 
were consciously addressed and overcome in writing analytic memos and bracketing, 
77	  
	  
the process of rigorous self-reflection where biases, notions and knowledge about the 
phenomenon being studied were suspended (Hein & Austin, 2001). At the same time, 
however, the realization exists that all views are partial and that no investigator is 
completely objective.  The researcher engaged in embedded analysis (Creswell, 1998), 
in which there was a narration of the research, by a thematic analysis across cases 
(cross-case analysis). This approach begins with an examination of the subunits and the 
themes that emerged during the interviews, allowing for a more detailed perspective.  
3.4 Sampling: Rationale and Selection 
Data Collection Techniques 
 For this study, 30 agents from HIDTA were interviewed. All interviews took 
place in the secret location at the HIDTA headquarters in PR. The following is a 
description of recruitment efforts. 
Research Participants 
The research participants came from a wide variety of law enforcement and 
personal backgrounds. There were 26 males and 4 females, ranging between the ages of 
22 to 55. Each participant was highly educated, trained and considered a specialist in 
his/her field. With interviews lasting for up to two hours each, thirty participants was a 
manageable size for the study. Having a fairly small participant pool was also rooted in 
the study’s important objective: to describe the breadth and depth of a phenomenon’s 
meaning as experienced by the individuals (Creswell, 1998). In this case, participants 
each gave one, detail-filled interview.  
All were English-speaking, bilingual, 25 of whom were either born in PR or of 
Latino decent. The remaining 5 were American who spoke minimal Spanish, but were 
not bilingual. Conducting the interviews in English was not of great concern since 
English is a second language for Puerto Ricans, and research has found that using one’s 
language, whether mother tongue or second language, does not result in discomfort or 
self-disclosure when talking about an emotional topic (Pizarro, 1995). Those speaking 
Spanish who were not bilingual admitted, however, that this had been problematic 
during interviews. There were 12 HIDTA agents specifically from the DEA who 
participated. The DEA had the largest number of participants from any single agency. 
The other participants were from a variety of organisations, including HIDTA, 
Department of Corrections, Interpol and the US Embassy. 
3.5 Research Procedure 
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3.5.1 Recruitment of participants.  The investigator gained entry to the 
HIDTA community with the assistance of the Attorney General of PR and Director of 
HIDTA, who have vast networks in the local and global policing community. Prior to 
arrival in PR, the DEA offered assistance with coordinating interviews, however this 
resulted in only three arranged interviews. A letter was then sent to the Director and 
CEO of PR/USVI HIDTA requesting help, who further provided assistance with 
recruitment efforts and guidance from a Puerto Rican perspective.   
Volunteer interviewees were sought via the HIDTA PR/USVI office, since it 
offered a safe, convenient environment and accessibility to a larger number of 
participants. Letters of cooperation in providing research assistance were obtained from 
the CEO and Director’s office. Potential participants were solicited via convenience 
and snowball sampling, primarily using mass emails and web flyer postings describing 
the study at the HIDTA office in PR. A total of 26 men and 4 women responded to the 
request for participants. Ultimately, the researcher selected all 30 participants who 
volunteered. 
 The researcher was accessible to the participants via personal cell phone or by 
electronic mail for further clarification of the study. As each agent responded, 
individual names were listed on a note card, used to keep track of each person’s contact 
information, age, response date, preferred language, cultural background, gender, 
eligibility information (when they were available for interviews), and correspondence 
efforts regarding setting up interviews. Potential participants were informally screened 
by the researcher to determine, based on established criteria (from an approved police 
agency, English-speaking, and working in a transnational capacity), the appropriateness 
of participation in the research. These agents also indicated that they would be available 
for at least one hour of interview time during the course of the study. Most interviews 
were extended by 30-60 minutes.  
Interviews were based on pilot interviews conducted with 7 other law 
enforcement officials: five detectives from the United Kingdom working at the Old 
Bailey criminal trial, ‘Operation Trident’ (Jamaican-London linked crime case); one 
agent from the Association of Caribbean of Police Commissioners (ACCP); and one 
representative at the United Nations. The seven interviews were kept on record, should 
the need for additional participants be deemed useful, and were helpful in developing 
the study’s baseline questionnaire. In the end, these were not used for the study’s final 
results and analysis. Participants who chose to take part in the study were provided with 
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a consent form for their required signature (see Appendix C). The consent form 
emphasised that their participation was voluntary and described the safeguards that 
were put in place to assure anonymity and protection of privacy. Participants were 
assured that the collected interview data would be held in the strictest confidence and 
that their names, as well as those of any individuals they mentioned, would be changed. 
The contact information of the study’s supervisor was provided to the CEO’s office, 
should participants have any questions or concerns during the course of the study.  
Furthermore, the HIDTA office was informed that all participants would be privy to all 
of their own interview tapes and transcripts upon written request.  
Reciprocity.  “All interviews are interpretively active, implicating meaning-
making practices on the part of both interviewers and respondents” (Holstein & 
Gubrium, 1995, p. 4). Participants were approached with the attitude that they were 
“research collaborators” (Mishler, 1986) in an attempt to give them as much power as 
possible throughout the interview process. The interviewer engaged in active listening 
as participants were invited to communicate freely and openly. Rapport was established 
and guidance offered when appropriate, in developing the interview, while the 
researcher took care not to interject, make commentary, and use facial or body 
expressions in a way that encouraged or discouraged an individual’s open responses. 
Tape-recorded interviews lasted up to 60-120 minutes.  
 Ethics.  Ethical considerations are embedded in every step of qualitative 
research (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000). The study was conducted in line with 
the Ethical Approval Form required by the Institute of Social Psychology at The 
London School of Economics and within the ethical guidelines of the British Society of 
Criminology, as informed by the British Psychological Society (BPS) and the 
American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines for ethical treatment of research 
participants. An ethical approval form was submitted to the LSE’s Institute of Social 
Psychology Ethics Committee before any data was collected (see Appendix B). The 
researcher was honest in facing personal perspectives and assumptions in what 
participants were sharing (via bracketing), and sought to establish a trustworthy 
environment. The requirements of informed consent and confidentiality applied to all 
participants. Procedures assigning generic and anonymous codes for respondents, as 
well as omitting individual names, agencies and titles throughout the study, were put in 
place to ensure confidentiality with regards to interviews and case files during 
transcription.. Naturally, the issue of intelligence, secrecy and protecting identities are 
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of paramount importance in this context, hence the decision to conceal all of this 
information. All participants were informed of their rights to withdraw from the study 
at any time without prejudice, and confidentiality of their results was guaranteed. 
Setting.  With the CEO’s assistance, interviews were conducted on site at the 
HIDTA head office, in a conference room specially designated for this study’s research 
activities whenever it was convenient for participants. The interview space insured 
privacy and was free from distractions, interruptions, noise, and other people. Meeting 
times were flexible, so as not to inconvenience participants.  
3.5.2 Interview topic guides and procedure.  Every interview began with a 
review of the study’s purpose, reassurance of confidentiality and an explanation of how 
the information would be handled. Permission to tape-record participant interviews was 
obtained, hence utilizing the voice-centred method of data collection as described by 
Brown and Gilligan (1992). This method preserved responses for analysis, as no notes 
were taken during the interviews, which allowed greater trust to be built between 
interviewer and interviewee, as participants need not worry about what was being 
noted. The interview’s design was such that the interviewer could stimulate 
participants’ recall of specific, TNP cooperation related topics when appropriate. 
The interview strategy was supported by Weiss’s (1994) and Seidman’s (1998) 
guidelines for conducting qualitative interviews (e.g., preparation, establishing a 
relationship, phrasing of questions, etc.). The interview schedule consisted of 4 sections 
(TNP and Caribbean links, the DEA, the HIDTA Program, and social psychological 
approaches to TNPC) and a total of 26 questions. These interviews took place at the 
PR/USVI HIDTA office between August 8 and 12, 2005. While there was an initial list 
of questions with four related topics, covering a wide range of TNP matters to be 
covered with each informant, the order and depth of coverage varied considerably from 
one participant to the next.  
To begin each interview session, participants were thanked for agreeing to 
participate. After an informed consent form was filled out and signed, taping began and 
then ended when the participant and interviewer agreed that the interview had been 
completed, going no longer than 120 minutes each session. An interview topic guide 
was used to ensure that questions were posed to each participant, yet it was not used in 
a rigid, tightly structured way, with interviews allowing participants to freely construct 
narratives and speak about their thoughts and feelings. Guided by interpretive inquiry, 
the study of construction, the interview focused on obtaining stakeholder’s narratives 
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on TNPC and establishing comfort with such a progressive lateral topic. Meaning-
making was taken to the participants, who were asked to define what TNPC meant to 
them.  
The interview was designed to stimulate the stakeholder’s views of TNPC in PR 
and DR. To this end, a list of topics was drafted, based on TNPC issues that trickled 
down from the broader issues of TNPC within the Caribbean to leading stakeholders; 
issues such as the DEA and HIDTA’s methods of cooperation, to the very specific 
social psychological factors that contribute to improved cooperation. Participants were 
encouraged to tell their stories, with appropriate probing to facilitate elaboration in 
areas of interest. Some participants talked at length without needing a question or topic 
to guide them, whereas others were in need of more guidance and prompting.  It was 
emphasised that hearing “their story” was of utmost interest. 
The interviews were semi-structured through the use of a mix of open-ended 
and more focused questions, however were influenced from certain narrative 
interviewing principles. These influences principally concerned the attempt to develop 
the interviews around the interviewees describing the operational work they conduct 
through occupational stories, and methods of story-telling (Denzin, 2001; Plummer, 
2002). The narrative approach to questioning was emphasised, since such storytelling is 
a commonly used mode through which people make meaning of their lives (Mishler, 
1986). Inquiry was toward understanding the subjective meaning of TNPC. Inherent in 
the process was the interviewer’s stance of being open to individual differences within 
each interview. As much as possible, the participant was asked to give an example or 
fully elaborate on a point with more detail if necessary. Questions similar to, “How did 
that make you feel?”, “What did that mean to you?” and “Can you tell me more?” 
helped to strengthen rapport, allowing participants to know that their experiences, 
feelings, and thoughts were being heard. Semi-structured interviews allowed for focus 
on both particular themes and variations in content and process. Throughout the 
interview process, participants explored various ways that TNPC information is used 
and communicated; direct or “spoken” ways, such as reading materials, and indirect or 
“unspoken ways,” like role modelling. 
 Interviews were transcribed verbatim, as soon as possible, following the 
interaction, and listened to repeatedly in order to ensure accurate transcription. The 
transcripts were formatted in an organised manner (page numbers, line numbers, line 
and margin spacing) that made them easy to reference. Each participant’s records were 
82	  
	  
maintained in their own binder, with names, places and other identifying evidence 
changed in the transcript for confidentiality purposes. Binders were stored in a secure 
location, accessed only by the researcher. Regular conferences were held with 
participants to ensure accurate interpretation of participant’s meaning-making and 
experiences.  
3.6 Methods for Analysis 
Qualitative research is propelled by the assumption that “knowledge is within the 
meanings people make of it; knowledge is gained through people talking about their 
meanings; knowledge is laced with personal biases and values; knowledge is written in 
a personal, up-close way; and knowledge evolves, emerges, and is inextricably tied to 
the context in which it is studied” (Creswell, 1998, p. 19). Qualitative research is 
analysed inductively; abstractions are constructed as evidence is gathered and grouped 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 2003).  
 Phenomenological data analysis involves reduction methodology, where 
specific statements and themes are analysed for all potential meanings. Data analysis 
was conductive as recommended by Creswell (1998): (1) Interviews were read in their 
entirety; (2) Significant statements from each interview were extracted, then divided 
into statements (also known as “horizonalization”), then shared with the participants for 
accuracy; (3) Statements were formulated into clusters of meaning, which became 
themes; and (4) Themes were integrated into a narrative, textural description of what 
was experienced and a structural description of how it was experienced.  
 Attride-Stirling’s (2001) methods were also employed in the analysis, 
suggesting that there had been too little attention paid to both the process of analyzing 
qualitative data, and an aim to fill the gap by describing one method of conducting 
thematic analysis of textual data in detail. She also points out how, what she terms, 
thematic networks can be used to express thematic analyses of qualitative data (Attride-
Stirling, 2001) Thematic networks draw on a number of analytical techniques, most 
particularly Toulmin’s argumentation theory, which describes the method of 
argumentation as the movement from data to a warrant to a claim (Attride-Stirling, 
2001). Thematic networks simply aim to structure the themes at different levels of 
meaning in a text, to illustrate a clearer relationship between premises. 
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 Basic themes are the most low-level, simple premises which make little sense 
unless read in the context of the organizing and global themes. Organizing themes 
group these basic themes into clusters of similar issues and reveal some of the 
assumptions that lie beneath them. A group of organizing themes constitutes a global 
theme, which is a collection of all the main ideas and metaphors within the text. Global 
themes group together organizing themes that together constitute an argument. (Attride-
Stirling, 2001) 
 Analysis was conducted by breaking down the text, using codes. Once a series 
of coded text segments had been identified, themes were abstracted and then further 
refined. Finally, organizing and grouping these themes produced the Global themes, 
and the whole was able to be organised as a non-hierarchical, web-like network 
(Attrride-Stirling, 2001). Once the network had been produced it was able to be used as 
a tool to re-evaluate the text itself, in order to interpret further patterns.  
Data was further analyzed as observational and marginal comments were made 
and analytic memos written on the content of the interviews. Some sections were 
summarised for content. Such reflective memos enable researchers “to critique our own 
work and to develop insights or directions” (Ely, Vinz, Downing & Anzul, 2001, p. 28) 
and turn the field notes into other forms. Transcripts were read several times with 
statements, holding special meaning to the phenomenon under study, highlighted or 
underlined. Significant statements were then interpreted both as either across-cases 
and/or within-cases (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003; Van Manen, 1994). Within-
case data typically involve detailed case study write-ups with no standard for such 
analysis; across-case data is used to select categories and look for within-case 
similarities, coupled with intergroup differences (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Great care 
was taken to “distinguish between information relevant to all participants and those 
aspects of the experience exclusive” to a particular informant, as recommended by 
Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl (2003).  
Hence, common themes, supported in the participant’s own words, arose from 
grouped data that had similar meaning across-cases. In reporting results, being able to 
provide within-case descriptions, in addition to the overarching themes of across-case 
data, afforded information closer to the reality of the lived experiences, further serving 
the investigation’s purpose.  
Analytic memos (an examination of the objects, articulations, events and people 
in study) became part of a maintained log, serving as reflections on what was learned in 
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the research process. They were penned in an effort to gain new insights and to make 
suggestions for future action (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000). Such self-
reflection enabled an awareness of the researcher’s prejudgments and experiences and 
encouraged reliance on intuition in capturing the essence of participants’ experiences 
(Creswell, 1998). A personal log also became data, capturing everything and replicating 
interview and research experiences in an effort to gather thoughts on the transcripts, 
analytic memos, observer comments, and ongoing analytic schemes. At this point, the 
researcher encountered “the self as instrument through a personal dialogue about 
moments of victory and disheartenment, hunches, feelings, insights, assumptions, 
biases, and ongoing ideas about method” (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000, p. 
69). This also provided the details needed to start analysis, including ideas or questions 
which became apparent during and after the interview, insights revealed during the 
transcription process and personal reactions. Additional connections were made within 
and across log entries on future review, prompting further comments to be recorded in 
the margins. This process, repeated numerous times, added insight, which sometimes 
confirmed or questioned earlier hunches.  This constant comparison method was 
employed, meaning analysis was ongoing throughout the data collection period 
(Maxwell, 1996).  
A preliminary analysis, following a process guided by Goetz and LeCompte 
(1984), was conducted after each participant had been interviewed. Tapes and 
transcripts were thoroughly reviewed to date, prompting intensive note taking, and a 
tentative list of categories with which to codify interview data was generated. The 
process of content coding was initiated by first reading and writing down words and 
phrases in the margins of the transcripts (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Any idea that 
seemed important was noted, tracking various terms, unrelated findings, and recurring 
points, allowing an analysis of the data free of any expectations of results. Data was 
then organised and coded into “bins,” meaningful units of labeled data (Ely, Anzul, 
Friedman, & Garner, 2000). These identified “categories,” helped link the data, 
arranging them into an organised form, in the hope that a conceptual scheme or 
metathemes emerged. Coding is a process of making sense through categories, and 
involves combining data about the same topic/theme so that each category can be 
studied separately (Tesch, 1990). Data was decontextualised, by way of coding and 
sorting, and then recontextualised, restored to similar groupings of meaning extracted 
from participants’ accounts (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). Categories were 
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assessed in terms of any commonalities in stakeholder’s experiences, as well as 
idiosyncratic experiences. They were then clustered into overarching themes and 
constructs, first individually and then for the entire group. Those that were similar in 
meaning or that lacked specificity were eliminated. 36 codes were identified through 
this process (Appendix F). 
The analyses were based on the scrutiny of transcripts; an examination for a 
consistency of pattern(s), recurrence of descriptive phrases or “stories,” and the 
emergence of holistic meanings across a number of cases (Miles & Huberman, 1984).  
The analysis was systematic, recursive, and substantiated with the use of a great deal of 
data; analysis was not the final phase of the research process, but rather was concurrent 
with data collection (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 2001). Participants were asked for 
their time in recursive analysis efforts, inviting further explanation, clarification, or 
expansion (Lofland & Lofland, 1984). Participant checks were conducted throughout 
the study, allowing the interviewees to describe the facts in their own views, challenge 
interpretations, assess the data’s overall adequacy and volunteer additional information 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A transcribed quote from the interviews was either emailed in 
section or read to them, asking for additional clarification or feedback on the 
interpretation of their stories. Winnowing assisted in editing the information and 
deciding what was excessive or unimportant to the study (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & 
Anzul, 2001). 
The final phase of data analysis involved constructing the phenomenon by 
indicating how elements related to and affected each other, and became a totality 
(Denzin, 2002). An attempt was made to find the same recurring forms of conduct, 
experience and meaning in participants’ lived experiences before contextualizing the 
phenomenon. With contextualization, participants agreed to collaborate on the study’s 
themes and structures, verifying or correcting interpretations following data collection. 
The ultimate themes were statements of meaning that either ran through all or most of 
the data or ones that carried a heavy emotional or factual impact for individual 
participants (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 2001). Participants, on the whole, agreed 
with the final assessment of their commentaries, with minimal corrections to the 
meaning and analysis of their comments.  
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3.7 Quality Assurance and Reflexivity 
 Great care was taken in preparing for interviews and in handling the data 
collected.  The research was conducted in a respectful, non-judgmental manner, highly 
regarding the confidentiality of thoughts and experiences of HIDTA or any 
stakeholder’s perspectives. In establishing a trustworthy environment for gathering 
data, recommendations made by Ely, Anzul, Friedman, and Garner (2000) were 
employed in: establishing rapport; providing focus; questioning, observing, and 
listening; being sensitive to clues; probing; amalgamating; being involved; and 
clarifying and managing biases. Lastly, peers and colleagues were consulted in the 
process, who provided additional tools in maintaining trustworthiness. Amidst such 
support, honesty was maintained, critical themes identified and alternative 
interpretations or possible biases were recognised. 
Like Douglas (1976) and Geertz (1973), the phenomenological perspective on 
validity is considered: “that multiple realities exist and multiple interpretations are 
available from different individuals that are all equally valid. Reality is a social 
construct” (Newman & Benz, 1998, p. 2). Validity, in this research endeavour, is 
grounded in the uniqueness of each lived experience. Phenomenological research is 
“the description of the phenomenon from accounts of those who have experienced it” 
(Jasper, 1994, p. 312), which is the validity in and of itself. 
According to Polkinghorne (1989), there are five questions that investigators 
may ask themselves in considering if validity is being honoured. These focus on: 
1. Whether the interviewer influenced participant descriptions in a way that their 
actual experience is not truly reflected. 
2. The accuracy of the transcription (e.g., the degree to which tapes were written 
up word for word with stylistic emphasis) and the meaning conveyed in the 
interview. 
3. The possibility of conclusions beyond those given by the researcher that could 
be derived during transcription analysis.  
4. The ability of the investigator to account for the specific contents and 
connections in the original examples of the experience by going from the 
general structural description to the transcripts. 
5. How specific or general the structural description situation is in holding for the 
experience in other situations.  
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In addressing these issues, and the study’s trustworthiness, the following was 
undertaken: 
1. Credibility, the data’s authenticity, was realised through peer debriefing (talks 
with colleagues and the dissertation committee), member checking, and clarity 
of roles. Participants were asked to review portions of their transcripts for 
accuracy. Participants and professional colleagues were invited to provide input 
about preliminary conclusions (Stiles, 1993), and biases as researcher (e.g., 
memos) were continually noted. Peer debriefing involved the doctoral 
dissertation committee, providing feedback on inconsistencies, alternative 
interpretations, gaps and unchecked biases. Furthermore, the relationship 
between researcher and participants was made explicit (Field, 1991), 
acknowledging at every stage of the study that “Interviewers are deeply and 
unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that ostensibly reside within 
respondents” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 3). 
2. Confirmability, also known as objectivity in quantitative research, was ensured 
in that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations were supported by the 
data. All data can be traced back to their original sources if scrutinised (e.g., by 
linking participants’ quotes to their original tapes and transcripts with 
pseudonyms), supporting the logical consistency between different data sets and 
truth value (Stiles, 1993). 
3. Dependability, or reliability, as it is known in quantitative terms, was achieved 
through record keeping (e.g., analytic memos) that would foster future research 
using these processes and procedures (Mertens, 1998) in determining stability 
of the results over time. An explicit framework was established for data 
collection and analysis of this type. Participants, being the main source, also 
contributed to the study’s dependability, simply by providing inimitable data 
Transferability, which allows another to determine whether research findings 
are applicable in other contexts or settings, was achieved through cultural and 
social descriptions of the community, particularly concerning the population 
from which data came, as is done in the research literature (Stiles, 1993). Thick, 
rich descriptions of findings, according to Creswell (1998) assist readers in 
making decisions regarding the transferability of results to other situations or 
population members who share similar characteristics. Additionally, 
information was sought from a variety of sources, using several theories to 
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understand the phenomenon under study, drawing data from multiple sources 
(Stiles, 1993). Since transferability is essentially determined by the reviewer, no 
definitive claims are being made as to how results apply to others, as this is not 
a goal of qualitative research. Instead, the use of detailed description and 
multiple, varied, cases helps situate stakeholders in their context – time, place, 
culture, background - allowing reviewers to comprehend the parameters of 
generalizability regarding who, what, where, and when. 
89	  
	  
Chapter Four 
Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Transnational Crime and Policing in Puerto Rico 
and the Dominican Republic 
4.1 Introduction to Chapter Four 
Narrative explorations of transnational crime and policing in PR and DR have 
been sparse in the literature. The experiences and perspectives of the stakeholders were 
collected by interviewing 30 agents about their perspectives on the crime problem, 
contextual factors and how they perceive tackling the problem. Taking this approach 
lent an understanding to how these law enforcement professionals construct the issues 
of TNP for themselves, and opened doors to a range of topics and experiences explored 
in such unique breadth and depth. These areas of investigation are critical to help better 
understand the barriers and facilitators and key social psychological influences in 
TNPC which are later explored at length.  
 In keeping with the overall objective of this research, Chapter 4 is the first 
which reports the current investigation’s results, as well as addresses the fundamental 
question of what TNP is and how it is overwhelmingly relevant in the Caribbean. It 
specifically covers questions, posed to participants, related to transnational crimes in 
PR and the DR; how they are addressed and the characteristics of cooperation displayed 
by local police forces. The resulting interviews with law enforcement officials 
determined that Caribbean crime related largely to drugs, weapons trading, human 
trafficking and terrorism. The study also uncovered the fact that cooperation in the 
Caribbean is different from other regions due to geographical, cultural and legal factors, 
and cultivating cooperation consisted of intelligence gathering, better surveillance, and 
undercover operations, amongst other factors. Respondents also felt that increased 
training, communication and political will were essential to enhance cooperation. 
4.2 Perspectives on the Crime Problem 
 The nature of transnational crimes, and the extent to which it exists, in PR and 
the DR was given a great deal of attention in establishing the environment in which 
agents must function. Participants were asked to share their thoughts on how these 
transnational crimes are currently addressed, including the degree and quality of 
cooperation involved. Specific aspects of cooperation were specifically probed: 
whether it is reactive or proactive, whether it is different from methods used elsewhere, 
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how it is linked to other regions of the world, how it is lacking, regulated, and needs to 
be improved, as well as how accountability is handled when agents do collaborate.  
Themes that emerged revolved around the interconnectedness of crime and the 
prevalence of drug crime, weapons smuggling, illegal migrations and human trafficking 
in describing the ‘scene’. The impact of geography as a theme, especially PR’s position 
as a ‘gateway island,’ helped to further explain why criminal activity prevails in this 
region.  
In offering solutions to existing problems, participants’ responses focused on 
cultural clashes and legal differences (including local and international laws), the need 
for cooperation, intelligence sharing, communications, support in cultivating 
cooperation, and the desire for those involved to be more proactive and tackle crime at 
its source. Other related themes included the need to train together, the need to get 
along with local police, and difficulties with human rights protections in doing their 
job.  
In discussing desired changes, major needs included more resources, 
accountability, support, and an overall organisational makeover.  
4.2.1 It is all interlinked: interconnected crime.  The clearest theme that 
emerged regarding the extent and nature of transnational crime in PR and the DR was 
that different forms of transnational crime in the Caribbean are highly interconnected, 
with drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, illegal migration, and human trafficking all 
perceived, by the participants, as interlinked. In addition, PR's position in the Caribbean 
as an offshore territory of the US was considered an extremely important factor 
contributing to its high transnational crime rate.  
 Clearly, transnational crime in the Caribbean does not operate in carefully 
delineated sectors. While this is true of all crime to some extent, in the case of the 
Caribbean different kinds of crime are seen as very interconnected. The strongest 
correlation described by respondents was the link between illegal migration and drug 
smuggling, given the large numbers of illegal migrants and trafficked people entering 
PR, many of them carrying drugs. One participant responded, “With 90 miles the Mona 
Strait is a hotbed of illegal activities” (R4-Federal). Drug crime, itself, was also seen as 
linked to both weapons smuggling and violent crime. This was on account of the 
violent and highly territorial nature of drug crime, with drug traffickers’ need for 
weapons to defend themselves against other traffickers and to protect their territory in 
the event of turf wars. It was suggested that most violent crime in PR was linked to 
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drugs: “In our newspapers, every day there is a lot of killings that you don’t see any 
other reason, they are all drug related in one way or another….”.(R27-Local). 
4.2.2 Running rampant: drug crime.  Drug crime was identified as the most 
prevalent type of crime, with some respondents suggesting that up to 90% of crime is 
drug-related. The dynamics of drug trafficking crime in the Caribbean are heavily 
dependent on PR's position as a “gateway to the US”, although the drugs from the 
Caribbean do enter other markets, as well. Drugs produced in Central and South 
America pass through the Caribbean and then on to the US and Europe, and there was a 
suggestion that the positions of PR and the DR in the chain had been consolidated and 
grown in recent years: 
Between three and five years the crime is going up and the DR like PR 
is getting one of the more important points in the drugs distribution 
around this basin with South America. So they are getting (inaudible) 
crime organisations in the DR and PR, like a middle point in distribution 
around the world to get into the States and going down to South 
America. (R20-F) 
 However, whether PR is only a transhipment point or a destination for drugs in 
its own right is disputed; certainly the majority of drugs pass through, but several 
respondents also mentioned a domestic drug problem, with housing projects a key 
distribution point for drugs. What was not in dispute was that drug crime is highly 
territorial, as drug traffickers and dealers seek to control specific housing projects and 
routes. In relation to drug crime, this was the main source of violence as “all the drug 
distribution points are already booked” (R21-F).  
4.2.3 Weapons smuggling abounds.  Weapons smuggling was not described as 
a large-scale problem in its own right in PR, but rather in its relation to drug smuggling 
and in facilitating drug-related violent crime. Weapons smuggling was clearly linked to 
drugs in the sense that drug violence fuels demand for weapons. As one respondent 
commented, “Ninety-nine percent of the time you will always find one with the 
other…” (R25-F). The fact emerged that weapons smuggling, as a process, is distinct 
from drug trafficking and does not necessarily follow the same lines of supply or 
involve the same people. While drug traffickers might regularly carry arms, dedicated 
weapons smuggling involved different suppliers and separate routes: “No, they come 
separate. They have guys that, all they do is just get you guns” (R3-International). 
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 It was also agreed that most weapons entering PR were not doing so in large 
quantities, although some officers described instances when this had happened. Most 
frequently, weapons were smuggled in smaller quantities, often brought in by post or 
individuals entering from the US. In this case, PR's position as the “gateway to the US” 
worked in reverse, with weapons coming from the US into PR, due to relaxed gun laws 
and the right to carry arms in the US One respondent described the process whereby 
individuals are able to carry a weapon on a flight, as long as they inform the airline, but 
not necessarily the local police: 
So it’s like the [airline] carrier knows but the carrier doesn’t have an 
obligation to tell the local police that this individual that is coming from 
New York to PR is bringing a weapon. [...] Maybe he’s bringing one 
new weapon every time and selling that weapon, we don’t know. (R27-
L) 
Another common method of bringing in weapons was via the US Postal Service, 
disassembling them in PR, and then reassembling the weapons once received in the US.  
4.2.4 The problem of people: illegal migration and human trafficking.  The 
issue of illegal entry to the island was regarded by many respondents as on a par with, 
and closely linked to, the problem of drug crime. Similarly, weapons smuggling and 
prostitution were seen as connected to the drug world. A rising related concern was that 
PR's “gateway” status could be exploited by terrorists, both as an entry point and due to 
the high level of transnational crime, representing potential revenue to fund terrorist 
activities. Illegal migrants are used by drug traffickers to carry drugs and weapons, and 
the scale of migration is such that respondents suggested that ten thousand people a 
year were illegally moving into PR from other islands, especially the DR: “Dominicans 
are coming to PR in boats that can’t even hold two people and there’s, like, twenty in 
there and stuff like that” (R29-F). Illegal entry from the DR tended to be framed as a 
threat in itself, particularly because a large DR community in PR meant that there were 
resources available to illegal migrants on their arrival. One respondent stated:  
Illegal immigration, that’s big business in the DR. Once they get here to 
PR there is a big DR community and they can easily get a driver’s 
licence, social security number, so it will be easy for them once they get 
that identification they can easily fly to New York or some other State. 
(R7-Local) 
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 Because of the heavy association of drug crime with illegal migration, there was 
also a sense among some officers that “every criminal here is a foreigner” (R3-I). It is 
an intriguing comment, in that it is not the foreigners, per se, that are seen as all 
criminal. The implication and the emphasis is more on the fact that all of the criminals 
seemed to be foreign, which in some way exempted all natives from criminal activity or 
suspicion. There was also an understanding among officers that there were reasons for 
the wave of migration coming from the DR – primarily instability and poverty:  
It’s only natural they will (inaudible) close to it and they have a bunch 
of problems politically and you have a lot of poverty, and if they just try 
to get out – I mean, we did it. Puerto Ricans did it at one point; they 
started fleeing to the US. (R3-I) 
 In this sense, the Dominicans were sometimes described in terms of a 
'threat' in themselves, and there was some stereotyping of Dominicans as 
dishonest criminals: “They steal a lot, somewhere I’ve heard that, but I’ve never 
been over there yet” (R29-F). The DR was also viewed as a violent place: “I 
believe Dominican gangs are very violent and I guess the violence comes from 
living in the DR and they come here and try to implement that violence here in 
PR” (R11-F). 
 In terms of the relationship between PR and the DR, it was suggested that 
criminals from the different islands specialise in different elements of trafficking, with 
Dominicans controlling transportation and Puerto Ricans controlling distribution. 
However, there was also some suggestion that, despite the high level of crime imported 
from the DR, a greater level of cooperation with the DR balanced this to some extent.  
 Human trafficking, specifically, was mentioned slightly less often than illegal 
migration, though often in the same breath and not always clearly demarcated from the 
more general problem of illegal entry. Some respondents suggested that it was a huge 
problem, while others were sceptical. Yet, clearly, there is a high level of illegal 
movement, some of which may not be consensual. Overall, it was clear that illegal 
movement into PR facilitates the movement of people, drugs, and weapons into the US 
and, despite some sympathy for the underlying problems, officers saw it as a key 
challenge.  
To conclude with the interconnectedness of crime, it appears that respondents 
generally agreed on the kinds of transnational crime faced in PR, the DR and the 
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Caribbean, as well as with the dynamics of how the different kinds of crime interact. 
The two biggest problems regarding the nature of TN crime in this area are illegal 
migration and drug trafficking, which feed each other and are closely linked. . In turn, 
drug trafficking creates a demand for weapons and causes violence. All of these 
transnational crimes depend heavily on PR's strategic position within the Caribbean and 
as a territory of the US, as well as on a symbiotic relationship with the DR, where 
instability and poverty feed crime.  
4.3 Contextual Factors  
4.3.1 The ‘Gateway’ Island: Puerto Rico’s position.  PR's strategic position 
in the Caribbean appears to be key in explaining the degree of transnational crime 
experienced on the island. The island’s was described variously by participants as a 
gateway, stepping stone, bridge and a hotspot. Since people and goods entering PR 
from other countries are considered 'domestic' when they continue on to the US, they 
are less carefully scrutinised. This makes PR particularly valuable as an entry point to 
the US for both people and illegal goods. In fact, the supply route from South America 
had, according to some respondents, actually grown in the past few years. However, the 
gateway is, to a degree, reversed for weapons smuggling, with more arms going from 
the US to PR.  
 The sheer size of the Caribbean, and the difficulty of policing land, sea, and air 
across many tiny islands, was stressed by agents at the end of interviews, indicating the 
degree of influence geography has on the criminal situation. For instance, one 
respondent described flying across the island and being shocked by its scale. Another 
agent emphasised the number of drug trafficking operations that transpire and the 
difficulty of watching every vessel entering and leaving all the islands:  
When the sun goes down there’s boats coming from the east and west 
and, you know, if you’re up in a plane and radar and a night scope, 
you’re going to see all these boats. Where are they all coming [from]? 
(R17-F) 
 Related to this was the frustration that drug traffickers adapt so quickly, making 
it difficult to keep up with changes in their methods and tactics. One respondent said 
that agents were currently seeing a shift in operations from drugs entering on yolas  (a 
wooden vessel with a small motor) to drugs entering on entertainment boats (such as 
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jet-skis and cruise boats), since these were less likely to be searched. The respondent 
explained, “We can’t define how, but a loophole has been found again and I see 
ourselves at that point where we’re trying to figure out, okay, there’s a loophole and 
we’re not seeing it” (R14-F).  
 Again, emphasising the scale and diversity of transnational crime in the 
Caribbean, another respondent suggested that it was important to think beyond drug 
crime:  
We have certain countries they have offshore banking for money laundering. 
They have Internet sites to commit fraud, telemarketing fraud, insurance fraud, 
that is here on this island, so you will find a whole spectrum of crime not only 
drugs. (R16-F)  
This repeated response regarding the interconnectedness of crime, coupled with the 
Caribbean’s ideal conditions for transnational crime, such as its geographical 
advantages, make it a particularly challenging area in which to work. 
4.3.2 Is it my problem, your problem, or our problem?: the impact of 
geography.  In understanding how other regions are affected by PR/DR linked crime, 
two factors emerged as relevant to cooperation: firstly, the awareness other countries 
and islands have of the problem of crime in PR/DR;. secondly, the extent to which they 
perceive this transnational crime as affecting their own area. Cooperation with areas 
outside of the Caribbean, such as in North and South America, and cooperation 
between islands, apart from PR/DR, was generally described as ad hoc rather than 
established, with crime awareness and the perception of local impact being key to 
whether cooperation occurs. This suggests that having a sense of a common problem 
helps to link different forces and build cooperation and trust. However, it appears that 
competition and territorialism are also factors that emerge as having influence in 
hampering cooperation.  
 It is the interconnected nature of crime in the Caribbean that reaches across 
geographical borders, making the situation everyone’s problem and not purely one of 
PR/DR. For example, drugs moving through PR/DR often arrive from, or are then sent 
on to, smaller islands, such as St. Martin, St. Thomas, or St. Croix. The awareness of 
this problem among smaller islands meant that they were eager to cooperate, for 
reasons such as the impact that a reputation for drug trading could have on their tourism 
industries. One respondent talked about this with reference to Aruba:  
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I think it’s because their economy is so much smaller and their island is 
so much smaller and so they kind of have a tighter grip on things and 
they would like it, for example this whole Aruba situation.  As long as 
you have, you know, a dirty mob reputation and the media think like 
that, your tourist industry which those islands rely on, will go down the 
drain (R23-Internatiomal). 
 However, in cases where transnational crime did not have a serious impact on 
islands, or in cases where there was no perceived effect, islands were less likely to be 
interested in cooperating. In cases where crime was perceived to be simply ‘passing 
through’, other forces were likely to be less motivated to cooperate because, as one 
officer put it, they think, “Hey, it’s not our problem, it’s your problem” (R17-F). 
 A key theme that echoed throughout many of the responses was that 
cooperation with local forces in other countries, islands, or the US mainland depended, 
to a large extent, on whether agents had an understanding of PR/DR crime and whether 
they thought it affected their area. In some cases, this understanding, as well as the 
clear interests at stake, including the cultural links and affinities between the forces 
(e.g., PR’s ties with Miami and New York), could be relied upon in terms of 
cooperation. In other cases, however, it depended on shifting priorities, time 
constraints, and efforts made by individuals involved.  
 Another key idea that emerged, related to geographic awareness, was that the 
physical differences between working on the mainland and working on islands 
presented challenges to cooperating and dealing with transnational crime. The natural 
border of the seas between islands makes entry to islands easier for traffickers, and 
makes it more difficult to police them effectively, with one participant commenting that 
law enforcement “need[s] to look [at] air, ground and sea, so that makes us unique” 
(R1-L). This naturally leads to a problem of resourcing as resources then need to be 
used more effectively and innovatively to cover all the different entry points. One 
respondent said:  
PR and the Caribbean, being little islands that are spread out in a big 
chunk of water, the resources and the way that you address these 
problems are different to how you address problems in the border, for 
example, where you put up a wall, put in a bunch of sentries. (R3-I) 
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 Some officers suggested that the smaller islands simply did not have the 
resources available to efficiently police all the different entry point, but, again, this 
could be presented as an opportunity for cooperation rather than as a barrier to it, as one 
noted: “There are small islands and they cannot function totally by themselves in a lot 
of respects so they have to depend on other people whether it be the Brits, whether it be 
the DEA, whether it be family” (R25-F). 
 In relation to cooperation with forces on the mainland, the most important factor 
in cooperation, when inquiring about North America, was whether other forces saw 
collaboration as something that was in their better interest; whether they were aware of 
how transnational crime was related to the crimes they investigate. Many respondents 
provided examples of times when they had successfully cooperated with mainland US 
forces, suggesting that, particularly in areas with strong links to the Caribbean, such as 
New York and Miami, awareness of the effects of PR/DR related crime existed. In 
comparison, some respondents felt that other forces did not appreciate or understand 
the nature of PR/DR crime, or felt that it did not affect them and were therefore less 
cooperative. One respondent thought that forces in other parts of the US saw the 
Caribbean as “on the margins” and perceived crime there as non-threatening to the ‘ US 
mainland: “They seem sometimes to look at the Caribbean as a problem out of the 
sides, out of the back of the nation and not as a problem within the nation” (R14-F).  
 This reinforced the idea that the perception of transnational crime as a shared 
problem and an understanding of its interconnectedness are key influencers towards 
cooperation. Where this does not exist, respondents report that cooperation is less 
common.  
 Apart from the sense of a shared problem, awareness of a shared culture 
influenced cooperation amongst police forces in particular locales. In areas like Miami, 
where migration from the Caribbean has been high, not only are many police officers of 
Latin American origin, but so is the population they are policing. Some respondents 
suggested that this cultural link improves cooperation: 
You had a big influx of Cuban immigrants at one time, you have a 
bunch of Puerto Ricans taking over Kissimmee or Orlando and other 
areas of Florida, you have a bunch of South Americans coming in and 
that all pretty much just changes your style in the sense of, ‘How am I 
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going to deal with all these individuals’, and how, culturally, you have 
to approach it. (R3-I) 
This acknowledges the need to recognise differences and adapt accordingly in 
order to deal with the alternative modes of operation that characterise different 
cultures.  
 Cooperation with Central and South American countries was found to be less 
extensive than cooperation with islands or with mainland US forces. While there might 
be some links, information sharing and other forms of cooperation were less frequent 
and proactive. Since fewer respondents addressed this, there was less information about 
what caused this lack of cooperation, but one respondent suggested it stemmed from 
legal differences, as well as the fact that countries with different political systems to the 
US could be difficult to work with:  
Sometimes you know that there’s someone out there that you want to get 
your hands on, the same government tries to hassle you and you’ve got 
to go through a whole lot of changes to get your hands on that person 
[…] but what makes it really hard is the difference on the system. We’ve 
got a democratic system, they work on a republican system and all that 
kind of stuff, and sometimes even government officials believe that 
you’re just hassling people. (R28-L) 
 Overall, responses suggested that the biggest factor for building trust and 
cooperation within the law enforcement community, across borders, is a sense that 
transnational crime is a shared problem. In areas where forces thought of PR/DR-
related crimes as ‘someone else’s problem,’ or where they did not clearly see the links 
between the crime and the area they were policing, cooperation was more difficult to 
establish. In the very least, there is a need for participants to have a stake in solving 
them. A shared culture in areas of high Caribbean/Latin American migration also  
supports a raised awareness and motivates cooperation.  
4.3.3 Divided, not united: cultural clashes and legal differences.  Another 
significant factor that emerged throughout the responses was a sense that cooperation in 
the Caribbean differs because of the sheer number of different islands, each with their 
own cultures and legal systems. Law enforcement agencies in the continental US 
might, depending on borders, deal with only one other country – their nearest 
neighbour, whether Mexico or Canada – whereas, in the Caribbean, officers have to 
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learn to cooperate with partners from a range of different cultures. These include 
islands that are overseas territories of Britain, France, or the Netherlands, as well as 
sovereign states with their own distinct legal and cultural traditions and Latin American 
countries, such as Colombia or Venezuela. This can lead to complications in dealing 
with individual legal systems – not to mention law enforcement traditions and cultures. 
For instance, one respondent mentioned the difficulty of dealing with local by-laws or 
‘hidden laws’ of other islands, while others mentioned the challenges posed by 
different legal traditions. As an example, in islands with a Dutch legal tradition, 
informants have no legal recognition or protection. 
 In addition to problems of cultural and legal difference, it was clear that some 
islands and states are more proactive than others in dealing with transnational crime, 
and political will was identified as a crucial factor in facilitating cooperation. 
Respondents noted that they deal extensively with islands/states that are willing to put 
effort and resources into dealing with transnational crime, as opposed to others that are 
incapable or unwilling to deal with crime effectively. As one respondent shared:  
I think there is much more co-operation here, you just, you know, it’s 
the same (inaudible) in Canada, you know, each place is unique, and 
what the problem is and how they are supposed to work this out, and 
some places are not working this out, only by connection with a couple 
of countries who are actually making a strong effort.  I mean the 
Dominicans and ourselves work very closely, you know, the Dutch co-
operate, the same with the English and stuff like that (R17-F). 
 An exploration into shared cultural elements between the islands of the 
Caribbean revealed that they were not necessarily positive or helpful towards 
cooperation. One respondent described a specific “island culture” that could be seen 
across the Caribbean (R7-L). The officer characterised this as a “relaxed and laid back, 
slack attitude”. Other, rather negative characteristics of Caribbean culture included 
nepotism and corruption, and a tendency towards territorialism between agencies 
(although this, it was suggested, is declining). However, these cultural elements were 
not the main element that respondents identified as common to the islands. Rather, they 
suggested that the Caribbean is united by a more instrumental factor, specifically, that 
the level of transnational crime, and especially violent crime across the islands, means 
that officers develop a sense of a shared goal or a common enemy. This sense of a 
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shared problem or goal appears to be an important element in developing trust between 
officers of different forces, and could be a powerful force in facilitating effective 
cooperation, as suggested by Gambetta (1988). One respondent stated:  
One thing we share is the drug problem all over the Caribbean so we 
share that particular similar problem.  I think that’s probably one of the 
reasons we’re – that motivates us to do a lot of intelligence and a lot of 
communication, having a communal problem.  This is our everyday 
nightmare, people getting killed because of the drug points and the drug 
selling….it’s the same in Jamaica, it’s the same here, a lot of islands. 
(R24-F) 
 In summary, it is clear that, although the Caribbean experiences a unique range 
of challenges with cooperation, these challenges in themselves create an environment in 
which cooperation must constantly be practised. The difficulty of one island dealing 
with transnational crime independently, as well as the sheer number of complexities 
that arise from working with a large number of very different agencies,	  along with the 
sense of a shared communal struggle against crime, all help to differentiate the 
Caribbean from the way the mainland tends to cooperate and to encourage cooperation 
between different forces. 
4.4 Tackling the Problem 
 Stakeholders’ perspectives on tackling the problem included key issues of 
cooperation and ways to cultivate that cooperation, whether by employing more 
proactive v.s. reactive methods or tackling crime right at its source. However, 
ultimately perceived solutions were reduced to: better communication and sharing of 
information, working within local laws and getting along with local police. Desired 
changes by stakeholders’ included: more resources, organisational restructuring and the 
need to train together. 
4.4.1 Cultivating better cooperation through improved communication and 
intelligence sharing.  Several key themes emerged around the kind of cooperation 
needed to address transnational crime in the Caribbean. In practical terms, these 
included a need to improve communication or sharing of intelligence, and a need for 
improved training. A clear theme also emerged of the need to focus on the roots and 
sources of crime, proactively tackling criminal networks and cutting illegal migration. 
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Other improvements needed include a greater political will to focus on crime, and a 
reduction in corruption. Some respondents thought that no improvements were needed, 
or that change was in progress, but, overall, there appears to be a need for 
improvement, as there was some suggestion that other actors needed to make a greater 
effort in cooperation, specifically, the DR. Key barriers to cooperation in the DR, too, 
were a lack of political will to deal with crime, and the effects of corruption. Some 
respondents thought that these were particularly bad in the DR, with officers there 
constantly trying to cope with “mini crime waves” rather than addressing crime at its 
root. In addition, corruption meant that building relationships for cooperation was 
difficult, both in building trust and in dealing with a high turnover of staff, as one 
respondent verbalised:  
It’s like, okay so all the effort and investment we put into this person to 
work and have a good relation, now is down the drain and now we got to 
start all over again, so that’s one of the problems that we [have] with 
working with them. (R13-International) 
 Sharing information effectively is the highest priority in improving cooperation. 
Most respondents thought that information should be shared constantly and freely, and 
that information technology (IT) systems should be linked to allow access to basic 
information (e.g., names of criminals). There was also a sense that there should be 
greater information sharing between intelligence communities globally, as well as 
between organisations within the US, on account of the diversity and global spread of 
drug-trafficking operations. As one officer explained:  
The problem is you don’t have specific groups doing the trafficking. 
You have the Colombians producing, you have Venezuelans 
transporting, you have people in Panama doing all the money laundering 
and dealing with the black market there, you have the Middle East using 
the drug money to support the international terrorism operations there. 
(R3-I) 
 While the literature examines the need for information sharing, particularly in 
the context of intelligence and deconfliction, it also notes that there are difficulties in 
this area, with intelligence communities not typically very good at cooperating with 
each other (Anderson, 1989; Sheptycki, 2000). 
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Cooperation as key.  Cooperation on addressing transnational crime falls into 
two categories: operation-based or intelligence-based. Cooperation in undercover 
operations and surveillance is one key area in which cooperation is either already 
strong or is considered important to develop. There was also a clear consensus that this 
was one area in which forces were required work together. As an essential element of 
proactive policing, respondents discussed undercover operations in terms of trying to 
'keep ahead' of criminal networks:  
Just slowly trying to step up and finding the new routes they are using 
and try and attack that route, and then they’ll come up with a different 
one and you’re just moving back and forth using confidential sources, 
using wire taps (R18-F). 
 Generally it seems that cooperation between agencies is perceived as 
widespread, yet not always effective. Some respondents thought that officers were 
gaining the skills for cooperation and becoming more adept:  
Well we have co-operation from all kinds of agencies, the Coast Guard, 
we have Customs. I think everybody has gained experience in ways and 
we are trying to put all the efforts to cover all these […] I think we have 
the people, we have the knowledge and the skills. (R1-L) 
 Others, however, thought that there was still too much competition and rivalry 
between agencies for cooperation to exist. Several respondents thought that antagonism 
between different agencies over their territory and cases could still hamper cooperation, 
with one adding: “There are still turf wars happening...”(R10-International). Some of 
this was related to funding, since “He who has the most, how would you say, arrests, 
gets the most funding…” (R12-F). But more important was the culture of competition 
and histories of rivalry that existed. For instance:  
You know how badly we hate the FBI and I don’t know if you’ve 
noticed but there is a lot of animosity…Can you imagine us actually 
trying to take directions from somebody that carried their badge. (R22-
Federal) 
The extreme level of dislike revealed in that statement, and its perception of 
universality, is significant. It supports the overwhelming sense in the literature that 
intelligence agencies are not always good at cooperating, and continues to illuminate 
103	  
	  
why. There is arguably a link here to culture as a barrier, with the two organizations 
clashing, possibly due to a lack of trust (Sheptycki, 2000). This comment is particularly 
reflective of the literature relating to the barriers to TNPC.  However, there was 
certainly a positive response to interagency initiatives, such as HIDTA, particularly in 
terms of the resources they contributed. One respondent in particular stressed the range 
of programs that are funded by HIDTA:  
You’ve got HIDTA, you’ve got PSN, Project Safe Neighbourhood, you 
have OCDTA, Organised Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces 
which are funded by the Department of Justice and specifically also this 
is managed by DEA, so that puts a lot of money which…we definitely 
need money to address the crime. (R11-F) 
This response recognises the benefit of cooperation and considers HIDTA as being an 
idyllic vehicle by which to facilitate this. It is also interesting to note the recognition of 
financial benefits, having seen how economics can be a barrier to TNPC (Johnston, 
2000). Taking into account the clear economic and resourcing challenges to policing in 
the Caribbean, this seems, by no means, a minor factor in explaining why agencies and 
local forces might want to work with a program such as HIDTA. In addition, the 
possibility to defuse the link between competition for successes in order to attract 
funding, as described above, may encourage efforts towards cooperation.  
 During operations, it seems that assets and resources are shared. For instance, 
one respondent discussed his unit's joint operations with the Coast Guard, with both 
forces putting their resources/assets to common use, whether that meant computer 
equipment, personnel, or vehicles. However, another respondent seemed to think that, 
although cooperation on undercover operations was good, outside of that, there was 
less need to cooperate. Another felt that there was too much focus on small-time 
criminals, and that police were not going after the source of the problem: 
The authorities are looking only at the small guys, you know […] try to 
look at other gangs, other people, the people with power and money 
right here […] need to direct our effort in those people in the marinas 
with the big boats, 50’ boats. (R2-F) 
This suggests that, although cooperation is positive in operational/practical terms, 
disagreement can still exist about the aims of the operation and perhaps, outside of 
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structured operations, cooperation is still too ad hoc and irregular The statement of the 
last respondent also reveals an attitude towards corruption, at the “power and money” 
level, which is a perceived barrier to cooperation and advancement.  
 Cultivating cooperation.  Respondents identified several factors, which 
encourage or hinder a proactive approach to cooperation. Those which hinder 
cooperation included a lack of political will to focus on the ‘big fish’ in the drug trade, 
as well as resource constraints. Although a lack of resources was identified by some 
respondents as merely a good reason to be reactive, others saw it as a factor actively 
hindering proactive cooperation. For instance, a lack of equipment for intelligence 
gathering and analysis, such as statistical crime mapping, could make it difficult to 
assess accurately where crime threats come from – an important aspect of dealing with 
crime proactively. One respondent pointed out how the Coast Guard had improved 
proactive cooperation with smaller island nations by providing them with additional 
resources: 
Coast Guard’s […] initiated a lot of programs that they’ve 
incorporated/got on board these other nations who have little resources – 
‘We’ll help you.’ Some of the assets that the other people have in fact 
been repaid, the costs have been more or less paid for by other 
government entities, you know. They don’t talk too much about that but 
it’s done. (R4-F) 
  This suggests that cooperation itself can ameliorate the effects of a lack of 
resources, which then allows for a proactive approach to be implemented. Sometimes 
cooperation was stymied by a lack of resources rather than a lack of will. One 
respondent suggested that other islands sometimes did what they could to cooperate, 
but might simply not have had the resources to help facilitate effective cooperation:  
In the DR, we try and work with them, […] and, I don’t know, they try 
to do their best but like I say, they can’t, because these people, they just 
make their own way on boats and they try to come here at night time and 
it’s very difficult (R30-F). 
 Another need identified in facilitating cooperation was for increased undercover 
operations and informants to deepen their knowledge of criminal activities. There was a 
sense that this was hindered, to some degree, by cultural differences between agencies 
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and local police (because informants were more likely to want to deal with local 
police), and that corruption could hamper efforts since it puts informants at risk. 
 As previously mentioned, another theme was that sharing intelligence, and 
communicating it well, was an essential element of success in cooperation, while we 
have seen evidence (both within the existing body of literature and in the primary 
evidence generated in this research) to suggest that, generally, this is not successfully 
achieved. In some cases, however, officers have a strong awareness of how important it 
is to have 'eyes and ears' in different areas and jurisdictions, therefore, creating 
motivation to cooperate effectively. Participants also believed that other agencies 
understood this, creating a basis for cooperation, as one respondent said, “And I 
understand that those agents of the different agencies, they work together when they are 
in those countries….” (R27-L). Another respondent added:  
We have a very good relationship with the DNCP NacionaleControlle 
(inaudible), the NCB, they have their own risk. The Central Information 
(inaudible) is how they call it - and this is very good.  It’s small though, 
they get an outstanding start, they get intelligence within hours, they get 
the information, they analyse it, they send the leads, its pretty good 
(R16-F). 
 While practical changes, such as improvements in communication and training, 
were important to the respondents, many also thought that there was a failure to focus 
on the right areas, holding back effective combating of transnational crime. This could 
be seen in short-termism and a tendency to focus on areas where immediate 
improvements could be seen, for example, by addressing low-level crime in housing 
projects rather than the criminal networks who feed that crime. To tackle crime at its 
source, one officer challenged: 
Who are you going to get, the usual suspects and a bunch of junkies, you 
know, these guys are replaced the next day and life goes on […] But if 
you are always never getting past the couple of fingers on the hand and 
you’re never moving up to the arm or the elbow, you don’t seem to be 
getting anywhere. (R17-F) 
 Several respondents seemed to agree that tackling the drugs trade in isolation 
would not be effective, moving on to suggest that focusing on reducing illegal 
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immigration and human trafficking would be of great benefit. This suggests a 
motivation for organisations to cooperate with those who work in these subsidiary and 
related areas. 
 Finally, personality, as a factor, was also identified by one respondent who had 
trouble getting a hold of information from a local intelligence unit:  
Because somebody in the past had burnt them and you know, to the 
locals, one federal agency is the same as all federal agencies. So […] 
they could breach it proactively basically by going there confidently, 
you know, showing that they weren’t, you know, out to burn those guys 
[…] they were very proactive in actually building on relationships… 
And it has to be personality driven because another agent might not have 
been able to do it. (R22-F) 
It is better to be proactive.  A greater proportion of respondents characterised 
police cooperation as reactive rather than proactive, with most of these agents believing 
that a tendency to react to events, or at least be too reactive, as is currently the practice, 
was a negative quality. “You know, I would love to sit here and say honestly very 
proactive but honest …It’s very reactive” (R23-I). They saw the tendency to be 
proactive as more desirable.  However, not all of those who thought cooperation was 
reactive thought it was necessarily better to be proactive, appearing to relate 
“reactiveness” to “responsiveness”. Viewed as a pragmatic approach, responding in a 
timely way to demands, one agent shares: “It’s reactive. My observation is we respond 
to the needs of other Caribbean nations” (R24-F). It was also implied that a reactive, 
independent approach is more pragmatic or realistic in the “real world” than a proactive 
cooperative approach. Similarly, another respondent agreed that a reactive approach 
was more pragmatic, this time on account of limited resources. A few respondents 
believed that current cooperation was more proactive than reactive: “Proactive…yes. If 
something happens here we have to go deep into that” (R8-I).  
 All of the respondents who thought cooperation was already proactive thought 
this was a positive thing; none saw a need for ‘pragmatism’ or ‘balance’ in a tendency 
to be reactive. They talked about proactive cooperation in positive terms, speaking 
along the lines of “we are going to go all the way down to take the problem from the 
beginning. We don’t want to leave anything, we want to close the case and we like to 
take care of it” (R20-F), and of being “always on the alert […] we cover a whole lot of 
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ground, and we always work out …The things which either have to be addressed”  
(R28-L). 
 A few respondents suggested that there was currently a balance (or differing 
approaches in different areas) between proactive and reactive approaches. Some, but 
not all, suggested that this was appropriate. For example, one respondent thought that 
different countries were more or less proactive, but clearly thought being proactive was 
a positive thing. When asked to expound upon the “right” balance between the reactive 
and proactive approach, fewer respondents regarded the balance as right versus not. 
Most favoured a proactive approach. However, by its nature, much police work 
involves reacting to events, and cannot be entirely proactive. As one respondent 
explained:  
Quite frankly you’ve got a smart enemy who’s been doing this longer 
and longer. So I mean you are always going to be more reactionary most 
of the time, you are going to get some stuff, you know, but for the most 
part a lot of it’s luck (R17-F). 
 Among those who thought the balance was not right, most thought it needed to 
be more proactive, some thought that improvements were being made, while others 
thought improvements had to be continual. However, a proactive approach was still 
seen as more effective, for instance, because it was more likely to secure convictions: 
“Yes, well usually when you get an indictment in the Caribbean, it’s because you’ve 
already performed the investigation, you know, you’ve got intelligence, you get 
information and then you perform, so I think it’s proactive more than reactive” (R1-L).  
Another respondent confirmed, “I think anything proactive is always preferable” (R22-
F).  
In conclusion, in terms of cooperation, there was a general consensus among 
respondents that at least some proactive policing is needed to attack criminal networks 
and operate ‘one step ahead’ of criminals. Most also recognised that it is impossible to 
be completely proactive and that a balance had to be reached. Yet there are clear 
difficulties in a proactive approach, since it requires political will and additional 
resources, and can be hindered by corruption and personality clashes. However, it 
seems that cooperation can help overcome some of these challenges, for instance, by 
sharing resources. 
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Desired changes.  Stakeholders expressed three main areas of desired changes: 
resources, organisational restructuring and joint training. 
Resources, resources, resources.  As suggested previously, proactive policing 
requires more resources for cooperation to be effective, and many officers suggested 
that funding for better technology would make a proactive (versus reactive) approach 
more feasible. Several added that local police, in particular, were underfunded, or that 
funding was misallocated. Many suggested that there was also a need for better 
technology, while some derided the useless way resources were spent on technology., 
For instance, resources were originally allocated to vehicle-based computer systems 
that, in the end, did not work because there had been no money left to spend on linking 
up the system. Another barrier to cooperation included bureaucracy, related once again 
to a lack, or misallocation, of resources. One respondent complained of funds being 
spent on expensive computer systems for cars while basic resources, such as a fax 
machine at the airport or better pay for officers, were neglected. This failure to 
appropriately allocate resources could be related to the problem of ‘exported’ solutions. 
Described by Brogden (2005), this is where resources are being spent on acquiring the 
accoutrements of ‘modern’ policing, which are useless or inappropriate to the context, 
while more basic elements are neglected. 
 Others pointed out that technology was an essential tool in proactive policing, 
such as mapping crime to see where trends are appearing. It was noted that 
transnational initiatives, such as HIDTA, sometimes unofficially made up for the 
shortfall, suggesting that cooperation itself can help alleviate the economic problems of 
policing in a transitional society, by allowing poorer countries to benefit (whether 
officially or unofficially) from the resources of others. Another respondent added that 
local police do well considering how few resources they have: “They’re doing a lot 
with almost nothing, I mean, no equipment, and you’ve got to see these people who are 
in the fields doing the best they can with nearly nothing and it is amazing” (R6-F). 
 A lack of political will and, connected to that, corruption, were identified by 
some as the root of underfunding, as well as a more general problem in achieving 
successful prosecutions. One respondent noted the lack of cooperation between 
different arms of the legal system, such as the police, the courts, and the prosecution 
service, as possibly related to corruption: “Sometimes we bring cases to them and 
they’re good solid cases, and sometimes they just get tossed out” (R7-L). The 
implication was that proactive attempts to indict and prosecute people higher up in 
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criminal networks could fail because they were simply too powerful. Better leadership 
was also an issue for one respondent, who thought that there was a need for one leader 
to coordinate cooperation and lead/push others, taking the “dominant role” (R17-F). 
Organisational makeover as a must.  Some respondents thought organisations 
needed to be completely remade in order to facilitate cooperation, with several wanting 
to revisit the topic at the end of interviews. One shared the need for a drastic make-
over: “Restructuring the whole thing, a big clean house clean, a clean sweep” (R15-F). 
Another respondent identified a need for a truly international/transnational police force:  
It would be great to have an actual international police force and a group 
of agents that will investigate and move from one country to another and 
be able to get all the evidence that I sometimes – sometimes you can 
have the victim in PR, the perpetrator in Santa Domingo and some of the 
evidence in let’s say Aruba or Martinique, and then it’s almost 
impossible to actually submit a crime. (R9-F) 
 This illustrates a key challenge of transnational policing; that it can be difficult 
to establish in which jurisdiction a crime was committed. However, despite the 
relevance of this idea to transnational policing, the respondent added that this was ‘far-
fetched’ and that he didn’t “see how that can be done right now” (R24-F). This 
supports the suggestion that while cooperation would ideally be an extremely central 
element of TNP, this is not always fully achieved. 
 Another respondent mentioned the language barrier in terms of communication, 
at least for dealing with local police (Puerto Rican-born officers in the DEA did speak 
English, but local police did not necessarily). The emphasis was on local police 
becoming bilingual rather than English-speakers learning Spanish, which provides 
further evidence of a culture-clash in the area of language.  
 Along the same vein, at the end of interviews, several respondents wanted to 
discuss the importance of improving cooperation even further, and one theme that 
emerged was the sense that there needed to be better control of cooperative activity, for 
example, by centralising cooperation. One respondent suggested, “Everybody I know is 
cooking in different kitchens, that is a big problem…We need to centralise 
investigations and open the channel for communications between the authorities in 
those countries” (R2-F). 
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 Other suggestions included having the UN more involved with cooperation in 
the Caribbean, using the Department of Homeland Security as a good example to 
follow in terms of effective centralisation, and speeding up communication in 
centralising cooperation. Centralising cooperation, though, also seems like a reaction to 
the cultural and legal challenges of cooperating across a range of moderately different 
contexts. It implies a desire to homogenise and impose order on the confusion of the 
Caribbean which operates in such a different way; to uniform that difference rather than 
to embrace it and use it for positive means. Indeed, when considering the differences in 
culture as a barrier, it was also noted that differences in culture could be a strength; a 
potential now somehow overlooked.  
Training us together.  Better training was also a clear priority for respondents, 
and was considered a contributor to cooperation in three important ways. First, shared 
training was seen as helping forces work together more effectively, building trust and 
relationships conducive to cooperation. For instance, one officer said that, having 
trained officers from the Customs and Border Protection of the DR, they now know that 
they can trust those officers to be their ‘eyes and ears’ in the DR, and that they had 
“seen a significant reduction on the number of seizures that we get here because they 
are being more effective there” (R27-L). To some extent, a failure to trust other 
participants in cooperation can be related to a lack of trust in their abilities, which can 
be addressed during shared training. Sharing training can also build a shared set of 
tactics and ways of working together, thereby reducing misunderstandings and work 
culture clashes.  
 Secondly, shared training helps forces deal with the specific character of crime 
in the Caribbean. As one officer described, “I always say that the Puerto Rican criminal 
is different than the US criminal and in that same sense, the island criminal, the 
Caribbean criminal, for example” (R11-F). This stresses, again, the need to develop 
methods of dealing with crime that directly address the local context, rather than using 
a ‘one-size fits all’ approach.  
 The third way in which shared training helps is by correcting a shortfall of 
training on other islands, due to a lack of resources. This means that the problems of 
limited resources identified by Brogden (2005) can be, to some extent, enriched by 
organisations with more resources sharing their own training with others. For instance, 
one respondent commented: “Whenever there’s something like operations that we 
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conduct, we take advantage of that to train with the Dominican Navy and we try to help 
them out […] they have an Academy […] but it’s not enough…” (R13-I). 
 In summary, a significant number of respondents thought that transnational 
police cooperation could be improved by sharing intelligence, sharing training and 
focusing more proactively on tackling criminal networks at higher, rather than lower, 
levels. While some respondents thought cooperation was satisfactory, most officers 
thought there was greater room for improvement, some blaming the inability to reach 
its full potential on an unwillingness or inability on the part of other islands to 
cooperate.  
Working within local laws.  The challenges of working within local laws 
clearly posed problems for officers. The diversity of legal systems in the Caribbean was 
mentioned in responses to other questions but was again raised by the respondents as a 
source of frustration when asked about its impact on cooperation. In particular, the need 
to build cases and achieve convictions while cooperating with local laws caused 
frustration, since officers need to deal with not only local laws and police forces, but 
also with local courts. One respondent said, 
We had a case about four weeks ago in which there was an attempt to 
kill someone, throwing the person overboard a boat and we started an 
investigation because they requested our assistance.  We were helping 
them but when that got to the point of the judicial process with 
Attorneys and Magistrates, it was impossible. (R26-F) 
 As discussed previously, several mentioned the Dutch legal tradition preventing 
the protection of informants, which runs counter to legal tradition in the US/PR.  
 In the area of jurisdiction, there were differing experiences of cooperation. One 
officer complained that cooperation with the DR was not good, and since they had little 
cooperation with the Dominican Navy, it resulted in the same individuals repeatedly 
being caught trying to enter PR by sea, then being sent back before returning. Another, 
however, suggested that although it was necessary to ask permission to enter territorial 
waters, there was a fairly good/respectful relationship with local authorities.  
I mean, we just can’t pass that Dominican border. First of all we need to 
ask for permission to go up to their own territory and we obviously 
cannot enforce our laws in their waters […] obviously the key here is 
that we need to show respect for them (R6-F). 
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This suggested that cooperation over jurisdiction is not consistent.  
 In comparison, extradition can be notoriously complex, but apparently 
extradition from the DR has become easier, with several respondents suggesting that 
the DR authorities had cooperated well on recent cases involving the extradition of 
individuals. Extradition is an important tool for dealing with transnational crime, in 
particular, as one respondent pointed out, because of corruption and weaker systems in 
some states, such as the DR: “Getting extradited to the US, you know, they get the 
sentences, the convictions and the sentences that they should get but they will not get in 
their own countries” (R25-F). 
The need to get along: relationships with local police.  Good relationships with 
local police were cited as crucial to the success of working within local legal systems 
and jurisdictions. Some respondents warned that legal issues could become politically 
complicated, with one saying that, in dealing with the DR, there was a need to 
constantly put pressure on them to act, but that good relationships with local police 
made it easier. When working in another country, their usual means of influence were 
not relevant, proving good contacts and relationships with locals were more important. 
Even where there were good relationships with local police, getting things done 
sometimes required officers to ‘get involved with politics’ by involving governments 
and embassies, which is seen as complicated and difficult.  
 Reinforcing the importance of local contacts, respondents who said that their 
unit had few contacts with the DR forces emphasised that this meant they were at a 
disadvantage. As one participant highlighted, 
The only relations that we have to Santa Domingo is the Interpol office, 
and we need to verify if any person we are looking for is in Santa 
Domingo so we send a message by Interpol and we do the operation and 
that’s it, but not the police in Santa Domingo. That is a closed area for 
us and that is a problem. (R12-F) 
 In developing relationships with local contacts, it was seen as essential to be 
respectful of local police and not to impose on them:  
You can’t go and impose, you know, say, ‘Well we do it like this in our 
country so this is how I think you need to do it.’ I mean that’s not going 
to get you very far with those guys. (R18-F) 
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 This tactic appears to build the mutual trust required for cooperation, while the 
emphasis on respect for others’ jurisdictions may also show an awareness of the need to 
play down the competition and rivalry that can hinder cooperation.  
My hands are tied: working within international laws.  Generally, respondents 
agreed that working within US laws was less complicated and easier than local laws, 
although many had complaints about the way both US law and international law had a 
tendency to be ‘politically correct’, thereby obstructing law enforcement efforts by 
protecting the rights of suspects/criminals. Overall, international law was seen as 
limiting rather than enabling. Related to this, often the positive elements mentioned 
regarding local laws tended to be ways in which local laws allowed them freedoms that 
US law did not, for instance, the ease in which to obtain wire taps. Respondents made 
little reference to human rights law, even when prompted by the interviewer. However, 
at least one respondent emphasised that they attempted, or were required, to continue to 
abide by US laws and protect individuals’ constitutional rights, even while working 
outside the US In addition, some respondents expressed uncertainty or ignorance about 
the kind of laws and treaties that were in place, for instance: “That is hard to answer.  
There are laws there but from the back of my head, I don’t know…” (R1-L). 
 Similarly, respondents often expressed a sense of distance from and frustration 
with, in particular, international law or with the idea of changing the law. As law 
enforcement officers, they seemed to feel that their role was to work within existing 
laws and not to think about how laws could be changed. Related to this, another 
suggestion made at the end of interviews was to improve intergovernmental 
cooperation, particularly with Central and South American countries, in order to deal 
better with drug trafficking at its source, before it reached the Caribbean. One 
respondent cited an example of a time when this had been achieved successfully when 
dealing with marijuana being trafficked out of Colombia; an agreement between the US 
and Colombia gave the US Coast Guard the capacity to carry out surveillance on the 
high seas and search boats leaving Colombia. The respondent thought this worked well 
until traffickers adapted their methods. Another respondent considered: 
Most of the drugs come from Colombia and South America and they 
have a route already established and I think down there in the south 
close to South America we need more international agreements so we 
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can protect the … that frontier over there…..Yes, the start of the source 
(R1-L) . 
 Again, this echoes the need to work more proactively and improve the 
conditions for cooperation. In terms of forcing cooperation from less willing 
governments, one respondent thought that there should be some attempt to penalise the 
countries themselves, using international law, for crimes committed by their citizens. 
This was an interesting example of using coercion in order to force cooperation, which 
was not otherwise discussed by respondents.  
 Overall, the themes that emerged from respondents’ answers suggest that law 
enforcement officers find themselves at odds with the law more often than they feel 
enabled by it. This came through most clearly in frustrations expressed regarding 
attempting to work within local law, but also in the responses relating to US and 
international laws. Relationships with other officers and forces were the most important 
element in negotiating these difficulties, as they could sometimes cut through red tape 
and achieve things the officers themselves could not.  
Who is accountable, or rather, who can be?  Based on responses, it appears 
that legal accountability and jurisdiction always lie with the country in which 
operations take place, although agencies are still responsible for the actions of their 
agents no matter in which country they operate. Leadership, considered separately from 
legal responsibility/jurisdiction, was more disputed by participants, as some thought 
that the DEA always took the lead, while others thought the host country was always in 
charge, while still others contended that it was decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 While the DEA often provides leadership and impetus for cases, for example by 
providing other agencies with intelligence, the legal responsibility and jurisdiction for 
dealing with operations lie with the country involved. US agencies could be invited to 
participate but are not automatically involved Even if they provided the impetus for the 
investigation, they would not have arrest powers overseas. One respondent mentioned 
legal provisions that prevented agents from making arrests abroad:  
We give them the intelligence and they do the enforcement action, we 
are not there when they enforcement action, technically we’re not there. 
Do we get invited? Yes. Are we taking an active role? No. They must 
take the lead because it works in different countries. (R25-F) 
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 Therefore, while a US agency might take the lead in launching or developing an 
investigation, any operations or arrests taking place outside the US would be carried 
out under the powers of officers of that country.  
 In the case of arrests or searches at sea, the area where the incident took place 
(in whose waters) would determine jurisdiction. It was also suggested that, in cases 
involving illegal entry to the country, Immigration or the Coast Guard would have 
responsibility. 
Show me the money: financial accountability and support.  The impression 
was given that financial accountability and resources also varied from case to case. 
Most respondents did not think that responsibility for financing lay entirely with the 
US, although one said,  
Well it’s always going to end up lying with us because we take it more 
seriously…Yes, but for the most part it’s going to be an initiation on our 
part…Most of the resources they enjoy with the US in one form or 
another. Whether it’s some kind of grant or purchase or payment, 
that/which goes for the most part of these countries. It comes from the 
US Government in some form or another. (R17-F) 
 Contrary to this opinion, for the most part it appears that financial 
accountability is shared between agencies/forces, depending on the resources used and 
the structure of the investigation. As one agent stated:  
If another country asks for help the manpower is, each jurisdiction, the  
time spent by investigators and the automobiles are used helping the 
other country so this is all individually shared by the different 
jurisdictions […]Each jurisdiction is very, very much autonomous when 
it comes to how much money they’ll spend and what type of manpower 
they will. (R24-F) 
 The sheer inconsistency of responses implies that there are no hard and fast 
rules for where financial accountability lies. However, there might be tendencies for 
actors with extensive resources to take a greater role in funding operations. For 
instance, one officer suggested that the DEA always funded operations (R4-F), while 
another thought that HIDTA, due to its large and consistent budget, was the main 
funding source for collaborative operations (R17-F). 
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Human rights as a hindrance.  The issue of accountability for human rights 
was raised several times. Respondents did not tend to think that the DEA could be held 
responsible or accountable in terms of human rights being upheld in other countries, 
although they thought that there was some possibility of leading by example. Some 
suggested, for instance, that it was important to train other forces and share ‘your way 
of doing things.’ One officer pointed out that it was difficult to gauge the effect of DEA 
actions on human rights abuses elsewhere, since it was impossible to control what 
actions other states would carry out on the basis of information provided by US 
agencies/the DEA. For instance, one respondent said:  
If you’re working on their territory, it’s their law but at the same time, if 
your targets are now subject to their laws, what happens if the target gets 
itself tortured…. And not only that but not just torture, say this target is, 
shall we say, Colombia for instance, we have targets down there that are 
not just criminals per se but enemies of the state, they are viable military 
targets, where do you draw the line? Okay, your target is wanted 
because he was drug trafficking, okay but he is also wanted for mass 
(inaudible) so what happens when, okay well, you give that information 
to the Colombians. Yeah, they want to arrest him but they’ll be just as 
happy to drop a bomb on him. (R22-F) 
 In the case of human rights, officers were uncertain about where the 
responsibility and accountability lay. This could suggest that, sometimes, this issue was 
overlooked – whether through ignorance or in taking advantage of a confusing system. 
When dealing with states where human rights abuses are rife, there is no way of telling 
what a tip-off could lead to, but clearly it is possible (and considered important) to lead 
by example.  
4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 To summarise Chapter 4, good cooperation with other islands was clearly seen 
as essential by the respondents, and, overall, appears to be beneficial, despite a range of 
challenges that were described by officers. The range of different responses suggests 
that, despite generally good cooperation, it can still be unbalanced and depend upon the 
different circumstances and units or agencies involved. For instance, some respondents 
had had very positive experiences, where local authorities were highly involved and 
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flexible, while some were vehemently opposed to cooperation in certain circumstances. 
There was a great deal of variation in terms of the extent to which effective cooperation 
had been achieved, but a general consensus that it was necessary. This reflects the 
canon of literature as a whole, which extolls the benefits of cooperation without being 
ignorant of the barriers (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002; Gambetta, 1988; Weber & Bowling, 
2002).  
 On the other hand, others described situations where a lack of willingness to 
cooperate was linked to other islands viewing transnational crime as something that 
'passed through' their jurisdiction rather than directly affecting them. This was only one 
of the barriers to cooperation. Other difficulties included a lack of resources on other 
islands. This could sometimes be mitigated by helping local forces, for instance, by 
helping them develop their ability to build cases. In cases where relationships were 
positive, respondents noted that it could be useful to cooperate. Using sentencing as an 
example, where criminals were likely to be granted longer prison terms, other legal 
systems proved more satisfactory than that of the US 
 Overall, the respondents agreed that cooperation in the Caribbean differs from 
cooperation elsewhere, corroborating the thesis that the Caribbean is distinct. The 
Caribbean’s geographical character as a chain of islands, and its cultural history of 
being a collection of distinct island cultures with their own legal and cultural quirks, 
were singled out as important key elements. However, respondents differed on whether 
they saw this as primarily negative. Some went out of their way to point out that having 
to deal with these challenges daily meant they were better at cooperating than officers 
who rarely needed to do so. This ”forced cooperation” not only means that officers are 
obliged to constantly practice their skills of cooperation, but also that trust and strong 
relationships are built by the iteration of cooperation between different actors. Each 
successful example of cooperation makes the next one more likely. 
 In general, it seems that most respondents were positive about the kinds of 
cooperation that had been achieved so far, but felt that there were many areas where 
cooperation had yet to reach its potential. This appears to be the result of a range of 
factors, including resourcing problems and a lack of motivation to cooperate, either 
because there was an inability to see the benefits of cooperation, or because 
competition appeared to be a more attractive strategy.  
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Chapter Five 
The Role and Contribution of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program 
5.1 Introduction to Chapter Five 
 This portion of the interviews sought to establish the participants’ current role 
and contact with the DEA, with special attention given to: the best and worst things 
about working with the DEA; the extent and nature of TNPC between the DEA and 
other law enforcement agencies; the administration’s successes to date; and barriers 
agents face and possible ways to overcome them. 
 Major findings related to the extent and nature of cooperation between the DEA 
and other agencies included joint operations as a form of cooperation, the importance of 
agents being trained together, and the need to share information and provide resources 
to officers. When asked about their positive experiences of working with the DEA, 
major themes revolved around the administration’s professional image, its reputation 
for being organised, well-funded and well-equipped, its advantages in allowing for 
agent access and its approach in creating job satisfaction. Themes encompassing the 
negatives of working with the DEA involved agents’ undesirable personality traits (e.g. 
overblown egos) the all-consuming nature of the job, issues with bureaucratic red tape 
slowing progress, and matters around cases being kept? top secret, even from within, as 
well as the atmosphere of competition. 
 When it came to views on the HIDTA Program, the themes which had 
presented themselves involved: the networking of agents, and creation of links and 
relationships related to such links; the need for better communication and intelligence 
sharing; matters around institutionalised secrecy; personality conflicts; the importance 
of timing; and the need for resources and adequate training. 
5.2 The Extent and Nature of Cooperation Between the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and Other Agencies 
 The DEA has representation in Foreign Offices in 67 countries, with new 
offices opening every year. The most recent are in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan. One agent commented on the DEA’s relationship in foreign countries as 
excellent: 
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You know, Afghanistan was one of the most popular places for opium 
production, the heroin is the by-product, and we are assisting the 
Department of Defence and other agencies, as well in combating not 
only drugs but terrorism, as well…they have a co-relationship. The 
relationship is excellent with the DEA and local police agencies within 
foreign countries. (R21-F)  
 Other agents agreed that the DEA is unique, noting that they have officers all 
over the world. One stated that they may have even more agents than the FBI and that 
other agencies co-operate with them because they are considered a world leader on 
drug law enforcement, even sending their people to the DEA Academy to learn new 
skills (R9-F). Even non-DEA agents, who felt they had limited knowledge and 
awareness of the DEA’s mission and activities in other countries, felt there was strong 
cooperation. One respondent said: 
It’s big, people all over the Caribbean and in fact, most of the times that 
my agency has to go abroad, we have to work with the DEA because 
they have all the contacts in all those countries. [...] They know all the 
people at the Embassies, they know all the contacts.  It’s good that they 
are all over the place.  Eventually one day, we will have an agency like 
that, you know, in every place, but right now we can’t. (R1-L) 
The comment that ‘one day we will have an agency like that…in every place’ is 
intriguing, suggesting the benefits of having organisations “on the ground” who all 
cooperate to achieve the same end. The implication of this comment suggests the lack 
of these type of agencies as a barrier to real success.	   
Several argued that the DEA would not be able to function well without local 
cooperation through taskforces (R1-L, R4-F, R9-F, R13-I, R25-F). One DEA agent 
confirmed that cooperation was indeed extensive and that they value the taskforces 
attached to their groups (R9-F). Most of the groups have the PR Police Department 
(PRPD) working with them. Another view, regarding the importance of local 
connections and understandings was: 
Well we have what we call the task forces, the state police, the local 
police assigned to the HIDTA program [...] they know the area, they 
know the lands, they know everything about the organisations, the inside 
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organisations in PR because of the culture and that helps the DEA 
people from the States to get into these type of organisations, you know. 
(R16-F) 
 Other DEA agents highlighted that it all depends on the country that one is 
dealing with, and whether relationships were good with the DR, with the exception of 
Venezuela and Haiti. Legal differences also played a large role: 
Because when we work with somebody in another country, a case in 
another country, the Country Office, be it Bogota or in this case Madrid, 
they have operational control over everything because you know when 
you operate from another country, you are subject to their laws. That 
being the case, you can’t take the case the way you do here on the 
streets. There are certain things that other nations will not let you do. In 
fact a lot of the operations that we would do here in order to gather 
evidence, considered crime down in Colombia. And we’re just starting 
this case over in Madrid and already we’re finding that although we 
called in the Madrid police and the Spaniards are excellent, they have to 
answer to their judges. Whereas a lot of questions that have to be 
answered by us and by the Country Office to the Spanish police before 
they will authorise an operation. (R22-F) 
 Overall, many respondents felt that cooperation was very effective between the 
DEA and other transnational police agencies. Although there were complications 
involved at times, they were grateful for the DEA’s assistance and appreciated their 
global networks. However, nearly 50% of those interviewed thought the DEA was not 
working well with local agencies and were extremely competitive for cases. It needs to 
be kept in mind, however, that many of those responses were given in line with 
questions regarding the barriers in place rather than as actual perception that 
cooperation, as such, wasn’t a good thing. Since there is no reason why every single 
HIDTA or any particular agent would have the same experience, it could be suggested 
that both of the perspectives are equally valid and serve to illustrate the potential 
benefits, as well as reasonable inconsistencies, in their applied success. One respondent 
discussed the need for more cooperation between local and federal agents: 
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One of the problems in PR right now between the law enforcement 
agents, the local and the feds, is that everybody is running their 
investigation without shared information and that’s why, I believe that 
DEA is running their investigation apart, do you understand now? 
…And the police department resources, I don’t know.  I think that we 
need more cooperation between local and federal agents, that includes 
the DEA and FBI. (R2-F) 
 There was clearly a lack of strategies to solve this issue. One agent mentioned 
the communication barrier, with a lack of Spanish-speaking DEA agents, as a problem. 
The same agent then added that there was an assumption by DEA agents that all PR 
Police Department (PRPD) officers were corrupt: 
...and they might be corrupt, some of them might be corrupt, I believe 
we shouldn’t deny that.But corruption is a thing that we have to look as 
a complete thing, you know, and we have corruption all over the 
Governments.[...] And you have to keep on working even in corruption 
so you cannot stop doing that relationship with another organisation, 
even if you find some corruption within that agency. You should keep 
your contact and working with that agency even though there are some 
corrupt individuals because if not that you will have to let the bad guys 
win the war and that’s not fair. (R14-F) 
Others agreed, but one added: 
I think that although the DEA has some Spanish speaking agents, which 
is good because that kind of improves relations between agencies, but I 
think always there’s a difference between federal and state agents and 
they kind of feel like they know more than you probably. (R7-L) 
 Another major theme around barriers to cooperation was the response time of 
information, with one officer complaining that information coming in to DEA offices 
from abroad was slow to reach them, or was not shared at all. Another suggested 
that the relationship was one sided:  
There are communications but they’re very secretive regarding their 
operations. They do not give us, for example, details regarding an 
operation that they might have until perhaps the date of the arrest.  They 
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might ask us for some manpower to go along with them and make the 
arrest. (R24-F) 
 The DEA cooperates with a multitude of agencies through various practices: 
joint operations, shared training, shared information and provision of equipment. There 
are many different programs and initiatives with which the DEA participate, one of 
them being the HIDTA Program, another is the Organised Crime Drug Enforcement 
Task Forces (OCDETF). The DEA, however, seem to cooperate most often with local 
agencies, in PR with PRPD. Some stressed the importance of the local police 
department’s role: 
Yes, I think we work more with PRPD. I mean HIDTA is its own 
animal, you know, so they have their own network even though we have 
one of our agents over there but …Puerto Rican Police Department, 
Hacienda, I mean there are lots of task forces here and we rely on the 
task force to actually come up with leads on the local cases and 
such. We can’t operate without them here in PR. (R22-F) 
 Another agent stressed the importance of local police in getting local 
information and obtaining informants, noting that without the assistance of local police, 
“DEA wouldn’t be effective at all” (R23-I). Similarly, one said: 
Let me put it this way, I don’t want to hurt feelings here, but the locals 
know the area better than outsiders. Unless the DEA specialist is from 
PR, he will not know the area, so it depends most of the time on locals 
to know the area, to do recons and other stuff. (R15-F) 
 Cooperation with local forces depends on the countries. One agent noted that 
this could include local or national forces, or the military, as in Colombia, with the 
Department of Administrative Security (which has a role similar to the DEA and 
Customs combined). Most of the DEA international agencies are located in foreign 
embassies, with the State Department providing grants for certain nations, so 
cooperation is extensive. 
Joint Operations  
 One major form of cooperation was the use of joint taskforces, a multi-agency 
joint operation that is sometimes led by the DEA or other agencies. From the 
respondents’ perspectives, this was the best way to develop and build trust between 
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agencies. Sometimes joint operations can simply involve providing additional 
manpower by sharing agents for a particular case. HIDTA was found to be extremely 
important and played a role in diffusing confliction of cases. One agent stressed that 
this was very important, “...because they need to be able to lead the operation that they 
are doing to really get to the big fishes” (R15-F). 
 One respondent points out that informal cooperation flows back to his office 
from having officers on joint task forces at HIDTA, “and in a strange way HIDTA 
seems to be an environment where everyone seems to have their spies” (R14-F). This is 
questionable as a means of cooperation, as it neither involves trust or teamwork, and 
rather has underhanded and quite negative connotations. That spying exists suggest that 
there are barriers, and even rivalries, between agencies. Some agents spoke of how 
agencies within HIDTA were even afraid of information leaks back to their home-
agency. 
 Some added that the DEA would brief them on operations and may need a lot of 
cooperation from local police, but that they seldom asked the PR Department of Justice 
or other international agencies for assistance when it came to arrests. Unsurprisingly, if 
they have more arrests in field operations, the DEA gains recognition and heftier 
federal funding for the next year.  
The Importance of Training Together 
 Another form of cooperation between DEA and other TNP agencies is shared 
training. The DEA lead task forces often offer training when needed, as well as receive 
it: 
We have been working for DEA and DEA have been working with 
us…. we are training together, DEA and PRPD, we receive as a PRPD 
officer, we receive training from DEA so that’s great because if we 
didn’t, we would have to pay for it, so they do it for us (R8-I). 
 As one DEA agent explained,  
We’ve attended several trainings with the Coast Guard.  Right now 
we’re trying to accommodate the Coast Guard people and some of the 
ISC on a training that we’re going to try to be the lead agency with 
XYZ, and so we invite people to our trainings, as well as get invited. 
(R9-F) 
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 The DEA also share training in Virginia, whether at the DEA or the FBI 
Academies (R18-F). However, most admitted that while the DEA do share a good deal 
of training they would like to see more of it (R30-F). 
The Essentials of DEA Shared Information 
 Sharing of intelligence and operational information is done in a variety of ways. 
One method is by attending informal monthly meetings or informal exchanges on the 
joint task forces. The DEA cooperate on investigations, primarily sharing information 
with the ISC. For example, cooperation is likely if the DEA has an operation ongoing 
in La Perla. La Perla is one of the smaller, poorest neighbourhoods (barrios) in Old San 
Juan, PR. It presents geographical challenges as it is set along a cliff and reaches down 
to the ocean. There is only one accessible road in and out. This area, more importantly, 
is also infamous for a high level of drug trafficking and considered to be highly 
dangerous. According to some police officers, they will not enter the area even if they 
are undercover. They may inform other agencies to avoid dangerous conflicts and 
misunderstandings. DEA respondents said that information passed to ISC includes 
information on targets and contacts. ISC is responsible for accumulating and 
disseminating information and co-operates with any agencies within HIDTA (R4-F). 
One local agent suggested that sometimes they passed information to the DEA, but then 
found out they already knew it. In these cases, the DEA would inform them: “Already 
have it, you can either leave it alone or you can go into it, but we’re investigating it” 
(R30-F). The agent surmised that the DEA often found it easier to get hold of 
information because they were better funded and therefore more able to pay informants.  
 The provision of equipment is another form of cooperation between the DEA 
and TNP agencies. As the DEA is well funded by the federal government, their 
equipment is much more advanced and sophisticated. The majority of respondents felt 
that the DEA was generous in lending equipment or assistance that required a special 
unit, such as for processing evidence. In some cases, the DEA step in to help out 
because federal regulations do not permit outside agencies to have access to equipment, 
such as wiretapping. One agent said,  
Not so much computers, but if you need special wiretapping or 
whatever, you know, equipment that …if we need to do surveillance or 
something related with a drug case, we went to the DEA office and if 
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they have any equipment that we need from them…so we do share 
equipment often (R12-F). 
 Although this form of cooperation may be a positive for one agency/joint task 
force, it is somewhat difficult for those on the technical end. One translating officer 
noted that wire taps could be passed along for translation with little explanation of what 
the voices on the tape were related to, making translation very difficult. There were a 
few officers who claimed that the DEA has refused to share equipment. However, DEA 
agents argued that they do what they can, even on an informal basis, to provide 
equipment: “As DEA, we supply PRPD with things that are surplus or that we’re no 
longer going to use. Instead of throwing that away we try to make it happen for them” 
(R9-F). This arguably illustrates something of a hierarchy, whereby the DEA has 
determined that PRPD needs nothing more than the equipment that it deems obsolete. 
This is not indicative of co-operation. Perhaps the attitude to the benefits of cooperation 
was best summed up by one grateful agent: “We share trainings, we share equipment, 
we share logistics….No matter how small cooperation might be it’s good enough 
because we have to look at it this way – anything that we can get we need” (R28-L). 
Success 
When asked how successful the DEA has been at TNPC, the majority of respondents 
said that the DEA was very successful. Several non-DEA agents even alleged that 
success rates were as high at 90-97% (R15-F). The majority thought the DEA was 
successful for a variety of reasons, primarily: response time, accurate tactical 
intelligence, geography, and resources. The DEA, overall, is perceived to be highly 
organised and highly strategic. One agent said, “I think it’s excellent, outstanding. I’ve 
been overseas four times so I’m very experienced working with other foreign national 
police agencies in foreign countries and it’s worked I think very well” (R25-F). Others 
felt it was because the DEA builds a lot of good cases (R18-F). Some respondents 
pointed out that the DEA were especially successful because of the resources they 
receive in comparison to the rest of the US. One officer explains, 
I would say with the resources that they have in the Caribbean they have 
been very resourceful, very successful. I believe that because drug 
trafficking within the nation is not priority or vital of the interest of the 
United States and Europe, you will never have the amount of people you 
need to diminish the threat or control the threat unless drug trafficking 
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becomes a vital interest of the nations [...] We will always be short of 
resources …because it is not a priority. (R14-F) 
It is interesting to note that this could be cited as an advantage of the HIDTA Program, 
which turns the most problematic of areas into priority areas, giving TNPC the best 
chance of success.  
 Another stressed that, in the Caribbean, they were extremely successful, but it 
really depends on physical geography. For example, the DEA in Alaska have very little 
transnational contact, while PR's geography makes cooperation essential (R11-F). One 
officer also explained that, with the use of the DEA’s tactical intelligence, they were 
able to quickly implement their operations and trust that the information was accurate. 
They felt that response time and accurate information was critical in order to do a better 
job across borders (R27-L). 
One DEA agent pointed out that they are successful from a completely different 
viewpoint, claiming that, across the world, the DEA have an outstanding reputation and 
that, after 9/11, the DEA were the first to respond at an international level with 
intelligence. However, this agent also alleged that the DEA is the first US Government 
law enforcement agency for everything (R16-F). This is debatable and arrogant 
attitudes of superiority such as these could possibly cause severe divisions in 
cooperation. An agent comments: 
Fairly successful because they co-operate with the FBI and the United 
States Customs. I mean it’s much more focused, you know, they’ve got 
one mission and that’s drugs and usually everybody is pretty much on 
board doing something about that….. Quite extensive, but again because 
the transnational problem with drugs smuggling as compared to other 
types of crime in the international storm, not everybody is interested in 
that. (R17-F) 
 Perhaps, surprisingly, in light of some of the criticisms that have previously 
been examined, only a small number of respondents answered that the success rate of 
the DEA needs improvement, though agreeing that recently there has been more co-
operation between state and federal agencies (R6-F, R13-I). However, one other 
respondent expressed the need for improved multi-agency cooperation: 
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I have to say, I don’t think that the DEA by itself can do much, you 
know. There’s no liaison (overseas) with other law enforcement 
agencies whether they’re local or state or federal or international. I don’t 
think that anything will be accomplished because, particularly with 
drugs, you have so many countries that are involved [...] so you as a 
single agency just stick to continental US, you really won’t be able to 
accomplish anything, at least that’s my opinion. (R3-I) 
One agent said,  
When it comes to our intervention, we do not hear from them that often. 
I suspect that they do have a lot of DEA officers in other nations and 
they do their own intelligence, their own communications, 
internationally they do it between their own officers. As I said, we don’t 
hear from them that often (R24-F). 
Another notion of their success partly lies in the fact that the Caribbean is such a key 
area for drug trafficking – this is the right place to focus on TNPC. While one agent 
agreed that, though they are as successful as they can be, it is seemingly futile: 
...the greed is just overwhelming and this island is like I would never 
have imagined when I first came here just how intertwined it is with the 
drug culture here, it’s insane…. And take the ramp-rats over in 
American Airlines. I’m convinced that the majority of them are dirty. I 
mean you know we took down a bunch of them a while ago and they’re 
still operating, so it’s like, it’s so, I don’t know… futile? (R22-F) 
Almost all of the agents reported that their contact or role with the DEA was positive, 
and that they had a cooperative working relationship within and outside of PR. One 
agent said, “It’s pretty good. Communication is pretty good, it’s a good flow of 
information and when you need help they’ll come up and help you out you know, real 
cool for you on that aspect” (R15-F). For many agencies, their main contact/role with 
the DEA was working through the HIDTA program. HIDTA presents an opportunity 
for meetings between heads of agencies to discuss current operations, and facilitates 
cooperation via the Investigative Support Centre (ISC), a central system used to share 
intelligence and information. Many agents admitted that all the intelligence they receive 
from the DEA is via the ISC. One supervisor explained that after the monthly HIDTA 
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meetings, he returns to his agents and explains new information and that, in turn, causes 
agents to have better relations with the DEA, despite not directly attending the meetings 
(R4-F). They cooperated with DEA agents better because they trust their supervisor’s 
link with HIDTA. Knowing that they have a good history with HIDTA or their special 
agent in charge, they are able to freely communicate and resolve problems more 
directly. This has opened up the channels of communication. In cases where they need 
information that is of a more official nature, they go through the ISC. 
This positive perception of communication is not consistent, however. Another 
respondent rated, on a scale of one to ten, how he felt about cooperation with the DEA, 
“I would have to say five. In the terms of relationship and how close we are, it’s still 
more work, we need to improve communication” (R13-I). This can be linked to 
Rocco’s (1998) consideration of the importance of effective communication needing to 
be done in a particular way. 
 A few of the agencies have limited contact with the DEA because of the 
sensitive nature of the agencies’ information. So cooperation is kept to a basic 
minimum or case-by-case basis: 
The contact is not so active right now because I am working with 
gathering intelligence on gangs, street gangs in PR and the information 
is very closed, you know, sensitive….sometimes we need to share 
information with DEA because the information involves direct property 
(R2-F). 
 It is quite striking to consider that, in a context where TNPC is held in high 
regard, barriers still exist involving trust and confidentiality that transcend the 
importance for TNPC. Indeed, given that the respondents suggested that consideration 
of different but related issues could be extremely helpful – such as the close link 
between street gangs and drug trafficking -, it is a shame, in this instance, that 
intelligence could not be shared. Clearly, cooperation is not always the case. While 
there may be some justification for limited cooperation due to sensitive information, in 
reality, secretive attitudes damage cooperation. Many of the DEA respondents agreed 
that their main role in PR is to know what is happening in their specific areas or units 
and to shut down drug trafficking networks. Many DEA agents supervise, or are 
involved with, special task forces, which have specific remits and consist of multi-
agencies and experts. For example, at San Juan airport, a task force made up of DEA 
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agents and PRPD officers aims to prevent drugs trafficking through the airport bound 
for the US.  
 DEA respondents were found to be well educated, experienced, and from 
diverse professional backgrounds. They enjoyed what they are doing, had a sense of 
purpose and were proud of their jobs. Overall, they rated job satisfaction as high, as one 
agent explained, “Well it’s a great job you know.  We are trying to work against 
something that is almost impossible; you know the Drug Enforcement Administration 
is very important here in PR” (R8-I). Some agents were intelligence analysts, meaning 
that they had the role of disseminating, collecting, and sharing information with 
colleagues and counterparts. Others worked in money laundering groups, Foreign 
Operations or in the assets group, focusing on financial investigation. Many agents felt 
that their roles were too busy and, although they enjoyed their duties and were 
sometimes challenged, they were overwhelmed with the amount of work. Many of the 
units are small and some complained that it is difficult to be pursuing so many cases at 
once. They also frequently travel abroad as part of their role. One agent described the 
positive side of this: 
I’m doing a lot of learning, I guess, kind of I do a lot of assisting some 
of the senior agents that have years on.  I’ll help them out with a lot of 
stuff so I get more familiar with the paperwork and policies and all of 
the red tape that goes with any government organization.  So yeah, I 
mean I’ve got a couple of my own cases that I run right now, which is 
kind of rare.  I know in certain divisions, that wouldn’t even be heard of, 
so down here I kind of got that fortunate opportunity to do that right out 
of the gates (R9-F). 
 Many of the agents felt that their ongoing contact with the DEA was 
constructive and analytical, also providing good contacts and networking information. 
One officer reported, “Whatever it takes…If they cannot let me tap into a 
network…they will in fact go out and do it themselves and get the information and 
intelligence I need” (R4-F). This suggests a willingness to assist in the sharing of 
information that, in fact, is somewhat contradictory to some of the other responses. 
There does seem to be a substantial level of inconsistency in this area. There is, 
amongst all the discussion regarding particular successes and failures, an overarching 
feeling of confusion regarding this question. One officer, for instance, admitted not 
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being able to answer the question of how successful the DEA are and that it was hard to 
gauge, claiming that it was all relative to the number of agents employed: 
…I don’t know how I can tell you that because first of all the DEA in 
PR, they don’t have a lot of agents in PR, maybe ten, twenty agents in 
PR. They use our people from this office, and working together maybe 
we have fifty and they’ve got four, okay [...] but they use our work 
people to work for the DEA. (R7-L) 
 Many other respondents spoke along similar lines, explaining that it was an 
operational question, feeling that they could not give their opinion. Indeed, I would 
suggest that the inconsistencies in these answers and the very different ways in which 
the question was answered would (or could) suggest a general hesitance in how to 
judge the success of the DEA with TNPC. 
5.3 Agents’ Experience of Working for/with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration 
5.3.1 The best things about working for/with the DEA.  Other TNP agencies, 
regarded as stakeholders, found the DEA to be extremely professional, organised, and 
well-funded. This is hardly surprising given that generous federal funding can attract a 
pool of applicants who are well educated, experienced, and further trained at DEA 
academies. Themes that captured the best things about working for or with the DEA 
included: one’s improved professional image, working for a high-class act, the benefits 
of access associated with the agency, as well as remuneration, increased responsibility, 
and recognition as lending themselves to job satisfaction.  
 Most respondents felt that the DEA staff was generally professional, describing 
its agents as good communicators who are direct, clear-cut and honest. One respondent, 
who works daily with the DEA, believed, 
They are very professional people, most of them, [...] They 
communicate pretty well, they more or less are straightforward people, 
you know, they don’t deviate from all their, you know, into other way of 
doing things. They go directly to the point and I like that (R14-F). 
 Many felt that the DEA has a deeper understanding of the important issues of 
cooperation, as indicated by one respondent, “They understand that they cannot achieve 
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their mission by working alone. They understand that the key to success is intelligence 
sharing” (R27-L) – gaining information and passing that information on. 
 Another agent said the best thing about working with the DEA was the 
accessibility of the agent, who was readily available for any direct, face-to-face or 
telephone, contact at HIDTA as they worked under one roof.  Others mentioned that the 
DEA is very analytical and extremely good at cross-referencing and providing 
cooperative training, and also fast and efficient when others need access to information 
from the DEA on off-island contacts. The DEA is seen to be very cooperative and 
“speak[s] the same language” (R5-F). Overall, the respondents generally agreed that 
DEA agents had reliable understanding of the issues surrounding TNP cooperation. 
 Globally, the DEA is seen as highly organised, well-funded and, therefore, well-
equipped. Some felt that cooperation was clearly defined by who does what, so that 
agencies could 'fill the gaps' for each other in terms of equipment and skills. For 
instance, one agency took care of the maritime side of an operation, while the DEA 
dealt with the land side. Another said the best aspect is the methods and the equipment 
the DEA provide (R8-I). Most respondents confessed that, if they had to do the work by 
themselves, it would be difficult because it takes money and equipment when you 
really want to get things done. Not surprisingly, some of the respondents blamed the 
US government for not providing enough funding to their own agencies (R28-L). 
 Another theme was that one of the best things about working with the DEA was 
that they have unique access to information that other agencies do not. DEA agents are 
seen as ‘street people,’ as a participant stressed: 
The best thing about working with them is their people. DEA agents do 
the time, they are street people, I mean the DEA knows the streets very, 
very well, they do a lot of undercover, they are exposed more to the bad 
people in the community and they bring back a lot of information that 
sometimes is very difficult for us to obtain. (R11-F) 
 The majority of TNP agents who responded clearly felt that the benefits of 
working with the DEA far out-weighed any negative aspects. The DEA are respected 
not only for their professionalism, but for their reliable contacts and networks.  
 The major themes which emerged, however, for working at the DEA, were the 
three R’s, so to speak: remuneration, responsibility, and recognition. For instance, 
many agents admitted that the salary and benefits were excellent, as were the benefits 
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of global travel (R25-F, R17-F, R16-F). Other agents found job satisfaction for 
different reasons, such as the amount of responsibility they were offered or public 
recognition when they had succeeded on operations. Many expressed an increased 
sense of purpose and duty to society: 
PR is a place where it needs to be more safe than what it is and working 
with them, other than that it just compensates, you know, it’s a good 
way to give back to society. So I am proud of what I do. (R4-F) 
 Others expressed that it is a highly rewarding job when you can see the end 
results (R9-F). This attitude highlighted their sense of pride in the agency and their 
positive self-esteem. One even claimed that “they love the drug world” (R4-F). Other 
agents expressed, similarly, that the job has variety and they rarely have been bored in 
their careers: “It’s the action. It’s something different every single day, so it’s never the 
same thing, you never know what to expect every day when you come in, so that’s one 
of the things I really like about the DEA” (R9-F). 
 Many expressed they were busy all the time, but that it was better than being 
bored (R21-F). Others pointed out the best thing was having lots of freedom on the job, 
with the autonomy to run their own cases. Some expressed that they liked targeting 
criminals who bring large amounts of drug monies into the country, and felt satisfied 
that they were an integral part of a solution towards a global problem, helping a larger 
cause. As one agent put it,  
Well the mission of the Agency is an honourable mission. We’re 
fighting drugs and drug trafficking, not only in our area but 
internationally and everything that goes on here is linked or affects 
someplace else. You know the Caribbean is considered like the second 
threat to the United States in terms of drugs and drug trafficking, they 
call it the Caribbean corridor. (R21-F) 
Another agent provided a balanced perspective: 
Challenging! It’s challenging and it’s frustrating at the same time. [...] I 
was working in PR, it was a lot of fun but you realise even as high up 
the food chain as you think you are, you’re only making a very limited 
impact. And then I was switched to xyz Group and I got a lot of freedom 
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to do these cases which we thought would be making a very much larger 
impact. (R22-F) 
Lastly, one agent viewed being a smaller and focused agency as the best thing: 
Well pretty much, compared to other agencies, it’s just that we work 
drugs so we’re a very specific agency.  [...] compared to the FBI, their 
jurisdiction is so wide that you can’t really concentrate on one thing in 
particular [...] So that’s pretty much what I enjoy most, that we can 
actually focus on something, we don’t have to be worrying about all 
kinds of stuff. (R9-F) 
 This highlights the argument against the centralization of TNP agencies. The 
larger an agency becomes, the more bureaucratic it can become, fragmenting various 
departments and arguably working against the ultimate goal. The question of exploring 
a TNP agency that fosters smaller, specific departments or agencies should be 
considered further. 
5.3.2 The worst things about working for/with the DEA.  When asked about 
the worst things involved in working for or with the DEA, two major topics emerged: 
personality traits and personal sacrifices. It should be pointed out, however, that some 
non-DEA agents felt that cooperation was great and, therefore, did not have much to 
say. 
 One theme that emerged from this portion of interviews was the undesirable 
personality traits and overblown egos of some DEA agents. With machismo and racism 
in the police having been historically commonplace (Bowling & Phillips, 2002; Foster, 
2003; Reiner, 2000), it is not surprising that traits like ego, machismo and 
competitiveness, described as a “cop culture” by Reiner (2000), dominated negative 
descriptions of colleagues. Many agents reported that DEA agents had egos and 
arrogant attitudes, and that this was exclusive to DEA agents in the region, except for 
those working at HIDTA, where such attitudes are strongly discouraged (R26-F). 
Several agents responded that they found the DEA male-dominated and that they have 
witnessed gender discriminatory practices over the years. When asked for clarification, 
many stated that these ways continue despite renewed policies and procedures set by 
headquarters. It was also suggested several times that the DEA needed to become more 
diverse in terms of gender and race (R25-F). Although many respondents reported that 
undesirable personalities were the worst thing about attempting to collaborate with 
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colleagues, many did not have specific examples to give. In fact, the only one who 
could give an example admitted having had only one bad experience in ten years.  
 While some DEA agents found that being extremely busy and travelling 
frequently were positive parts of the job, the majority said these job requirements took 
their toll, and that personal sacrifices were being made. Time away from family was 
mentioned as a major consequence, with one agent highlighting the risks of how much 
time is spent on the job: “Sometimes you get recognised in the street by some of the 
bad guys. It happened once” (R9-F). Although most agents are extremely careful with 
their identities, unfortunate, threatening circumstances can and do occur with agents 
and, worse, their loved ones. This ties in as a potential limitation for TNPC, in the 
context of the relationship discussed in the literature between trust and risk (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994; Gambetta, 1988; Schoorman, Mayer & Davies, 2007). As seen here, the 
stakes are extremely high. They must be assured that trust can be guaranteed before any 
cooperation between agencies or individuals can take place. Heavy workload was 
another problem, along with the possibility of burnout (R16-F). It could, perhaps, be 
perceived that cooperation with another agency might bring more work, adding to this 
perceived problem.  
 The DEA and other TNP agents expressed annoyance over bureaucracy. Federal 
and local laws and policies currently in place were mentioned by many respondents to 
hinder rather than expedite the processes of policing across borders (R17-F). One non-
DEA agent conveyed,  
The worst things are I believe, the problem or most of the problems 
working with them is the responsive time because they depend on 
federal systems. When I say federal systems, federal acquisition 
systems, legal systems and not the DEA. For example, if they need to do 
a facility or they need to have an enhancement on their facility, they 
need to wait for two or three years to acquire that change and it’s not fair 
for them to fight against a threat that adapts pretty quickly…. I think the 
DEA flexibility is not enough (R14-F). 
Others agreed, one saying, 
Flexibility of operations. Sometimes they are very strict in their ways 
and they only do drugs. I mean, for example, if I have a case that doesn’t 
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have drugs, I can’t really work with them, I can’t bring any of them with 
us. (R22-F) 
 There were different perspectives on why information may not be passed along 
quickly but, again, the frustration was with federal bureaucracy, not the DEA itself. 
Another suggested that information was good quality, but did not move fast enough, for 
instance, to allow quick interception of boats entering PR. Similarly, in carrying out 
arrests, bureaucracy can give criminals an unfair advantage. As one agent attested: 
Bureaucracy I guess [...] the obvious problem in my point of view is the 
fact that we are competing practically with the bad guys. They have all 
the money in the world to get whatever they want or whatever they need 
and do it the way they want it, we have limited resources and we have to 
go through many steps in order to get approval, in order for 
investigations, approval for funds. (R3-I) 
Not sharing the same software and computer systems was also expressed as a 
communications concern, but more as a technicality, than the fault of the agency itself.  
 Many non-DEA agents thought the worst thing about the DEA is that, 
admittedly, not unlike themselves, the DEA hoards information, liaisons, and 
informants and are highly competitive. Others suggested that information mysteriously 
got sidetracked, while others said the DEA was out to get the final prize - the 
recognition. Indeed, this is linked to the theory of competition being a barrier to TNPC. 
Someone added,  
They could improve upon, I mean, I know when they work on a federal 
case they keep it to themselves; sometimes they don’t give us 
information. I don’t know if this is because they want to get the credit on 
everything, or how secret is it, is there something that is really secret? 
(R30-F) 
 Some respondents suggested that competition played a part in preventing 
effective cooperation between forces, with one speaking about it in terms of a 
relationship “going sour” (R13-I). This suggests that while competition can sometimes 
be beneficial, in this case, it was more likely to lead to resentment when cases were 
‘taken away’ by other agencies, leading to unwillingness to cooperate in the future. In 
essence, what caused problems was not robust competition but, rather, rivalry and a 
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territorial attitude to individual cases. The majority of respondents felt that the DEA 
were doing an adequate job, but that their role or methods of cooperation needed 
clarifying. 
 One of the milder criticisms was regarding the current Director at the DEA; 
many people were unhappy with him and felt he should be let go (R14-F). It was noted 
a few times that the “rotten apples should go” and to “fire away the bad people.” It is 
unclear as to whether the “bad people” referred to the incompetent or the corrupt, but as 
considered in the literature, there is little difference between the impact of the two 
(Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) on the trust of another organisation, However, 
further questioning of leadership and restructuring would be required to give a fair and 
adequate representation of this issue. Several respondents felt the need to express that, 
although the majority of DEA agents were cooperative, there were always a few egos 
that would attempt to sabotage joint operations (R25-F). 
 Improving efficiency of the DEA was noted as important in order to increase 
cooperation with other agencies. One agent explained, 
I would say we need to be more efficient in how we get things done, 
because this is a very time sensitive business. [...] If we were going to do 
a drugs transaction and you had a bad guy on the phone and he’s telling 
you, “Yeah, I want to see you now at such and such corner”, and you go 
like, “Well, you know, now is not a good time”, because we need a 
couple of hours to get operational supplies in place and people in place 
and do all this structural thing that we already have in place in order to 
get that transaction done, I don’t think that guy is going to stay on the 
line. (R8-I) 
 Both DEA and non-DEA agents complained about the size of the agency. Many 
felt that the DEA is still too small, and that it needs to be a little bigger. One 
experienced agent thought that the number of joint initiatives in PR and the Virgin 
Islands were out of proportion and, since PR is bigger and more populous, it should be 
a much greater focus of resources and efforts. In addition, this agent thought HIDTA 
should be the main centre for operations and resources, with the ISC growing to 
support this. This is certainly a suggestion worth considering given the success of 
HIDTA to date (R4-F). 
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Overall, the DEA is viewed as being quite autonomous and secretive. One agent 
replied,  
Customs will come over here to our agency and talk to us and we can 
exchange problems and we respect the US Inspector, investigators and 
the FBI. DEA are very, very, secretive of their operations. They call us 
when they need us, when they need some information internationally, 
but they do have their own communications network internationally 
(R24-F). 
 Many felt that the DEA needs to be more receptive about other agencies, 
specifically with local ones. It was suggested that if the DEA could understand local 
agencies and their role, then it would yield better results. Subsequently, the DEA 
should try to better understand how local people think and react. Many respondents felt 
that as long as the DEA continues to cooperate with other countries at a local level, and 
develop good relationships with local law enforcement, they would be able to get the 
job done. 
 A last, but crucial, point made was that the DEA needed to be more open to the 
community. The people in the streets look at the DEA as something very far removed. 
One respondent said,  
They need to be more open with the people in the schools, in the media, 
radio, television in order to bring back the images that the people have 
of DEA or the people think something, you know, strange, something 
obscure. They are outsiders. They need to all map more with the people 
of the street, the majority of the people, with the local culture…This is 
very important (R23-I). 
 Most DEA and non-DEA agents agreed that this was not only important, but 
critical, that of being more open to community, local culture and local law enforcement.  
5.4 Agents’ Views of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Program 
 HIDTA’s overall goal is to reduce drug trafficking in high-intensity areas, such 
as PR, but how HIDTA contributes to achieving this aim was the main issue for most 
respondents when asked how they saw the program’s goals. Key themes were that 
HIDTA: 
• encourages the sharing of information 
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• improves networking between agencies 
• helps ensure that resources are managed efficiently and that investigations are 
not duplicated 
• allows the agencies involved to work more proactively to attack criminal 
organisations at their source rather than investigating small-time criminals.  
 In realizing these objectives, the sharing of intelligence was seen as a key 
element of HIDTA’s role, in particular, allowing links to be made between different 
investigations, which might otherwise remain in separate areas. This element was seen 
as very important by many of the respondents, since intelligence is regarded as playing 
a huge role in building good cases and securing convictions. As one agent said: 
“Intelligence is the base for a good criminal investigation” (R26-F). 
 Several respondents suggested that HIDTA’s role is as a central ‘clearing 
house’ for information, so that disparate pieces of information can be collected and 
connected. HIDTA processes information from a range of different sources so that 
connections can be made and links established between different cases and reports. 
This function as a clearing house also speeds up the process of acquiring and 
connecting important information so that the crucial data is easily accessible and, as 
one agent put it: “Timing is what makes it work” (R17-F). 
 There is a clear link between HIDTA’s role in allowing intelligence sharing and 
its role in building networks and relationships, since, in addition to acting as a clearing 
house for information, it allows agents to access each other directly to confer and 
compare information. When it came to explaining their own interactions with HIDTA, 
the range of experiences described by agents differed quite extensively; with some 
saying they had very little contact with HIDTA, while others worked within the 
organisation or had constant, daily contact with it. This meant that experiences with 
HIDTA could range from occasional cooperation on operations or sharing of 
information, right through to having regular meetings or working constantly with the 
organisation. In addition, the roles described varied widely: from investigators and 
taskforce agents, to facilitators, supervisors, training coordinators and administrators. 
Processes of Selecting HIDTA Agents 
 HIDTA agents are selected by the agencies/forces from which they come, rather 
than handpicked from within HIDTA. Although, candidates are chosen to fit into a 
specific vacant role within a team and, consequently, must have certain 
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experience/attributes. The perception is that they are experienced and the best in their 
field, not agents who are unwanted in other departments. After a thorough selection 
process, including panel interviews searching for candidates with the right skills and 
background, potential agents also undergo extensive polygraph and background 
security checks before they can be offered roles within HIDTA. One officer said:  
The HIDTA agents are selected, very carefully selected, like for 
example, as far as the agency goes, I don’t have much of a say on who’s 
going to, which federal agent is going to be assigned to my group.  We 
might sit down and brainstorm a little bit but I don’t have say-so that 
way (R11-F). 
 If it is well known that HIDTA has a rigorous application process, there may be 
advantages in terms of building relationships. Conceivably, they are more likely to be 
considered by other agents within HIDTA to be competent and professional from the 
beginning, without perhaps having to “prove themselves” extensively before earning 
trust (it could perhaps also be noted that there is also potential for snobbery from within 
HIDTA towards other agencies). 
There does not, however, appear to be a centralised hiring apparatus for 
HIDTA, since agents are chosen through their own agencies rather than by an overall 
HIDTA selection body. Among the suggestions for ways to improve HIDTA’s 
recruitment and training, one suggested that there should be common standards and 
procedures for selection, as well as the same training. Joint training appears to be a 
regular feature of HIDTA training, often with different agencies organising or running 
training sessions and then inviting members of other agencies to participate. The fact 
that most training was run by individual agencies may be related to funding cuts that 
have reduced funding for training within HIDTA.  
 Joint training was also considered to be useful in building relationships and 
improving cooperation for several reasons. First, it ensures officers have the same 
reactions to situations and follow similar procedures, such as searches, which can be 
crucial during operations. Second, good practice and useful tactics are shared 
throughout the forces. Finally, but most importantly, the networking inherent in joint 
training builds relationships that can be essential later on, as one respondent said: 
It’s not that you’re going to be sitting on a chair watching the instructor 
but you’re going to be meeting the person right next to you and the 
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person right next to you, you’re going to be going for lunch together, 
and in some way you’re going to be breaking that big wall between 
agencies […] then when you need some favour or you need to work 
together with somebody you say, “I remember that guy, let me call 
him.” (R6-F) 
This is an extremely relevant point in the context of motivations and, in 
particular, social and psychological motivations: building relationships, building 
trust and building teamwork are all crucial, and this is one of the ways in which 
these essential elements are fostered. 
 Joint training also helps develop the message that all the agencies are working 
towards a common goal, another element which is important in developing cooperation. 
This is a feature of the HIDTA working culture that is developed through shared 
training. In terms of improvements that could be made to training, joint training was 
identified as the most important improvement by respondents, since it offers the 
greatest benefits to cooperation. One respondent thought, however, that joint training 
was not the issue, but that leadership was still too fragmented; that performance was 
judged according to DEA or FBI priorities rather than HIDTA’s goals. 
 When it came to training for local Puerto Rican officers specifically, several 
respondents thought that training for local officers was more important than training for 
federal officers, since Puerto Rican officers were less likely to have received adequate 
training due to funding constraints. In addition, they would not have received the same 
kind of training as federal agents, and so would need to have additional training in 
order to operate in the same kind of environment. Language was also occasionally 
raised as an issue when it came to training, the perception being that there needed to be 
more Spanish-language training. 
Inadequate Training 
 Complicating training needs further was the important theme that funding and 
resources were inadequate, or were barely adequate. While HIDTA used to have a 
dedicated training program, funding for this was cut and training was now arranged and 
planned on a more ad hoc basis, mostly to coincide with specific operations or to meet 
particular needs, based on annual surveys. There are no longer any dedicated funds for 
training. As a consequence, fewer officers - only those whose immediate needs required 
it - were being sent on courses. In some cases, training was made available on a “first 
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come, first served” basis, with only a proportion of all the agents able to attend. Many 
of the respondents thought this was inappropriate and that enough resources should be 
available to offer the same training to all officers.  
Most of the officers thought that additional training would be an important way 
to improve cooperation and effectiveness. Overall, the perception that standards for 
recruitment to HIDTA are high may be useful, but recruitment is still managed by 
individual agencies rather than centrally. In addition, joint training was seen as a crucial 
contributor in building networks and instilling a sense of shared goals, although it had, 
to some extent, been downgraded in importance due to funding constraints. Training 
plays an essential part in ensuring that officers work in the same ways, rather than at 
cross purposes, and also helps to fill in ‘gaps’ in training for local officers assigned to 
HIDTA. It seems that increasing joint training and providing more funding to allow 
additional officers to attend each training opportunity might be another way to promote 
networks, as well as improved performance.  
Information Sharing 
 Effective means of information sharing is a vital element of TNPC. For 
example, a key aspect of information sharing through the ISC is to coordinate the 
actions and operations of individual agencies and forces. By sharing information on 
which targets they are investigating, and on undercover operations, they avoid both 
duplicating their efforts and creating embarrassing and dangerous clashes. One officer 
described a situation:  
Which has happened in the past where we’ve had an informant arrange a 
deal and we get there and we start looking around and it’s like there’s 
(inaudible) from (inaudible) here.  “Get out of there,” because we were 
going to like hit Customs or we were going to hit ourselves. (R3-I) 
Information sharing in HIDTA can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) via 
systems; (2) through face-to-face contact; and (3) by telephone. By far, the more 
common method appears to be by telephone, calling a contact to ask questions. There 
are two extremely important issues at play, however, that do not seem to be entirely 
compatible in practice. The first is an issue of security. One respondent said:  
It’s pretty bad over here in PR because we have a lot of corruption in the 
department and it would be great but it would be bad for any case 
developed, you know, if somebody get their hands on that information 
142	  
	  
and they let you know that we’re doing an investigation and you, you 
know. (R20-F) 
The issue here is security in the face of potential corruption and the concern that 
information might get into the wrong hands. Not one of the three categories of 
information sharing provide an adequate remedy to this. Systems across the various 
forces and agencies involved in combating crime in the Caribbean are diverse and un-
integrated. Respondents described a number of systems, including the Investigative 
Support Centre (ISC, an FBI/HIDTA system), Business Partner Network (BPN, Coast 
Guard), Regional Organized Crime Information Centre (ROCIC), Regional Sharing 
Information System (RSIS), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and Electronic Privacy 
Information Centre (EPIC). What was clear is that there is no central system that all the 
agencies, including local forces, can access. While this might be ascribed simply to a 
failure to yet establish a centralised system, there are also security concerns in creating 
a database that anyone can access, particularly in sharing information with local forces 
in PR. Similarly, as phone calls can be intercepted, there were some concerns that this 
was less secure and that trust was harder to establish over the telephone. For instance, 
one respondent said: 
Sometimes one of them is not knowing the person face-to-face but if you can 
tell me you’re from the Coast Guard, are you really from the Coast Guard? All 
this is being done over the line, we don’t know if you’re really from, I mean 
what else do I have to vouch for you other than you telling me, you know, I 
need something else, somebody else to tell me (R13-I). 
Trust is crucial in information (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) and face-to-face is 
considered to be the most appropriate means of achieving this end. Anderson (1989) 
and Rocco (1998) echo these concerns and very much advocate the face-to-face 
communication methods. Indeed, some of the respondents recounted how information 
sometimes had to be literally walked across and put into someone’s hands because 
fax/phone/email lines were not completely secure. 
 Another important issue in the effectiveness of cooperation was timeliness. 
While this would not be categorised as a barrier to cooperation, it has an enormous 
impact on the effectiveness of information sharing. Particularly in cases where there 
were conflicts between one agency and another, as when an undercover operation 
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interfered with an operation by another agency, the ISC had sometimes been late in 
becoming aware of this clash and therefore late in preventing problems. 
Networking - Creating Links and Relationships Between Agents 
 Another essential function that HIDTA fulfils is to bring agents from different 
agencies and physically force them together, both through providing an office where 
they work together side by side and by bringing senior officers together for monthly 
meetings. Monthly meetings between senior officers allow quick resolution of conflicts 
between agencies and reassignment, or agreement on sharing, of cases when necessary. 
However, with most of these regular face-to-face meetings being between senior 
officers or directors, rather than individual agents, some officers did note that they saw 
it as highly important to introduce themselves to other agents in other areas or 
departments and to also get to know them directly.  
The value of HIDTA’s strength in facilitating these opportunities is underlined 
by several respondents’ comments on the importance of having agents literally meeting 
around the same table, at regular times, or being able to speak to each other directly by 
being in the same office. This constant proximity, working alongside each other helps 
build trust and break down barriers between agencies. It is also the most effective way 
to cultivate relationships between agents and establish good cooperation between 
agencies. This further increases efficiency and speeds up investigations due to avoiding 
long processes when needing to acquire information or speak to agents from different 
forces. Instead, officers have the contacts to quickly get in touch and resolve queries in 
the first instance. As one officer said: 
I would pick up the phone and call my intelligence group that’s over 
there and I would say, “Listen can you find this out from so-and-so 
agency, or can you find this out,” and then they would go to that agency 
who has the responsibility for that particular action, and they would ask, 
but if I had my own contact, I could make the call to the agency (R25-
F). 
 In addition to facilitating communications and building relationships and 
networks, HIDTA helps improve coordination of different agencies in combating drug 
crime. By allowing agents to be aware of what others are working on, and allowing 
them to reallocate cases based on new information, cases can be taken over by another 
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team or shared to ensure greater success in pursuing the case. This could also mean 
combining resources, such as agents or equipment, to pursue a particular case.  
 Agents assigned to HIDTA are further able to ensure that priorities and goals 
are communicated back to their agencies, preventing different agencies from moving in 
different directions. A key theme of coordinating and maximising resources is the idea 
of not multiplying or duplicating investigations so that forces, whether local or national 
agencies, are not pursuing similar targets or lines of enquiry simultaneously, thereby 
wasting resources. The term for this is “deconfliction”, mentioned earlier, ensuring that 
different agencies do not conflict by pursuing the same cases. The method of having 
senior officers meet regularly to compare cases and reassign them according to how 
they can be pursued most efficiently can both avoid a duplication of efforts and 
sidestep some of the territorialism of law enforcement agencies. Since senior officers 
are making authoritative decisions, together, cooperative decision-making is promoted 
and conflict becomes less likely.  
 By encouraging cooperation, intelligence sharing and coordination of resources, 
HIDTA creates better conditions for proactive investigation of drug crime, and many 
respondents recognised this by identifying that the main purpose of HIDTA was to go 
after criminal organisations, rather than focus on low-level crime. As has been 
described in previous sections, proactive law enforcement requires additional resources, 
strong cooperation, as well as timely and joint analysis of intelligence from a range of 
sources – all elements which HIDTA’s TNPC model aims to provide.  
 Several respondents agreed that HIDTA’s role was to focus on building cases 
and initiating investigations against organisations and powerful individuals rather than 
low-level dealers, creating an infrastructure that could deal with the complexity of 
criminal organisations. As one respondent put it, “If we kill the root then we can stop 
the flow” (R27-L). While this is a somewhat mixed metaphor, it supports a staple of the 
research and extols a benefit of TNPC, of dealing with areas of concern that relate to 
the one at hand (for example, the previous suggestion that dealing with low-level crime 
in housing projects rather than the criminal networks who feed that crime could be 
significant). 
 In conclusion, it appears that HIDTA has at least two important roles in 
combating drug trafficking in the Caribbean. Firstly, it improves cooperation and 
sharing between agencies, thereby making investigations and operations more efficient 
and reducing ‘clashes.’ Secondly, by extension, it allows agents within HIDTA to work 
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more proactively than their counterparts outside HIDTA, focusing more on initiating 
investigations against criminal organisations and working to attack these organisations 
at their root rather than investigating lower-level criminals. The gains in information-
sharing and efficiency that HIDTA provides, as well as its additional funding, allows 
for the extra resources needed for effective, proactive work. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 To conclude, Chapter 5 focused on the findings of interviews held with 
individual officers at HIDTA working for/with the DEA in PR. Each official was asked 
about his/her role and, with that as a basis, opinions about the best and worst aspects of 
working for the agency, types of cooperation between the DEA and other agencies, 
how successful this cooperation was, and what they perceived as barriers to increased 
cooperation. Respondents said the DEA is professional, organised, and well-funded, 
leading to high job satisfaction. At the same time, the work required personal sacrifice 
and was affected by bureaucracy and competitiveness. Research found that staff saw 
HIDTA as a central agency whose role it was to coordinate, create linkages and share 
intelligence through both personal and process-oriented channels. Respondents said 
barriers included linguistic differences, institutional biases, funding limitations and 
speed of sharing, but stated that improved networking and technology had been 
introduced to address these obstacles. HIDTA is seen as a world-class model that 
mainly needs increased resources to be more successful. It was also perceived as a 
prestigious agency to which agents were nominated by department heads and joined 
after an extensive process. They felt that training needed to be multi-agency driven and 
that all local agents should meet federal standards.  
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Chapter Six 
Transnational Police Cooperation: Perceived Barriers and Potential 
Improvements 
6.1 Introduction to Chapter Six 
 Perceived barriers to cooperation in TNP in PR and DR have been touched upon 
in the previous chapters, involving existing literature and some of the views expressed 
in the context of the DEA and HIDTA program. These have included language barriers, 
a lack of political will, bad governance and corruption, issues in dealing with different 
legal systems, cultural insensitivities, a lack of universality and defined roles amongst 
agencies, gender inequalities and competition. Major themes regarding key influences 
on TNP cooperation revolved around partnership issues, the politics and play, and anti-
Americanism and other cultural clashes. This chapter will consider the perceived 
barriers and possible improvements in more detail. 
6.2 Perceived Barriers to Cooperation in Transnational Policing in Puerto Rico 
and the Dominican Republic 
 When respondents were asked what they thought were the main barriers to 
TNPC, there were some anticipated responses, such as language, politics and different 
legal systems. However, there were also other factors revealed such as cultural 
insensitivities, attitudes, organizational issues and gender.  
Lack of Political Will 
 On a transnational level, political differences were seen as a main barrier, with 
one agent explaining that differences between “neo-socialist” and “capitalist 
democratic” countries could cause communication barriers. In addition, anti-US 
government sentiment was also seen as an important barrier: 
I see it when I go to these countries and I’m sure many agents feel the 
same, these other police officers in these other countries, they don’t have 
a problem with us as a person, they have a problem with our 
Government, the role it plays.  [...] the Dutch, that’s who we work a lot 
with, they do not like our administration in Washington. They like us, 
the DEA, but they don’t like the policies of the US….then sometimes 
you get some comments directed your way and you bite your tongue and 
so you keep on working (R13-I). 
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 Another agreed and added to sometimes seeing a lack of political will to 
cooperate in other countries, although the agent was unsure whether this was due to an 
unwillingness to cooperate with the US or simply a fear that cooperation would expose 
corruption in that country. When asked why this barrier exists, respondents suggested it 
was because of historical and current relations with the US Government (R11-F). One 
agent stated that, in his experience, many countries perceived US assistance as 
“interference” even if it had been requested (R10-I). Another said that PR’s status 
undermined their cooperation with some other Latino communities:  
We’re a US protectorate, so a lot of people envy that, a lot of people in 
South American countries and in the Caribbean, even though we are 
Spanish Latinos, they envision us as Americans and they say, you might 
be Hispanic but you’re a “gringo also”, you know. That attitude prevents 
us from doing a lot of work. (R6-F) 
 Many respondents agreed that the governments, both locally and federally, do 
not treat local police fairly and do not adequately pay them. In particular, one 
respondent suggested that a failure of the Puerto Rican elite (including the Governor) to 
adequately pay public servants, such as the police, reflected an exploitative colonial 
mentality. 
 Overall, with all of the mentioned barriers, many agents believed that to 
overcome them and improve cooperation it would, ultimately, have to be the 
government’s responsibility. One agent explains, 
I think mostly, you know, it takes political pressure from the US 
Government. I mean there is a certain amount of controlling and co-
operation that we can do on our level but obviously [...] to get some 
things done it takes people at the high office and at the right place to get 
somebody to co-operate and show them why it’s in their best interest 
(R14-F). 
Bad Governance and Corruption 
 Bad governance surrounding the issues of economy, health, and education, 
which typically lead to corruption, was seen as a major barrier not just in poorer 
countries in the Caribbean but in PR as well. One agent stated that federal agents were 
seen as being on another tier: 
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Another barrier it’s economic, we make more money than they do in 
their countries, they consider us on a different social set, someone to 
look up to, someone they can respect because we have diplomatic roles 
when we work overseas, [...] the quality of living that we earn which is 
much more than what they make and the way we are able to operate 
overseas, everything is paid for so we tend to have the best homes, 
bigger homes, the furniture, travel more, a lot of luxuries, not here in PR 
though (R17-F). 
 It is understood that some of the other Caribbean island police forces may 
simply not have resources. So it is interesting that PR, a US protectorate, with federal 
funding and federal agents is not viewed as one of the lucky ones. Another agent 
expressed their thoughts about bad governance with specific regards to the distribution 
of resources and priorities in PR: 
The political side, the political instrument on the political side, doesn’t 
have the drug trafficking as a priority, not even in PR. The way that I see 
it, it’s the root of most of the problems that we have in PR, but they 
don’t see that, so the priority for the elimination of drug traffic, or 
reduction of drug trafficking is, you know, as a prime reality, is not 
there. That is not their priority and so the resources are used for other 
things (R10-I). 
 It appears as a catch-22 scenario, in that resources are taken away from local 
police departments and prioritised to a supposedly better cause which, in turn, enables 
corruption within the police and within government. This is not unique to PR, as many 
agents explained that police departments throughout the Caribbean are corrupt, 
consequently making transnational police cooperation more difficult (R2-F, R9-F, R11-
F, R18-F, R30-F). Sadly, this scenario seems to develop a learned helplessness both 
within the police forces and perhaps, more importantly, in the community itself.  
 In terms of causes, the question of bad governance and corruption is really an 
age-old question of which came first? With bad governance, lack of education, lack of 
training, and poor overall quality of living, corruption is sure to thrive. The attitude in 
the statement, “I may as well try to get something for myself and my family” is a 
common one if the government itself is corrupt. Many respondents felt that corruption 
occurs because of lack of education and lack of role models, with one saying: 
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You don’t get trained; you don’t improve your duties, your skills, so a 
law abider could be an income for the local police. You have a lot of 
corruption here. I mean, corruption is not an excuse for that, you know, 
but the income for the local police, state police, that’s a reason that most 
of the corrupted police are getting into that (R11-F). 
 Another agent explained that the acquisition of even very basic English 
language skills is not properly funded or encouraged by the local government, and local 
state employees are not obliged to know English (R18-F). If communication is key, 
then one would consider, at the very least, the government’s support to fund and 
encourage, if not make mandatory, the second language skill for professional 
communications. However, as one agent suggested, sometimes problems are not at the 
senior level and instead it is necessary to make an impact from the bottom up, with 
networking, dialogue and training.  
Corruption Makes for Mistrust 
 Corruption is the single most important reason for mistrust, far more than 
concerns that officers from other agencies would be competitive or incompetent. This 
was understandable, since corruption causes so much more damage and harm than 
other barriers to trust. There was also a concern that corruption was fairly widespread 
among local officers in PR and other islands/countries. 
 In combating corruption, the most important action was background checking 
and vetting, although better tracking technology for tracing who had accessed 
information (for instance, through unique reference numbers for each officer when 
accessing or requesting records/intelligence) would also be useful in determining where 
leaks had originated. There were differing responses on whether vetting was effective, 
suggesting that different organisations have vetting procedures of different degrees of 
thoroughness, with many local forces being inadequate. 
 Although trust between organisations is important, on a fundamental level, it is 
based on trust between individuals. As such, suggestions for improving trust between 
their individual agents, such as joint training and improved networking opportunities, 
are, to some extent, reiterated. However, in terms of competition over cases and general 
levels of trust, there are additional institutional changes that could be made. For 
example, an important problem raised was that there is a proliferation of agencies 
involved in combating drug crime, with the consequence that there are too many 
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agencies investigating the same cases and, therefore, creating a tendency to compete 
over them. Organisations whose main remit is far removed from drug crime are 
involved in interdiction in addition to those, such as the DEA, for whom drugs are their 
main focus. One agent put it: 
You don’t see the Customs and the IRS lining up to take care of people 
dumping PCB in the water, but everybody wants to play in the drug 
business. I mean if they want to do that, then let’s focus our efforts 
together. (R17-F) 
 The proliferation of agencies involved requires more extensive coordination to 
ensure that investigations are not duplicated, with different elements of the crime being 
investigated by separate agencies. This perception of the need for deconfliction runs 
throughout the literature as an established need for effective TNPC (Best Jr., 2010). 
Some respondents suggested that this issue could be corrected by having more written 
agreements between agencies, which would improve trust by ensuring that agencies are 
always aware of their rights and responsibilities to each other in pursuing cases.  
Official agreements on how to share cases can be useful; one agent described a process 
known as “bluejacketing”, which allows another agency to take on elements of a case, 
such as the ATF investigating elements of a drugs case that related to arms dealing 
(R12-F). This can be an appropriate and structured way of sharing cases that could 
minimise mistrust.  
 As with trust between individuals, trust between organisations needs to be 
earned, not given automatically, and is vulnerable to being lost if there is a perceived 
betrayal of trust. One respondent described a case where an agency took over an 
investigation that several other agencies had contributed to, only to claim full 
responsibility for the success of the case once solved. Of course, this lessens the 
incentive to cooperate next time (R15-F). Correspondingly, successful cooperation 
leads to increased trust and willingness to cooperate again. In this sense, trust requires 
iteration, with each successful episode of cooperation contributing to the success of the 
next operation. At any time, as with trust between individuals, a betrayal or perceived 
betrayal can undermine all the trust that has previously been built up. Ensuring that this 
does not occur is essential. In this, honesty and open communication can help to foster 
trust since it helps prevent misunderstandings that lead to mistrust. Respect was also 
mentioned as a key element.  
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 Overall, the personal was more important than the institutional in determining 
trust levels between both individuals and organisations. Personal trust between 
individuals, alone and in teams, was seen to affect both individual relationships and 
trust between agencies. As such, the most effective solutions lie in encouraging trust 
between individuals, and the most effective approach is through personal contact. 
Training and regular meetings were both identified as useful ways to establish 
networking. However, vetting and careful tracking of information were also important 
ways of dealing with corruption. Formal agreements might also be effective in reducing 
competition between agencies and improving coordination and collaboration.  
The Problem of Differential Legal Systems 
 One of the most difficult obstacles to transnational cooperation is the different 
legal systems of each country. When a US agency has information that can be shared, 
often internal policies on both ends do not permit the exchange. Many agents thought 
that legal reforms should be a high-priority for the international legal community, with 
one commenting,  
Some countries are more liberal and the local law tends to be more 
liberal, and then some other countries are more strict. Some places 
you’re guilty until proven innocent instead of ours that you’re innocent 
until proven guilty [...] in that sense I guess that’s pretty much what 
complicates stuff. (R17-F) 
 Some agents felt that other countries misunderstand their motivations, wrongly 
imagining that they are trying to interfere in internal affairs, while others expressed 
their frustration at the way current international laws are structured: 
It’s a little bit conflicting with the United States Department of Justice. 
Sometimes when we think it suitable to indict a trafficker it’s not the 
same. In that country and based on their laws…So we have to establish 
what we call an MOU (memorandum of understanding), also use legal 
assistance in order to interpret the laws and regulations (the barriers) and 
charge those traffickers in that colony. [...] sometimes it cannot be done 
because if that target is arrested in that country, and depending on the 
country’s laws, that target’s going to do time in that country (R17-F). 
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 One agent offered a glimmer of hope that the problem of different international 
laws is not irreversible, 
Right now we are developing a case with Madrid, Spain, and different 
laws and culture and we have to get special permission when it comes to 
clearance [...] we are going to be working together with the Spanish 
police. [...]But you know, different laws, we have to study what we can 
do and what we cannot do so that is one of the issues right now but we 
work with that and we get there…. It is not something that you cannot 
fix (R18-F). 
 When asked why the barrier of different legal systems occurs, many 
respondents replied that many international laws were not applicable to today's criminal 
problems (R17-F). One suggested that outdated laws may not only hinder cooperation, 
but contribute to corruption (R5-F). Another main reason was the mere lack of trust and 
not having a history with that country, agency, or individual. One agent explained that, 
while the assumption was that US agencies have the same professional and security 
protocols and can, therefore, be trusted, other countries' agencies do not. 
Lack of Universality and Defined Roles 
 Many agents complained that there is no universal way of doing things and that 
this is also a barrier. Each agency has something to contribute, each with its own 
internal culture and methods. One of the biggest complaints made was the lack of 
defined roles. In fact, some felt it translated into pure disrespect and a superiority 
complex: “Federals treat you like you don’t know nothing and they know everything” 
(R30-F). Others realised that it doesn’t matter who is in power, as they have to work 
together to a common goal, but roles must be defined more clearly: 
You have locals that want to do big cases and they want to go 
international and then you have DEA sometimes, they want to make a 
big case and they go to a drop point and there are so many people on the 
case…roles have to be clarified (R15-F). 
 Another felt it was a communication matter, one of having the right protocols in 
place of how to communicate with each other since there was a lack of clarity about 
who was in the chain of command and who should be involved at which point.  
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Institutionalised Secrecy 
 One theme that emerged was that, to some extent, there is still an 
institutionalised tendency towards secrecy in many agencies, which is both cultural and 
structural; built into the structures of the organisations. For example, part of the 
organisational tendency towards secrecy is that each agency carries completely 
different records, and that agents from one agency do not have access to the records of 
another. A DEA agent cannot, for example, access FBI records, even if they are in the 
same department.  
 Reinforcing this structural barrier is a cultural tendency towards secrecy, which 
one respondent noted was actively encouraged in training until 2001 and is therefore 
engrained in the working habits of most agents. While most respondents said they were 
always willing to pass on information, several displayed some disquiet about the idea 
of having to divulge details of sources – a principle which has always dominated police 
work. However, now that cooperation has been made a requirement, there is more 
impetus to share.  
 A most important barrier to this cooperation is the matter of trust. Agents were 
sometimes simply not sure that they could trust other law enforcement officers who 
were coming to them for information. In overcoming this, the importance of face-to-
face contact was emphasised over and over again, with agents noting that, in order to 
create a “bridge” between agencies, they would ensure that they were introduced 
personally to other departments with whom they needed to work.  
 Another method for networking and allowing agents to meet  face-to-face was 
by holding monthly short conferences, and always sending representatives to similar 
events held by other agencies or departments. The primary idea was that even limited 
direct contact could improve trust, since regular meetings between senior officers, or 
the ability of officers within HIDTA to act as a bridge between agencies, were 
mentioned as important.  
 HIDTA’s model of having officers from different agencies working side by side 
in the same building, in the same offices, directly taps into this advantage of working 
face-to-face. It can help build trust between agents and agencies much more effectively 
than by more remote means such as telephoning or sharing the same systems. One 
agent described the situation as improving through these means:  
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At one point we actually had somebody from the FBI here in our office 
space and somebody from the DEA in their office space, and that was 
hell just because internally all the agencies have their own policy and 
their own little cultures. So I think that even though we’re still separated 
by doors, now there’s more communication in the sense of our 
supervisors have no problem with each other. (R3-I) 
 This is reflective of the discussion within the literature referring to the problems 
that are brought forward when different organisational cultures attempt to work 
together (Foster, 2003; Reiner, 2000). In discussing what HIDTA does to reduce 
barriers in information sharing, many officers emphasised that there are no problems 
within HIDTA itself, and, rather, that issues of trust and competitiveness are more 
evident when dealing with agents from outside HIDTA. This suggests that HIDTA’s 
methods of promoting cooperation are effective.  
Get Off My Turf: Competition Kills Cooperation 
 Again, competition was identified as a common barrier to cooperation, even on 
an individual level. At an individual level, it is associated with pride (as agents are 
proud to be part of their particular agency) and ego. Individuals simply picked up on a 
mood generated by the dominant organisational culture of competition. For instance: 
Do you remember when you went to college for example, when you 
went to college you probably felt really proud about the college that you 
were at and you went probably to a basketball game, following this 
college and the other colleges, and it’s addictive and you’re proud about 
the college where you belong, and I’m pretty sure people feel proud 
about the agency they belong to (R6-F). 
 To this extent, some respondents did think that it was possible to do more to 
deal with competitive behaviours, such as emphasising the common goal of defeating 
crime, and the idea of all law enforcement officers being ‘on the same side’ rather than 
competing against one another. One participant said: 
Everybody has to think that this is a war between people that don’t have 
any respect for the law or the authorities, and we are the people that 
need to keep the law running. If everybody is thinking that, we are in the 
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same boat (inaudible) we are police, we are not FBI or (inaudible) 
everybody is police. (R2-F) 
 Similar suggestions included helping everyone feel part of the same 
organisations (for instance, by showing them how other parts of the organisation work). 
It was also stressed that leaders and supervisors need to lead by example, personally 
promoting and leading on cooperation and refusing to show competitive behaviours, 
such as making derogatory remarks about other teams. 
 Competition within different agencies was also seen as a barrier. Several agents 
referred to the problem of 'short memories' since, after 9/11, there was much discussion 
of the need to work together. Still, turf wars persist. Some suggested that this is because 
there was a history in the past of “being burnt by another agency”.  Greed in taking all 
the credit is a concrete barrier to sharing with local and federal agencies, let alone 
transnationally. Some agents suggested that the competition, even within their own 
agencies, was so fierce that they were burnt by other internal divisions. If there is a 
history of one agency taking shared information for themselves and claiming all the 
credit, it is sure to fuel bad feelings, lack of trust and, ultimately, lack of cooperation. 
 The role of competitive behaviour, as it relates to trust, proved itself another 
major barrier to cooperation. This was especially true in agents trying to avoid 
cooperation in order to ‘hang on to’ particular cases, their concern being that, if cases 
move to a different department or agency, it reflects badly on the initial investigator. A 
key factor in encouraging competitive behaviour is the promotions system, which 
rewards agents based on their case work rather than tenure or willingness to cooperate, 
and, therefore, encourages them to try and keep as many cases as possible rather than 
passing them on to agencies where they can be more effectively investigated. Thus, one 
important suggestion would be to make the promotions process less reliant on the 
number of successful cases, or at least include some incentive towards cooperation. 
Official acknowledgement of situations where agents contribute to cases that are not 
their ‘own’ could invite more cooperation, as well.  
 Further contributing to matters of trust and competitiveness was the matter that 
agents considered other agencies and departments closed to them, and were thinking in 
terms of secrecy and competitiveness. One agent stated: 
We have agents that report to HIDTA, like we have one agent from ATF 
that reports to HIDTA and basically he’s like a little spy there, you 
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know, for us and he’s always paying attention to gun aspects of HIDTA 
investigations, and anything that deals with guns, he’ll bring it to us, but 
there’s a misnomer sometimes where most of us don’t know exactly 
what to give to the ISC because a lot of the agents in my group think 
that if we give something to the ISC, then they’re going to give it to the 
FBI because you remember the ISC is run by the FBI. It’s because the 
FBI have a lot of money. (R11-F) 
Not Meant to be Mates: Personality Conflicts 
 Another barrier to cooperation involves the personality clashes that occur from 
time to time, where agents find themselves working with a ‘difficult’ character who is 
highly territorial or antagonistic, making cooperation difficult. It appears that clashes 
were not extremely common, but when they did occur there was no specific method of 
dealing with them, other than by the standard method of “deconfliction” for dealing 
with cases being pursued by two agencies at once. In some cases, personality might 
also be linked with issues like competitiveness or trust problems, when egos, rather 
than incentives in the system, cause competitive behaviour. 
The Need for Big Bucks 
 The importance of intelligence being analysed in a timely manner can be linked 
to funding, since analysing and disseminating large amounts of intelligence, ensuring 
that information is sent to where it is most useful, requires both manpower and 
technology. Several respondents expressed concerns that HIDTA budgets were being 
cut, while others mentioned that facilities and infrastructure were inadequate, especially 
in terms of security. There was a sense that HIDTA was not being valued highly 
enough in funding terms, considering the program’s effectiveness and successes. 
Assign more money to us. I understand that they’ve been on the same 
budget for some nine or ten years now …Yes, I think it’s 10 
million….[…] Assign money based on the type of cases you have. I can 
guarantee you that the HIDTA here does, they require (inaudible) than 
all the HIDTA’s in the US and here they seize more in money and drugs 
than any HIDTA. Probably the HIDTA’s closest to the border. (R11-F) 
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Cultural Insensitivities 
 A few respondents discussed cultural differences as a barrier to cooperation, 
leading to a lack of understanding or appreciation for another’s viewpoint. One agent 
felt that their office is often on the receiving end of this mindset: 
Attitude and ego from the other countries and that has happened before. 
Very different from us [...] when law enforcement agencies from other 
countries come here, we receive them with open hands, you know, come 
here and we’ll cooperate with you, however us going to their place, 
sometimes we feel a little bit with our hands tied (R13-I). 
 Another suggested that cultural differences could lead to a failure to recognise 
crimes, for instance, the crime of adultery in some Arab countries would be 
unrecognisable in the US, which would make it impossible for US agents to respond 
(R17-F). Again, as with different legal systems, if there was a way to somehow 
universally agree upon and document certain cultural issues, it would, without a doubt, 
significantly aid in improving future transnational cooperation. 
Lost in Translation: Language 
 The language barrier was by far the most common response as a barrier to 
cooperation. Many of the Puerto Rican police department officers do not speak English, 
and just as many federal agents, who are transplanted to the island, speak no Spanish. 
The reasons for the lack of second language skills in each group were quite different. 
English and Spanish are both primary languages of PR, but English is often abandoned 
in the public school system later on. There are two potential causes for this: lack of 
resources and an attempt to preserve Spanish on the island (R8-I). Many respondents 
felt that the lack of a common language was the main contributor in failing to share 
information or successfully cooperate: 
In our case over here in PR we have a lot of agents from the States. They 
go to school, try to speak Spanish, and some of them do and some of 
them don’t, you know, that’s one of the primary issues right now (R9-F)  
 In essence, many federal agents, although well-funded and educated, do not 
follow through or make the effort to become bilingual. The lack of resources, training 
and, indeed, personal effort in learning the second language seemingly leads to an 
underlying prejudice both locally and federally. Once again, there underlies an issue of 
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trust. If, as has been evidenced through literature and agents’ responses, there is a great 
deal of benefit for speaking face-to-face in order to build trust and facilitate co-
operation, the need to speak the second language either poorly or through a translator is 
arguably detrimental.  
Gender Inequality: Women Have to Work Harder 
 Overall, there is a small percentage of women working in the law enforcement 
community, and female respondents replied that gender was a big barrier, begging the 
question: if there were more women, would there be more cooperation? Or would 
women be just as susceptible to the ultra-competitive police culture (Braithwaite & 
Brewer, 1998, cited in Newburn, 2003)? One agent said:  
Well being a woman, that is a big barrier. It’s male dominated also so 
when they first get to meet you as a woman, they don’t know who you 
are or what kind of person you are, if you’re tough, if you’re weak, if 
you’re opinionated, [...] and so … Although they feel that way about 
male agents also but more so for the women because in the Latin 
society, which is where I work, the Latin society is very much … It’s 
amplified and so you don’t know how, they don’t know you are going to 
react with them [...] the working relationship you have with them, it 
becomes, each personality is whether you get along with somebody or 
not and get them to accept you as a woman but then depending on how 
good you do it. You could be totally rejected by them depending on who 
the person is. (R9-F) 
 Gender issues can make it difficult for women to work within law enforcement 
in PR. While one agent said that gender was not a problem in PR as much as elsewhere, 
it was still required for women to prove themselves by showing that they could work as 
hard, or harder, than male officers. As one woman agent expressed: 
If you show that you’re weaker or there’s something that you cannot 
quite accomplish, as well as they do, then you’ll be seen as like a little 
woman who co-operates (inaudible) and they’re not going to send you in 
the front of the stack to work or deal with the guys. (R29-F) 
 Another agent pared it down to personality above a blanket gender prejudice, 
implying that it was more a matter of whether a person was capable of leading rather 
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than their gender, while at the same time suggesting that women officers had greater 
motivation than men. Still, another respondent thought that the situation between men 
and women was much less equal, and that, as a woman, it helped to be attractive in 
order to elicit cooperation from male officers: 
It does affect co-operation, especially if they don’t know you and I just 
hate to say this but I’ve heard it already, so if a person is not good-
looking or pleasing to the eye, there’s like even less co-operation, […] 
Right now, I’m using it to my advantage because I’m not going to be 
(inaudible) if I can take advantage of it (R13-I). 
 Overall, it appears that experiences in relation to gender are diverse and not 
easily generalised, although women certainly find themselves operating in a ‘man’s 
world’ in law enforcement in PR.  
 While women may, indeed, have to work harder in some respects, there are 
arguably areas where significant advantages can be drawn from being a woman. In their 
study, Braithwaite & Brewer (1998, cited in Newburn, 2003) found that men tended to 
use physical actions in order to exert control over citizens. This led to both verbal and 
physical resistance. On the other hand, female officers, even if they adopted the tactics 
of their male colleagues, did not experience similar responses. “Male officers tended to 
be more often placed at risk of physical confrontation, while females were generally 
more supportive of citizens, preferring tactics heavy on mutual power in the 
interaction” (Braithwaite & Brewer, 1998, p.286). Also according to Braithwaite & 
Brewer (1998), coercive tactics are less often chosen by females than males, resulting 
in less verbal abuse and physical resistance towards females during interactions with 
members of the public. 
6.3 Potential Ways to Improve Cooperation in Transnational Policing in Puerto 
Rico and the Dominican Republic 
Key Influences on TNP Cooperation 
Cooperation – a highly personal matter.  The personal aspect of cooperation 
is perceived as a key influence on cooperation. Personal aspects, including 
relationships, commitment and personality factors are, in a number of ways, important 
to the collaborative process. 
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In terms of relationships, it appears that face-to-face networking is an essential 
element of cooperation, creating the initial meetings and laying the foundation for 
relationships that both increase the participants’ faith in the system of cooperation and 
gives them reason to help “oil the wheels” for each other. Trust between individuals is 
vitally important, as simply being told that they were ‘on the same team’ or ‘working 
towards the same goals’ was not enough to create full trust and sharing. In particular, 
senior officers carry out extensive face-to-face networking through events, but 
respondents also thought that agents with less seniority had opportunities to network 
and that this was important to cooperation. In relation to this, concerns about 
organisational aspects were raised, since frequent turnover of agents meant it became 
more difficult to build and keep stable relationships. Also in regards to networking, 
technology was frequently mentioned, with respondents stating that improved 
communications technology had made networking and communication much easier and 
more secure, and, therefore, improved relationships and the ease with which agents and 
supervisors could work together. 
 Another important and related aspect of personal influences was that of personal 
commitment. It seems that personal attitude and commitment towards the goal of full 
cooperation was seen as important ingredients in facilitating cooperation, particularly in 
a legal/jurisdictional environment that is not always conducive to cooperation. In these 
cases, both personal relationships and personal commitment to cooperation could be 
helpful factors. For instance, agents went out of their way to find solutions to 
difficulties in sharing intelligence. These two personal aspects interact, in the sense that 
a commitment to the principle of cooperation leads to building better relationships with 
other agents, which then leads to improved attempts at cooperating, and, therefore, an 
incentive to continue to be committed to it. One agent described this process: 
With good networking and knowing each other, […] If there is any 
problem they can say, “Okay, we cannot share information” try to bring 
somebody to look into that and see how we can overcome that barrier to 
make it better.  […] we have a lot of policies with regard to sharing 
information to outside countries, but there are always ways that you can 
find that maybe […] “Okay I cannot talk to you, you cannot talk to me,” 
it’s clear in the policy, but why we don’t go to these (inaudible) and then 
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you tell him, you tell me, I tell him, and then we got the information 
flow. (R27-L) 
 Again, the commitment of senior agents was mentioned as a particularly 
important factor, as those in leadership positions need to be positive about change and 
cooperation in order to overcome others’ apathy.  
 Personality also emerged as a contributing factor, although not as strongly as 
other personal aspects. There was a suggestion that there were individuals with 
personality types who might be resistant to cooperation or to change itself, especially 
those personalities where ‘ego’ was the problem. However, officers with determinedly 
uncooperative traits were considered to be rare.  
The political is at play.  Political elements were seen as just important, if not 
more so, than the personal aspects to cooperation. The clearest precondition is that 
some political influence will exist among the political class to encourage cooperation 
and create the conditions for an effective response to transnational crime. One agent 
said: 
I think the politics of each little island, of each little state has a lot to do 
to them because normally in PR if the Government doesn’t say we are 
going to do this, we are going to do that or he doesn’t improve the 
facilities you’re not going to be doing anything. (R29-F) 
 Political will, in favour of cooperation, was an important condition for receiving 
adequate funding for cooperative initiatives, although a lack of funding was not always 
related solely to a lack of will to solve the problem. In the case of some islands, like the 
DR, it was simply a general lack of resources. Corruption was also described as an 
ongoing problem, although generally not as central a problem as others. Several 
respondents pointed out that political will was partially based on self-interest, with 
agencies/governments only willing to cooperate if there was some clear return for them 
for their efforts (R4-F, R16-F, R17-F, R18-F, R19-International). However, emphasised 
by an agent, this is clearly counterproductive: 
You know, there’s more, how can I say, every agency, every country is 
very jealous about their sovereignty and, you know, they are protecting 
their laws, protecting their image around the world, so probably I think 
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nations should open up a little bit more, you know, this is not, this is 
fighting crime, it’s something that benefits everybody. (R18-F) 
When asked how to overcome the corruption barriers in place, there were several 
suggestions. Most common was to improve the vetting process, which involves a series 
of tests (including lie detectors) and background checks to ensure that the person is 
“clean”, Some went so far as to say this process should not only be used with other 
countries, but within multi-agency cooperation. One agent replied, 
We can work on some type of memorandum for understanding among 
the countries so they can establish minimum standards about the hiring 
of this individual or these individuals that are being assigned to work in 
these task forces, so there is a vetting process. And as soon as the vetting 
process is established and you pass, then sharing can be more easy. (R4-
F) 
 Another agent thought they needed to increase and revise memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) and use of treaties between island nations, for example, having 
a representative of an island nation on board Coast Guard vessels who would have, for 
example, the power of arrest in the event they are in the waters of that nation. Other 
agents suggested that a major restructuring of the agencies take place, specifically, the 
local police forces where corruption is more common. One suggested that this would 
need to involve changing personnel at a higher level, bringing in 'fresh faces' and 
improving the working lives of police (R27-L). 
 Almost all agents, both federally and locally, agreed that the current situation of 
inequality of funds and education between local and federal agencies needs to be 
urgently improved. One agent said they felt it would never be solved because locals 
will never make the salaries that they make, “it is condescending and we need to stop 
treating them like they are lower…that becomes individual” (R4-F). A glimmer of hope 
for a solution is the HIDTA Program: 
HIDTA is doing a lot here. HIDTA pays for these task forces, a 
premium pay in addition to their salary, I don’t know how much it is 
right now, probably there are only 800 more than, in addition to, HIDTA 
provide the vehicles, they provide all the equipment, the only thing we 
don’t pay is the gun and the salary. Besides that we try to cover 
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everything. If we don’t pay that, DEA try to co-operate on those lines. 
(R11-F) 
 Another mentioned that the DEA provide training for their counterparts by 
sending them to their academies and by giving them incentives to help out with their 
financials. The only problem with this major funding from HIDTA is that it is not an 
official arm of the government but merely a “program” that can be cut at any time. This 
was noted as a grave concern from all law enforcement in PR, the DEA included (R14-
F). 
 While political will is usually considered a local political issue, international 
politics was also raised as an issue that affected cooperation. For example, the 
importance of the US government’s political will, at an international level, was needed 
in the government parties’ willingness to raise issues of transnational cooperation and 
drug trafficking with other governments, including those in South America. Related are 
issues surrounding the US’s position in the world, including the sense that other 
countries were likely to see US attempts to cooperate/help as an “imposition” even 
when assistance had been requested. In addition to this concern is the effects of the US 
change in foreign policy positions, such as an increased focus on terrorism after 9/11, 
which distracts from drug trafficking as a central problem in itself, rather than one 
simply linked to terrorism. 
Anti-Americanism and other cultural clashes. Cultural influences on 
cooperation ranged from different values and styles of communication to basic 
language problems and even anti-Americanism (among island countries).  
Difficulties in communication is attributed both to differences in styles of 
communication, as well as basic language problems among agents. One Spanish-
speaking agent suggested that he had trouble introducing other English-speaking agents 
to Puerto Rican informants, emphasizing the importance of building personal 
relationships and suggesting that anything that impacts the ability to do that can 
undermine cooperation. Another respondent said, “I mean people are going to have a 
natural tendency to want to work with people of their own culture, of their own 
language” (R23-I). 
Others felt the solution lies within education and training. One agent explains 
the inequality between public education in PR and on the US mainland: 
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I think it’s important that the public schools teach a little bit better 
English, because I went to private school when I went to school in the 
States, and I went to public school in PR and there’s this big difference, 
there’s a big gap. If you want to get a good education you’ve got to send 
your children to private school. Public school is just basic, it worries a 
lot of people because the majority of Puerto Ricans cannot afford private 
school. If they do afford it they’re like “Oh I sent them to private school 
and I have the cheapest car and the cheapest house so the kids can get a 
good education.” (R11-F) 
 One reference to a culture of anti-Americanism among other islands (e.g. Dutch 
Islands) was related to the previously described perception of the US participation in 
the world; seen as an “imposition” even when invited.  
 Overall, the key influences around transnational cooperation focus around 
political, cultural and personal factors. Personal interaction is a crucial factor in 
building relationships that go on to facilitate cooperation, making effective networking 
essential. However, the political factor is also an essential part of the equation. No 
matter the level of commitment of individual law enforcement officers, effective 
cooperation requires favourable political conditions: the political will to provide 
necessary resources, promote cooperation officially and expedite legally difficult 
situations. Most respondents agreed, however, that a combination of factors and 
influences towards cooperation was important, rather than a single influence being 
paramount over the others. In fact, as several respondents pointed out, each of these 
influences tended to interact and affect each other. 
Changing attitudes and perceptions.  Attitudes and perceptions were rated as 
very important for successful cooperation, locally or internationally. Changing the 
overall perception of the US was noted as a way to improve relations with other 
countries. Most respondents were in agreement to this given statement, 
It’s a tricky subject. I guess that first changing the point of view of that 
particular country towards the U.S. is one major aspect that I would look 
into [...] first you need to kind of like let these people know that “I’m a 
friend and not a foe, and I just want to work with you because by 
helping you I’m helping myself”. We have South America, we have 
countries in South America, they are leading producers of cocaine and 
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heroin, and actually that makes a lot of money for them, so if you go 
there and tell them that you are there to get rid of the coca plantations in 
Bolivia they are going to say like, “No, because we farm those and the 
locals use it to kind of inhibit their appetite and that’s what gets them 
going”. [...] they have their own idea of what’s going on and if you don’t 
work on that first then it’s pretty much useless. I mean you’ll go there 
and they’ll look at you and they’ll say like, “Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, 
yeah”, and you turn your back and they’ll continue to do what they’ve 
been doing. (R11-F) 
 To improve cooperation, you must be more respectful and understand 
interdependence in order to expand your network.  
Outreach: networking and communication.  Networking and communication 
were noted as key in improving cooperation and overcoming barriers. Interpol is a good 
example of this, with their modern communications system that is linked to member 
countries 24/7. One agent suggested having quarterly face-to-face meetings with all the 
heads of the law enforcement in PR, DR and all the islands, the Netherlands, and so on, 
to network and share information or methods with one another (R24-F). However, there 
always needs to be a liaison from the country of origin when one agency enters into 
another country. The agent explained, 
For example, in the DR, if we had an MOU saying, okay you let my 
agents go there, carry guns, do the law enforcement work as long as one 
of your agents is there with us, you’re done, but let them free will, 
because a lot of times they restrain a lot the locals. (R24-F) 
 Networking, supplying other countries with training and exchanging agents 
could all be positive means to improve cooperation. Another is to have agents act in 
more diplomatic roles as opposed to directive roles, asking ‘how can we help you to get 
the job done?’ In some respects this already being done, but it needs to become a more 
widespread policy. 
 The above suggestions are all important approaches towards improving 
cooperation but they are not being put into practice. One respondent summed it up 
simply: “There is so much to learn from each other, it’s a win-win situation for all, 
really” (R14-F). 
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Individual Level 
Reciprocity Gets Results.  At a personal level, personality and different styles of 
communication make a difference to agents’ ability to cooperate. An ability to be 
friendly, to delegate and be diplomatic/tactful, yet aware of personal/office politics, are 
all qualities that help agents in developing effective, productive working relationships. 
There was a suggestion that in order to develop the best cooperation, agents need to be 
able to enjoy each other’s company and get along well, becoming friends, as well as 
colleagues. There is a clear need for officers to feel as if their cooperation is being 
reciprocated – a need for mutual cooperation. If one person shares willingly while 
another shares grudgingly, the willing person might feel there is less reason for them to 
cooperate in the future. One respondent expressed, “As long as I feel that the officers 
I’m dealing with over in the DR, the ones I’m working my case with, are co-operating 
with me, then I have no problem with working the case and co-operating with them 
(R29-F). 
 To some extent, this need for reciprocity could be used to encourage 
cooperation, if shown up front how cooperation could be mutually beneficial. As one 
respondent stated: “Expose them more to operations and push them to, don’t ask here, 
to go to the other agency and show your product. It’s basically, here’s what I can do for 
you if you embrace me” (R11-F). 
 However, obviously not everyone is cooperative or a natural team-player, and 
several respondents described people they thought had personalities which were less 
suited to cooperation (R3-I). There were few suggestions as to how these personality 
types might be helped to become better integrated, particularly as there was a sense that 
people were set in their ways and not easily capable of change. While there were 
suggestions made elsewhere about how to encourage or create the best conditions for 
cooperation through institutional change or material rewards, there were no ideas on 
how to change ‘personalities’ that were set against cooperation. Most respondents who 
discussed this suggested that the best solution was to simply go around “difficult” 
people (R19-I). 
Money as Motivation.  There was general agreement that the rewards for 
successful cooperation needed to improve in terms of verbal encouragement or 
recognition, as well as through more formal recognition such as salary increases, 
promotion and qualification for better training opportunities. Regarding verbal 
appreciation, one agent expressed: 
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Telling them their successes, you know, showing them that you care, 
telling them that they are doing a good job.  […]  We always need 
somebody telling us, “You are doing good.” Because we may be 
working very hard but when we don’t see the support of somebody, […] 
It’s like it’s more difficult to carry on. (R27-L) 
 Another respondent thought this, along with organisational culture, was more 
important than financial remuneration, but most were adamant that decent salaries were 
essential, especially for local police involved in dangerous and difficult work, 
comprising of long hours, for what is right now little money: “Salary, recognition, 
training. If you see somebody doing the right thing then recognise that guy. If you can 
improve their salary then they are going to work happier…” (R1-L). Another suggested 
that the existence of HIDTA itself acted as good incentive towards local officers 
working their way up through the force to be involved in the program, since it was a 
better paid and  more prestigious position (R28-L). 
Institutional Level 
Cultivating Cooperation via Leadership.  There was a strong sense that 
leadership in organisations is the most important aspect affecting cooperation at the 
institutional level. Leaders who are personally committed to fostering cooperation and 
championing the organisation and its successes at the highest levels were seen as 
essential to the effectiveness of the organisation. There was great respect for leaders 
who work hard to secure funding in Washington for new cooperative initiatives, and to 
ensure the successes of the organisation are recognised, thereby reducing the likelihood 
of funding cuts.  
 Leaders and managers also play a key role in creating an organisational culture 
that is conducive to good cooperation and in reducing the role of competition, as well 
as introducing organisational changes that would benefit cooperation (such as less 
paperwork). There was a sense that a 'trickle-down' effect in culture was possible, and 
that it is crucial to have people at the top of the organisation who are completely 
committed to cooperation fostering this attitude to filter down to lower levels. As one 
agent shared: 
The management has to do it also, they have to set the standards for, 
they have to do cooperation, if you have them fighting you are going to 
have us fighting too, you know, we are not going to get along. (R25-F) 
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 There were also concerns about the political nature of appointments for law 
enforcement in PR and the US mainland, generally, and the fact that this could mean 
both a relatively frequent turnover of leaders (every few years) and a failure to align the 
views of a political appointee with the goals and needs of the organisation. One agent 
remarked: 
When you have a government with specific style and they put in 
personnel that have nothing to do with law enforcement, for example, 
the head of an agency, a law enforcement agency, you get certain 
contradictions in style and actually in what they do. It’s not necessarily 
true for every instance [...] but I see it a lot, like for example in PR. 
Once the government changes or the administration changes all the 
agencies’ heads, they change, and because they’re appointed that doesn’t 
mean they are the best person for the job. (R3-I) 
 In relation to culture and cultural change, turnover of staff was also raised as an 
issue, since agents who had spent time getting to know PR and learning to cooperate 
could be reassigned and new people, who have a different attitude, brought in.  
Opportunities for Personal Contact.  As has been discussed throughout, 
personal, face-to-face contact with agents from other departments and agencies is often 
raised as an essential aspect of building good cooperative relationships. As such, some 
respondents thought that additional opportunities to meet with other agents, such as 
conferences and regular meetings, would help to improve cooperation at an institutional 
level. Although this already happens at a managerial level, additional opportunities for 
agents at lower levels would be useful. As one agent believed: 
Exactly and you got to talk to people, I mean, yesterday I saw people 
that I’ve talked to on the phone and never seen them before, you know, 
and you wish you had more time to talk to them, to get to know them, to 
say, “hey I’m so-and-so that talked to you on the phone,” I wish it could 
be made longer. (R25-F) 
 There was also a sense that there was a need to build better relationships with 
officers in other countries, and that personal contact plays an essential part towards that 
goal. Several respondents mentioned that the DEA was doing well in developing 
offices and contacts abroad, and that it was important to have an agent stationed in 
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other countries as this allowed people to 'put a face to a name', to have a personal, 
trusted contact within that country.  
 Political Level 
You Want Change? Focus on Political Appointments.  At a political level, it 
seemed that there was a huge amount of cynicism and disillusionment about political 
processes in PR, and, in particular, about the way they lead to political appointments 
that reflect the attitudes of governing parties rather than the needs of law enforcement. 
Therefore, the most effective change that many thought could be made at a political 
level is to change the way law enforcement leaders are appointed, so that they serve the 
needs of the organisation rather than political masters. At the same time, it was again 
stressed that leaders need to ensure that they are politically savvy and able to operate in 
a way that would ensure the organisation was championed and its goals advanced at the 
highest levels of government.  
 In addition to the way political appointments are made, there is also a high 
degree of frustration with the way politics is conducted in PR and how that affects 
cooperation. Politics is polarised in a way that prevents effective discussion and creates 
dramatic shifts during changes of government, as expressed by one participant: 
Well here in PR every four year is a big issue about the politics, you 
know, if you have a vision, this Governor came in with a good way to 
work with this, share information with everybody and work with the 
crime and everything, and they are doing a great job. Next elections 
came along, another person will take that out because, “No, he did it, I 
want to do it this way,” and we start all over again. They don’t continue 
what they already start (R20-F). 
 The attitude of the government towards police cooperation is extremely 
important since it can prevent any effective cooperation being carried out and, again, 
there is a sense that the policies of a preceding government would be undermined or 
impeded by its successor. One respondent expressed this in terms of wanting experts, 
rather than ideologues, to be in charge of policy and for requiring government to listen 
to what works rather than suggesting policies that have already been tried and failed 
(R23-I). Ideally, removing the effects of politics from law enforcement would produce 
improvements.  
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Funding.  Generally it was understood by respondents that the more money was 
available, the more cooperation could be carried out and the more effective agencies 
would be, indicated in the following statement, “As much money as they want to throw 
at it, that’s how much co-operation”(R17-F). While this might be unrealistic in that this 
is not the only effective factor, the fact that funding had been frozen for the past few 
years seems to have produced real differences, particularly in hiring practices, as there 
was not enough funding to have a reasonable number of agents available to work on 
task forces. The lack of funding to hire more agents leads to increased hours and 
overwork among the rest. There were also, again, real concerns that local police did not 
have funding for basic equipment – even cars – and hampering cooperation between 
federal and local agencies. 
Trust: the most critical component to cooperation.  Trust is completely 
critical in cooperation. This was reflected by unanimous agreement by respondents that, 
without trust, cooperation could not continue. A minimal level of trust, then, is a basic 
condition for successful cooperation. However, there were differences between how 
different people trust, and the extent to which trust has to be earned rather that given 
implicitly. Corruption also emerged as a major concern in relation to trust.  
 While trust is considered crucial in allowing cooperation to successfully take 
place, it was not always given freely or without reservation. While some agents said 
that they would trust automatically without reservation and only then withdraw their 
trust if they thought it had been betrayed, many more thought that trust was something 
that had to be built slowly over many interactions. In both cases, if trust had been 
betrayed - for instance, if intelligence was seen to have been leaked, or if a tip-off was 
incorrect - in many cases the relationship could not be repaired. To some extent, lapses 
in the integrity and value of information can be forgiven, as one agent believed: 
I would say you’re telling me there’s a sale of 50% off at JP Penny’s [...] 
I go there and, yeah, there was a 50% off but guess what, the sale ended 
yesterday. Nobody likes to be duped. It’s like it isn’t your fault, it’s just 
maybe that you weren’t (inaudible) and you didn’t know all the facts 
and therefore the information was like half-way, so there you go. (R13-
I) 
 However, if the value of the information was compromised due to information 
being leaked or falsely supplied on purpose, there is no way to recover trust. Because of 
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corruption, important barriers to trust include not having enough information about a 
person's background or having doubts about their history or associates. Continual 
intelligence failures or leaks would also lead to mistrust.  
 In overcoming barriers to trust and building relationships, the need for personal 
contact with other agents was again one of the most important factors mentioned. The 
importance of direct networking and communication is clearly the most effective way 
to build trust, beyond any kind of remote communication. Because of this, additional 
opportunities for networking and meeting personally were again suggested as ways to 
build trust. These included regular meetings as well as joint training sessions, perhaps 
because training is a scenario that involves working together, but not on active 
casework/investigation, so there is less at stake.  
 In addition, the need to show that there are mutual benefits to be had in 
cooperating, and to show reciprocity in trust by offering information, as well as asking 
for it, are also important. The importance of repeated interactions is crucial, as 
highlighted here: 
Since most of our trust is based on previous behaviour, you just need to 
kind of start being a good boy from day one and say, “Okay, we’re 
going to start working together and all that”, and then ensure that my 
pact with you is in a manner that it’s going to build the trust [...] You 
don’t tell people that you’re going to do something and then just go 
behind their backs and do something differently (R3-I). 
Clear communication and honesty between agents, in avoiding 
misunderstandings, also emerged as an important aspect of trust. One agent described 
how he had accidentally repeated information he had overheard that should not have 
been shared, but had repaired trust by explaining and apologising to the injured party 
(R23-I).  The honesty ensured that it was treated as a mistake rather than an intentional 
breach of trust. These rules of honest communication would seem to hold true for most 
relationships. It was also suggested that because of the stakes involved in trusting 
agents – when corruption could lead to injury or death, as well as drug crimes – law 
enforcement officers were naturally less inclined to trust. While this could be overcome 
to some extent, respondents suggested that a certain amount of wariness had to be 
tolerated, and was in fact essential. Mistrust, on the other hand, was identified as a 
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major barrier to cooperation, in particular, because of the life-or-death nature of 
situations involved with law enforcement. 
Features of the HIDTA Agent’s Organizational Culture 
The need to lead by example.  Good leadership is a key component of good 
cooperation, and respondents agreed that clear leadership that acted as a role model was 
an important aspect. In addition, in relation to power between the different agencies, 
one important aspect is that the Executive Board is balanced to ensure equal weighting 
for federal and local agencies. Interestingly, a respondent (who discussed this referred 
to this body as the ‘Secretive Board’ rather than the Executive Board), implied that 
whatever else the HIDTA leadership achieves, it does not manage to be transparent 
(R11-F). 
Working in spite of reduced resources.  Resources are a particular source of 
contention, since the HIDTA budget has not increased since its original allocation, 
resulting in a real-term reduction over the years. One respondent made the point that, 
with increasing costs of keeping facilities open, operational costs have been squeezed. 
However, while funding has reduced in real terms, another agent made the point that 
they are accustomed to being as effective as possible on limited resources, so there 
might be some extent to which HIDTA manages to be effective even on a reduced 
budget, as shared here: “To be honest with you it doesn’t matter, the information that 
you get me, police officers are used to working with limited resources so we will find 
ways” (R16-F). 
Race and ethnicity.  As with gender, different experiences were recorded when 
race and ethnicity were explored. The literature would suggest that there may be an 
issue with race. Anderson (2000) considers, for example, the different and often very 
powerful loyalties that members of one particular race or ethnicity feel towards their 
own and against others. However, overall it was not considered to be a major issue of 
contention or barrier to cooperation in PR, and most respondents did not think it was as 
relevant in PR as it might be elsewhere, as one agent said: “Race, no, because PR is a 
big mesh of Spanish, White, Black and Indian, so we are just a mesh, so there’s no 
race” (R29-F) . 
 The range of different ethnic heritages present in PR’s culture seems to reduce 
the impact of racism, or at least make it less obvious on the surface. However, a few 
respondents did think it had affected them, with one saying: “You’ll see favouritisms 
across the whole agency when it comes to nationality or ethnicity. I’ve felt it” (R9-F). 
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 The language barrier is also again an issue here, with participants pointing out 
the division between local agents and federal officers assigned from other parts of the 
country who do not speak Spanish. One respondent made the point, though, that racism 
was unacceptable within federal agencies, such as the FBI, although there could be 
more diversity: “You’d be found out pretty quickly just what kind of, if you had that 
mindset, you would be found out fairly quickly” (R4-F). 
 Regarding potential ways to improve cooperation, overall, there were a number 
of issues that respondents wanted to re-emphasise at the end of the interview, although 
none were matters that had not been discussed at all before. Essentially the key to 
cooperation is a willingness to work hard and commit to it, at all levels of the 
organisation. In achieving this, it is crucial for all agencies/forces to remember that they 
share a common goal in combating drug crime, and that this goal is worth the work 
involved in cooperating.  
 Some respondents also wanted to reiterate the problems faced, particularly in 
encouraging cooperation between federal and local officers, where a gulf still exists 
despite attempts by HIDTA to ensure the two are equal within the organisation (R4-F, 
R11-F, R15-F). Differences in pay, in particular, were singled out as creating 
resentment on an individual level. Therefore, overall, respondents wanted to reiterate 
the difficulties involved in cooperation and the attitudes needed to succeed.  
6.4 Develop a Transnational Version of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
Program? 
While perhaps seemingly far-fetched, a concept of a global version of the 
HIDTA scheme and an evaluation of how that could be beneficial, has the potential to 
reveal much about the success and relevance of the scheme in a TNPC context.  
6.4.1 Driving global integration via better communication and intelligence 
gathering.  The clearest advantage to having a transnational version of HIDTA is that 
it would allow for global integration of intelligence around drug trafficking. Linking 
intelligence across the world into one system would allow agents to make associations 
and track connections far beyond their current abilities, and most respondents 
interviewed thought that this would provide them with a huge advantage in comparison 
to the current disjointed system. It would also mirror the real structure of criminal 
organisations, where there is usually collaboration between groups based in a number 
of countries and crimes are committed across national boundaries. Similarly, the trade 
itself shifts constantly to react to supply, demand, and enforcement of the law, as is the 
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case with the heroin trade shifting from Asia to Mexico and Colombia. Because of this, 
several of the respondents thought that a more global approach was essential in order to 
“keep up with” drug traffickers. One respondent said:  
Since we have such great mobility now between nations and you might 
have the victim in one country and the evidence in a second country and 
the perpetrator in a third country, it would be great that a group of agents 
can travel and they will gather everything together and be able to submit 
the criminal accusations in one particular jurisdiction.  That would be 
science, as I said before, like science fiction, but there is definitely a 
need, in the modern world. (R24-F) 
It is interesting to note how they consider that a global police force -arguably the purest 
and most total form of TNPC - as being ideal, but do not consider that it would ever be 
possible in reality. 
6.4.2 Difficulties in linking intelligence systems and security.  There are 
major drawbacks and difficulties to merging international intelligence systems. While 
the difficulty and expense involved in creating a system that could harness intelligence 
from all over the world was a definite drawback, the most important concerns lay in the 
security implications of having a centralised database. There would need to be clear 
tracking mechanisms in place, so that access would be tracked and agents would be 
able to view, but not change, data in systems outside their own agencies. Alternatively, 
a specific administrator could be charged with maintaining the database and answering 
queries.  
 In relation to this, the fear of corruption, particularly in other countries that 
could be members of this transnational HIDTA, also emerged as a theme. No matter 
how strong the checks put in place on a new system, corruption was still seen to be an 
element that could undermine the entire enterprise. As one agent believed: “One rotten 
apple in there would be a huge disadvantage. I mean you have a lot of information in 
those systems” (R18-F). 
 In fact, even making enquiries around a particular name could allow corrupt 
officers to alert criminals to the fact that someone was interested in them, and that they 
were being investigated, whether directly or indirectly. Therefore, even a very limited 
amount of information being leaked to criminal organisations could compromise 
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investigations (which again underlines an important reason why the culture of mistrust 
and secrecy in law enforcement is so ingrained).  
 Most of the respondents were in favour of integrated intelligence systems, ‘in 
theory.’ Yet, the practicality of such systems was called into question based on the 
difficulties that have already been experienced in trying to implement limited 
integration:  
I think if all the agencies will input information and all these regional 
information centres that could be shared with everybody, that would be 
good because I can tell you from my agency, we don’t share that 
information with anybody.[…] I know ISC doesn’t have access to ATF 
stuff. And I know they don’t have access to IRS stuff, so if they don’t 
have access to that, how can they put out information that I need? Like 
right now, I call the ISC and I ask, […] “Can you run how many guns 
this guy has purchased in the last month?” They can’t, they can’t do that, 
only ATF does that (R18-F). 
 In addition to the financial and technical difficulties involved, there is also a 
lack of legal framework to deal with that kind of information sharing, since intelligence 
gathered by one agency/force can be inadmissible in the courts of another country if not 
formally/ officially requested and granted.  
6.4.3 Sharing expertise and creating shared goals.  Another important 
advantage of creating a transnational HIDTA would be to allow the same relationships 
and coordination to be built on a global scale as on a national level. For instance, 
linking law enforcement agencies and forces all over the world would help create 
shared goals and ensure that forces were working together rather than against each 
other, and not duplicating efforts. The importance of deconfliction is emphasised in 
much of the literature (Sheptycki, 2000; Best Jr., 2010; Anderson, 2000). It would also 
allow sharing of techniques and expertise, which is useful on a national scale, but could 
be even more effective globally, since there is likely to be even more differences in 
tactics between various forces than there is at a national level. As one respondent 
shared: “You see that would be an advantage because you would have a whole different 
ideas coming together towards a common goal and it would make things easier, not just 
in PR” (R28-L). 
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 Again, proximity was mentioned by respondents as an essential factor in 
building trust between agents from different forces:  
The advantages for certain […] are just when you have local law 
enforcement representatives and federal under the same roof, working in 
the same office together, just again a natural relationship, a natural flow 
of information (R23-I). 
 This underlines the importance of this as a part of the HIDTA model – that by 
working together under one roof, agents build better, more productive and cooperative 
relationships and experience less competitive behaviour. In fact, some agents spoke in 
terms of agents becoming more like “families” by working together. 
6.4.4 Difficulties in Integrating Police Forces.  Doubts were expressed over 
the practical difficulties involved in attempting to integrate dramatically different police 
forces from all over the world. When considering some of the difficulties that had been 
encountered in trying to integrate even the different cultures of federal US agencies, 
respondents were sceptical about whether this could be overcome when dealing with an 
even more diverse range of cultures globally:  
What we do between us and England, between us and Spain and 
between us and Colombia, they’re all going to be different. I mean what 
you just said, in terms of international standards, an international 
standard that would be great but who would enforce something like that? 
There is no world government (R22-F). 
 Some respondents thought there would be disagreements about where a 
transnational HIDTA would be based, others that there would be disagreements over 
leadership. But the clearest problem that emerged was the likelihood of competition 
between the forces involved. As elsewhere, the prospect of competition was seen a 
crucial threat to cooperation, but particularly in the beginning, before trust has been 
established between officers. This included the possibility of competition between 
different agencies, but also between federal agents and local officers. In particular, 
officers referred to the recent merging of agencies under the auspice of Homeland 
Security, which they considered to have been relatively unsuccessful: 
Well we’re going through it almost with the Homeland Security where 
they merge all the agencies and they’ve got a lot of problems, a lot of 
177	  
	  
problems, budgetary problems, personality problems, turf problems, 
battles. As far as putting them all together, I’ve seen nothing accomplish 
it, a lot of confusion, a lot of confusion. (R25-F) 
It is suggested, then, that trying to make something too big and too complicated, means 
that problems are amplified to a point where nothing meaningful can be accomplished.  
6.4.5 Lack of legal framework.  Another barrier to implementing a 
transnational version of HIDTA would be the lack of a legal framework within which it 
would operate; as outlined earlier, there are important questions of jurisdiction when 
dealing with transnational crime, particularly in deciding where a crime was 
committed, when in fact it was carried out across several different countries. The 
difficulty of deciding where to prosecute a crime and where jurisdiction lay would not 
be solved by creating a transnational HIDTA, as one agent illustrated: 
A new agent came in that did not know anything about Interpol and 
asked us, “Would you please facilitate the penal code, the international 
penal code.” He actually thought that there was a penal code that would 
apply internationally and that we would be investigating that here. It was 
such an unintelligent question for a request that we all laughed at the 
poor guy.  But it would be great if we had something like that, a world 
penal code. (R24-F) 
Similar problems arise with reference to evidence. Although intelligence might 
be shared between officers from different countries, there are strict procedures for 
requesting and granting it officially so that it can be used in affidavits or as evidence in 
court, which would inevitably hamper swift and effective communication.  
6.4.6 Management - who’s holding the money bag?  It was suggested that an 
essential component of any successful transnational HIDTA would be good 
management, preferably unattached to any specific agency (or rotated between 
countries/members) that could help to integrate different forces. This appeared to be in 
response to the organisational situation within HIDTA, in which managers come from 
specific agencies, rather than “belonging” to HIDTA alone. It was also stressed that this 
manager should not have other duties, such as investigative duties. For instance, this 
individual could be a ‘civilian’ manager with an understanding of law enforcement, 
such as an intelligence analyst, as one respondent said: “There seems to be a lot of 
people wearing different hats, so to speak, doing many jobs” (R14-F). 
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 This also draws out one of the problems with HIDTA, which had not been 
explored until now - that some agents assigned to HIDTA still have duties to carry out 
related to their original agency, and are not able to focus completely on their HIDTA 
role. Concerns were also expressed, with agents questioning how management and 
funding of a transnational HIDTA would operate, with suggestions including the UN, 
Interpol or the G8 countries. One officer also suggested that the US would have to be 
the leader on any such initiative because only the US would be able to afford to fund it.  
 With concern over funding and the will in Washington to continue and devote 
resources to the HIDTA program, there was a clear sense by participants that HIDTA is 
undervalued, particularly in comparison to the work done and successes achieved. This 
can be understood in terms of funding, with one agent saying that funding for HIDTA 
had stayed the same for eight years (representing a decrease in funding in real terms). 
Agents seemed to feel embattled, with one saying: 
This year we suffered, well we almost, but we won the war.  We had to 
fight a big battle because they wanted to change a program under the 
umbrella of The Department of Justice, and since we are under the 
White House that gives us more power (R5-F). 
In conclusion, although respondents discussed the many difficulties involved in 
setting up a transnational version of HIDTA, they did not come up with any real 
disadvantages to the scheme. This reflects the fact that, although they were sceptical 
about its implementation, almost all thought that the idea was exciting, at least ‘in 
theory’ (only one Federal interviewee suggesting that HIDTA was a not useful model at 
all). The real objections came not towards the idea of a transnational HIDTA itself, but 
to the likelihood of it being implemented successfully. The major barriers to this were 
competition between forces/agencies, fears over corruption, and the lack of a legal 
framework within which such an organisation would function. Interestingly, despite the 
fact that their earlier answers showed that HIDTA in the US has largely managed to 
overcome the tendency towards competition and mistrust, officers did not assume that 
it would be possible to do the same transnationally. Respondents were also keen to 
reiterate the importance of cooperation and sharing and to add that management of 
HIDTA was good. Overall, the clearest concerns were those of funding and the 
recognition/ continuation of the HIDTA program. 
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6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 To conclude, Chapter 6 examined perceived barriers and potential 
improvements in PR and the DR and the key drivers of TNPC. It began by considering 
personal, political, and cultural factors that influence cooperation, and then seeks to 
understand different steps that can be taken at the individual and institutional level to 
improve cooperation. It also discusses the importance of attributes, like trust, 
motivation, leadership, ethnicity, and gender in cooperation. Respondents felt 
cooperation was affected by a combination of factors, including political will, personal 
commitment, individual personalities, technology and language barriers. At the 
personal level, they felt motivation through encouragement, recognition and reward 
was critical, as was defusing competition and building friendships and diplomacy. At 
the institutional level, training and leadership were seen as important. Trust was viewed 
as crucial, built gradually by working together in different ways but driven by 
individuals. Gender was considered partially useful for cooperation, but ethnicity not 
that much at all. Respondents repeatedly stated that, at the end of the day, cooperation 
was the result of an individual’s willingness to do so and a commitment to overcoming 
barriers. Lastly, the advantages and disadvantages of the development of a transnational 
version of the HIDTA program is theorised and explored by analysing its goals, key 
influences, information sharing methods and staffing models. Advantages of such a 
model were increased intelligence and fighting drug trafficking in the same way as 
terrorism, but disadvantages included difficulties in integrating multiple police 
organizations, creating shared systems, managing corruption in other countries, and 
developing shared legal frameworks. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Implications 
 Before discussing the results and implications of the research presented here, I 
will briefly summarise the research questions posed in this thesis and then summarise 
the findings from each of the interviews carried out. The implications of the findings, in 
light of what they mean for the field of transnational policing, will then be discussed. 
Future steps will then be considered and conclusions drawn. 
7.1 Overview of the Research Question 
 The overall research question driving this thesis, as set out in the preface, was:  
1. Does this study examine the barriers and facilitators to the use of HIDTA as a 
model of TNPC on a global scale? 
The review of the literature in Chapter 1 and 2 established that, for several decades, the 
globalisation of crime has emerged as a significant issue. Many researchers, such as 
Brown (2008) and Goldsmith and Sheptycki (2007) have investigated the effects of 
international crime and how this translates into policing. Many agencies have, over the 
past twenty years, recognised the need to move toward transnational policing. There 
has been a substantial amount of literature based around the structural features, such 
comparative policing, courts, and corrections, or on transnational crimes or regional 
issues (Hill, 2005; Ortiz, 2005; Roth, 2004). The intention was to consider the impact 
of social psychological factors, in addition to the aforementioned issues. Some research 
had already been conducted, but this was felt to be a relevant, vibrant, and potentially 
valuable area worthy of further research. It was also established that the DEA and 
HIDTA program would provide the context for the research, and so in order to fully 
illuminate the successes, failings, and scope of these agencies (as a reflection and 
representation of TNPC) to attempt to universalise these was thought to provide an 
avenue for further relevant explanation. 
 In addition to the main research question, each results chapter presented was 
driven by a supplementary related research question. Chapter 4 was driven by the 
investigation of stakeholders’ perspectives on transnational crime and policing in PR 
and the DR. Chapter 5 explored the role and contribution of the DEA and the HIDTA 
program, and Chapter 6 continued with an investigation into TNPC, specifically 
examining perceived barriers and potential improvements. This chapter, Chapter 7, 
aims to interpret the findings and explore ways to enhance cooperation in TNP. This 
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chapter also critically examines options for implementing change, including looking at 
what future steps could be taken, and ends with the main conclusion of this thesis. 
7.2 Summary of the Findings 
 There has been substantial discussion throughout this research about the barriers 
and facilitators to TNPC, both in terms of what the current body of literature suggests, 
and in terms of what the primary research conducted in this study has revealed. The 
findings in this respect are crucial for answering the two main research questions and 
for fitting the summary of the findings into this framework.  
Shared Mission 
 Many of the agents talked about the importance of a “shared mission” in the 
Caribbean. As one said:  
That motivates us to do a lot of intelligence and a lot of communication, 
having a communal problem. This is our everyday nightmare, people 
getting killed because of the drug points and the drug selling… It’s the 
same in Jamaica, it’s the same here, a lot of islands. (R24-F)  
 As suggested by the concepts of conditional and unconditional trust put forward 
by Jones and George (1998), the fact that the drug problem is perceived to be a regional 
issue provides a sense of shared mission and shared values, which can reinforce trust 
within teams. Although there is, by no means, unconditional trust between the whole of 
law enforcement in the Caribbean, with the perception of a common enemy, there is 
nevertheless grounds for some agents to feel that they have a mission and values in 
common and that they are “on the same side”. As Bowling (2009) writes, those 
involved in transnational policing have typically honed a set of skills, including the 
ability to work with individuals from different cultures, to negotiate different (and 
perhaps opposing) legal systems, to master the art of diplomacy, and to problem-solve. 
While this is certainly applicable to transnational issues, working cooperatively with 
agencies within the same country can also be difficult, requiring a version of some or 
all of these skills.  
 Where islands in the Caribbean were less affected by drug crime (or were 
perceived to be less affected), those islands were less inclined to cooperate with Puerto 
Rican agents because the crime was considered to be 'passing through' the island and 
the attitude was, “Hey, it’s not our problem, it’s your problem.” (R17-F) Some agents 
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believed the same attitude held true for forces from the mainland US, who saw the 
problems of PR as separate and not affecting the mainland.  If a person, or party, does 
not feel they have a lot to gain through cooperation, it is possible that the skills 
discussed by Bowling (2009) will not be used because it is simply easier to ignore the 
problem, believing it has no bearing on one’s situation. Here, Knack and Zak’s (2001) 
research on trust between countries may also be relevant; the author explores how trust 
plays out when social and economic climates are different and when rates of investment 
differ. 
Electronic Information Sharing 
 Information sharing and communication could be broadly categorised as either 
electronic (through central information clearinghouses such as the ISC, which collects 
information on cases centrally, takes queries, and carries out deconfliction), or via 
formal or informal personal communications between agents.  
 With regard to information-sharing via large centralised databases, there was a 
sense that the ISC was an invaluable resource, and that there should be more sharing of 
data, but that there were also clear security concerns. This does not necessarily indicate 
blanket distrust amongst law enforcement agents; rather, it is an ideal example of the 
need for “institutionalised distrust” (Luhmann, 1979), using control systems to reduce 
the risks of sharing data. In this case extra controls in fact increase trust and willingness 
to share by providing some extra safeguards for information. As Gutierrez (2004) 
wrote, despite post-9/11 changes, there are still some issues that need attention within 
the ISC. 
 One of the most important functions of the ISC appears to be deconfliction, 
which facilitates cooperation by ensuring that operations and investigations by one 
team/taskforce do not overlap, duplicate, or disrupt those of others. Apart from 
ensuring effective use of resources, this is an essential control mechanism which 
prevents dangerous clashes, especially during undercover operations. Again, providing 
effective but not overly controlling institutional control/monitoring mechanisms 
facilitates, rather than undermines, trust.  
Personal Communication, Networking and Relationships 
 In addition to sharing via the ISC, a large amount of information-sharing 
happens informally, by telephone, as agents call contacts they know in other offices to 
check information. This highlights the importance of networking as a method of linking 
teams, since although these “loose ties” (Granovetter, 1973) or, as Levin et al., calls 
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them, “weak ties”, are not necessarily closely linked but trust each other enough to let 
information pass, which can then be shared with others within the network. In this 
situation, there is more likely to be “conditional” rather than “unconditional” trust 
(Jones & George, 1998), where two contacts are inclined to help each other 
reciprocally. Levin et al.’s research, in his words, refined Granovetter’s (1973) 
argument about weak ties, finding that useful, non-redundant information can be gained 
from trusted weak ties.  
 As predicted by studies of cooperation, such as Rocco's (1998), agents still have 
concerns that trust is harder to establish over the telephone and through other kinds of 
distant communication than it is in a face-to-face situation. Part of this concern was a 
worry that phone lines were not secure enough - another area where security should be 
ensured in order to “bridge the gap” between trust and the possible risk involved. 
However, there was also simply a difficulty if the person on the other end of the phone 
line was an “unknown quantity.” Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it 
would be reasonable to expect that a limited amount of face-to-face communication 
with contacts, ahead of time, could mitigate some of the disadvantages of 
communicating at a distance, and this was borne out by agents’ experiences. A majority 
of them believed that regular face-to-face meetings, or at least occasional contact and 
introductions, in order to “put a face to a name” would be essential in building trust. 
For this reason, it seems essential that in order to build strong links between different 
agencies and forces, there should be regular meetings and networking events in order to 
build the type of trust that is more difficult to develop when dealing with people on a 
purely virtual level. However, it is also important to consider Levin et al.’s argument, 
as posed above, and how weak ties can also have their uses.  
Co-location and Building Strong Teams 
 One of the most important strengths of the HIDTA model is the physical co-
location of different agencies, which underlines the research and suggests that physical 
presence is a key factor in trust-building. While virtual teams can work, it does seem 
that physical presence is a significant factor in building trust (Rocco, 1998), and the 
HIDTA model feeds off this by ensuring not only that agents within the same location 
have easy access to one another but also that senior officers and directors have regular 
meetings in order to discuss cases and carry out deconfliction.  
 In addition to senior officers meeting each other regularly, taskforces operated 
as much more closely-knit teams, with some clearly displaying signs of unconditional 
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trust between team members - for instance, some agents described their colleagues as 
being like family. 
Cultures of Secrecy And Competition 
 While agents report that there has been much organisational change in recent 
years, and a genuine improvement toward increased cooperation between agencies, 
there is inevitably still some reluctance to share information based on traditional “cop 
culture” values, as explored in chapter 2, such as protecting informants and keeping 
information restricted to a limited audience. This is reinforced by remaining 
institutional barriers, such as the different cultures and policies that each agency has, as 
well as completely separate and incompatible data records. While this culture appears 
to be weakening, thanks to a greater emphasis on cooperation and sharing, it can still 
cause problems at times.  
 However, a far more pervasive problem is that of competitive behaviour. While 
this too has been challenged to some extent, it remains problematic due to the 
promotions structure, which tends to reward individuals based on cases/investigations 
that they personally conclude, rather than the extent to which they are able to contribute 
to other cases or cooperate effectively.  
 Competition damages cooperation because of an unwillingness to hand over 
cases to other investigators who may be in a better position to pursue them 
successfully, as well as a reluctance to seek help in case this means devolving 
responsibility for the investigation. As one agent put it, “He who has the most, how 
would you say, arrests, gets the most funding…” (R22-F).  
Corruption 
 While competition is insidious and undermines trust, it is by no means as major 
a threat to cooperation as corruption. By far, the greatest concern that agents had in 
trusting other law enforcement officials was corruption. In particular, corruption 
amongst local officers (for instance in PR and the DR) emerged as a significant 
concern. While the change in culture needed to undermine corruption is an ongoing 
task, the most important measures most agents suggested included ensuring the most 
extensive vetting and background checking possible. This, again, introduces an element 
of “institutionalised distrust” (Luhmann, 1979) that controls some elements of risk 
while allowing the need for agents to trust one another. This does not remove the risk 
altogether and thereby removes the need to trust. One major concern agents raised was 
that different agencies and departments had different vetting procedures so they were 
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never sure what types of procedures the people they dealt with had gone through before 
being accepted as officers. This ties into cooperation and trust as well as the sense, or 
lack thereof, as described in chapter 2, that people are “on the same team.”  
Funding 
 Funding arose regularly throughout the interviews, in both positive and negative 
comments, and it is clearly seen as both a vital component of cooperation and a 
potential sticking point. On the positive side, the additional funding that HIDTA 
brought to the challenges of policing was extremely needed. In particular, it was 
common for agents to say that they thought HIDTA's additional resources brought the 
additional advantage of being able to proactively investigate and dismantle the roots of 
drug trafficking - the criminal organisations that enable it. Griffith (1997) discusses the 
serious issue of drug trafficking in the Caribbean, discussing the nature of these 
operations and the challenges in controlling them. While some thought more could be 
done in this area, few thought it was unimportant as a priority.   
 Many of the elements that have made the PR/USVI HIDTA successful are 
reliant on adequate funding. Timeliness of information delivery, for example, arose 
repeatedly as a crucial aspect of cooperation. Accurate and potentially vital data that 
arrives too late to help is of no use. As one agent said, “Timing is what makes it work.” 
(R17-F) However, processing the huge amounts of data that are required in order to 
ensure this intelligence is useful inevitably involves both expensive technology and 
manpower. Similarly, equipment, the ability to pay for extra personnel and hours, and 
extensive training were all listed as essential to cooperation.  
 Another interesting role that the additional funding from HIDTA fulfilled was 
that of filling gaps in the funding for other police forces, such as local forces in PR and 
even in the DR. Through cooperation with PR/USVI HIDTA teams, local forces were 
able to gain training and even the use of equipment which was otherwise unavailable to 
them. This helped to redress one major limiting factor on transnational cooperation, 
which is the disparity of resources between forces of different countries. One of the 
units working with HIDTA stated that most of their resources come from HIDTA 
funds; the boats, helicopters, patrol cars, weapons, radios, all kinds of equipment are 
basically paid by HIDTA. It was suggested that if they weren’t getting HIDTA funding, 
the agents could be certain they wouldn’t be able to have access to those resources. 
 Despite the fact that good cooperation is hard to achieve on a shoestring, 
funding to the PR/USVI HIDTA has not increased even in line with inflation since the 
186	  
	  
project's inception, resulting in a real-term budget reduction over the years. This was a 
source of resentment for many officers, particularly considering what they saw as the 
impressive achievements HIDTA had made.  
Training 
 Training plays a vital role in improving cooperation in several ways and, in 
transnational policing, shared training appeared to be the most effective way to manage 
training. Firstly, training ensures that the norms of cooperation are spread throughout 
the organisation and, of course, that agents are kept up to date with the most effective 
techniques and methods of policing. While training is important, shared training builds 
on this in order to deliver additional dividends of trust and cooperation. Sharing 
training between agencies ensures that all agents have the same reactions and 
procedures for various situations, which is crucial when working together on 
operations. But, more importantly, it allows agents from different agencies or forces to 
network with each other, providing essential face-to-face trust-building contact which, 
as previously discussed, facilitates future cooperation. As one agent stated:  
It’s not that you’re going to be sitting on a chair watching the instructor 
but you’re going to be meeting the person right next to you and the 
person right next to you, you’re going to be going for lunch together, 
and in some way you’re going to be breaking that big wall between 
agencies […] then when you need some favour or you need to work 
together with somebody you say, “I remember that guy, let me call him. 
(R6) 
 In addition to the social element of building trust, shared training reassures 
agents of each other’s abilities, so they can be certain of the capabilities of members of  
other forces. As a belief in others’ abilities is an essential precursor to trust (possibly 
even more so in competitive, “macho” cultures such as exists in policing), this lays 
essential groundwork for later trust and cooperation.  
 However, despite the efficacy of shared training as a tool for improving 
cooperation, training generally has been undermined by the real-term cuts in HIDTA's 
budget. Where previously HIDTA ran its own dedicated training program with full-
time staff, there is no longer any dedicated training budget. Training is now organised 
by two part-time coordinators and is planned on a far more ad hoc basis. As a 
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consequence, fewer agents are being accepted for training, and courses are offered on a 
'first come, first served' basis that many agents believed to be unacceptable. 
Leadership and Political Will 
 Political will, and intelligent leadership, were two factors mentioned frequently, 
often alongside the issue of funding. The two are interconnected: without political will 
to encourage, fund, and create policy around cooperation, there could not be effective 
cooperation. However, the importance of a strategic leadership that could champion the 
organisation and the idea of cooperation was related to how much “political will” 
would exist for it - because a good leader could lobby for political backing for 
cooperative policies.  
 The importance of management/leadership that understands the need for 
cooperation and is able to champion it at the highest levels, including the highest 
political levels, in order to gain backing and resources for cooperation, is crucial. 
7.3 Implications of the Findings 
 As briefly mentioned in the preface, the research presented here has important 
implications for a variety of different fields within the TNP domain, especially in 
current times of economic uncertainty. When budgets are tight, programs such as 
HIDTA become vulnerable and, therefore, it is vital for researchers within the TNP 
domain to have as much information as possible about methods of cooperation. Gaining 
substantial information about different perspectives on TNP cooperation can greatly 
influence the successful development of improved efficiency and effectiveness of TNP 
initiatives. 
We have seen, throughout this research, the crucial importance of trust in 
TNPC. Trust is built gradually through commitment, and communication. It is also 
built, or brought out, through recognising the asset of different types of ties and the 
value of each (Levin et al., 2004).  It has been established that corruption, suspicion, 
and lack of a personal history or knowledge for others can damage cooperation and that 
belief in others’ competence and their tendency to be benevolent (Abrams et al, 2003) 
can enhance trust (and thus cooperation). Indeed, history and trust were found to be 
critical, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (Barber, 1983). This supports the claims and 
findings of Gambetta (1988) and Luhmann (1979), who have argued that cooperation is 
still an individual activity; this was explored in the context of cooperation having 
supposedly become less of an individual activity in recent years. 
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Chapter 6 has illustrated that capacity building was an essential aspect of 
improving cooperation. Training was seen as building relationships outside of normal 
working situations, with integrated, equal training a must. At the same time, agents 
rated resources and funding as key drivers to cooperation but responded that training 
had been cut and now was taken out of individual operational budgets. As mentioned 
above, Brogden (2005) and Held (2000) also noted that training, intelligence, 
equipment, and communication all suffer without appropriate funding and leave little 
funding for global cooperation. Chapter 6 provided supporting evidence for this, 
especially in the areas of training and capacity building. 
Griffith (1997) and Harriott (2002) noted that capacity building and funding has 
been long overdue in the Caribbean. It seems that their holistic and balanced studies of 
crime control and cooperation would support these major findings. This is something 
that can be of use to TNP and governments when developing new campaigns for 
improving cooperation, especially when these are targeted at both the national and 
international levels. In that case, TNP and governments could ensure that any methods 
agencies perceive as useful and are highly interested in are more easily available for 
them to try to implement.  
The broad implications of the findings of this research are in informing practical 
steps of action to improve TNPC. Therefore, the results from the studies presented in 
this thesis have important implications for researchers in the TNP domain, especially 
the “newer wave,” as implied in the introductory chapter. A number of researchers have 
put forward strong arguments that TNPC should no longer be regarded as an ideal 
concept or activity, and that the need for TNP to cooperate on a more holistic scale is 
critically required (Bowling & Foster, 2002; Giddens, 2002; Joyce, 2005; Marshall, 
Robinson & Kwak, 2005; Michalowski & Bitten, 2005; Nadelmann, 1993; Newburn & 
Sparks, 2004, Nicola, 2005; Niemann & Dovidio, 2005; Reiner, 2000). This research 
contributes to the study of what is needed to facilitate that cooperation and to improve 
current practice. It will be of value in a variety of contexts. For instance, transnational 
law enforcement agencies and governments around the world may benefit from the in-
depth examination of how transnational police are cooperating on an individual and 
institutional level, and perhaps even more so when resources and economic times are 
difficult. Cooperation needs to be considered much more, as well as fostered more 
appropriately amongst the correct target groups, and the importance of issues beyond 
the overarching policy issues and programs should not be underestimated. This is a 
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must as it becomes increasingly difficult for smaller, less funded, regional police and 
indeed governments to cope with the aftermath of the economic downturn. For these 
politicians and law enforcement agencies, the information gathered in this thesis can be 
vitally important in learning more about how key participants think about TNP 
cooperation, enabling these policy makers to produce more appropriate campaigns. The 
implications are, simply put, in the suggestion of ways to enhance cooperation in 
TNCP, which will be of value to anyone involved in TNP. 
7.4 Enhancing Cooperation in Transnational Policing: Future Steps 
 This section analyses and interprets the results of the research in more depth and 
explores future steps toward enhancing cooperation in transnational policing.  Options 
for implementing change include building trust through face-to-face interactions, 
funding for TNPC and creating organisations and systems that facilitate cooperation. 
Ways forward include such factors as integrated technology, training, and management. 
7.4.1 Options for implementing change. 
Build trust through daily, face-to-face interaction.  One of HIDTA’s strengths 
is the collocation of agents and taskforces in one physical location, which is backed by 
both theory and evidence as an effective way to build trust and therefore improve 
cooperation. Agents are more likely to trust each other if they have personal contact 
with each other at least occasionally, and have the opportunity to share information 
with each other informally as well as through official channels. As suggested by 
Abrams et al., trust is also built through factors such as accountability, building a 
shared vision (which is vital to policing work), ensuring transparency in decision-
making, and holding individuals accountable for trust-building. Abrams et al.’s work 
illustrates that face-to-face contact alone isn’t enough but what is accomplished through 
that contact which truly makes a difference to trust and, therefore, cooperation.  
 The literature (e.g. Anderson, 1989) extolled the importance of face-to-face 
interaction in order to build trust, which was reflected in the primary research: the value 
of encouraging networking, face-to-face meetings, and taskforces where agents/officers 
work side-by-side with each other. This also ties into Abrams et al.’s (2003) view of 
creating a shared goal.  There should be two main approaches to face-to-face 
interaction: firstly, to create integrated taskforces that co-locate staff and include 
members of several agencies. Secondly, to encourage more informal networking in 
order to build weak links between different teams and forces, as weak links provide 
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valuable connections between otherwise discrete and closely integrated teams. This ties 
into Levin, Cross and Abram’s (2004) work exploring capitalising on weaker ties and 
the value of these ties.  
 For this reason, it seems essential that, in order to build strong links between 
different agencies and forces, there should be regular meetings and networking events 
in order to build the type of trust, which is typically much more difficult to develop 
when dealing with people on a purely virtual level.  
 One of the best ways to carry out networking – as it goes beyond merely 
socialising – is to create opportunities for agents to train together. This ties into creating 
a shared goal, as noted above (Abrams et al, 2003). Trust is easier to build through 
training as this allows agents to evaluate each other’s competence and therefore fulfils 
the component of trust, which often relies on perception of competence (Levin, 2004). 
Particularly in the competitive, macho, and risky world of policing, this type of trust-
building should not be undervalued. By involving agents from many different forces 
and taskforces in the same training, shared training can also begin to create the weak 
links that facilitate informal cooperation. Practically, this would entail increasing the 
budget for training within HIDTA and ensuring that it is once again allocated 
specifically for training rather than leached in an ad hoc manner from the budgets of 
other programs. 
Funding for transnational policing.  HIDTA’s budget has decreased in real 
terms since its establishment, despite its successes and importance in funding 
development of local law enforcement in the region. Having evaluated HIDTA’s 
successes, one clear recommendation would be to improve resourcing and make more 
funds available to the HIDTA program. 
 HIDTA brings much-needed funding to the fight against transnational crime, 
and by extending assistance with resources to transitional countries helps to even out 
some of the resource disparities; this makes transnational cooperation between 
developed and developing countries more difficult. In particular, considering the 
advantages of training agents together, and the fact that HIDTA training already makes 
up for the budget shortfall in training for local Puerto Rican officers, a key 
improvement would be increasing (and once again ring-fencing) the training budget 
and opening shared training to all officers involved in cooperation.  
Create organisations and systems that facilitate cooperation.  HIDTA has 
also created systems which allow sharing to take place and take some (though not all) 
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of the risk out of cooperation - for instance through effective deconfliction services, 
sifting through huge amounts of information in order to link pieces of disparate but 
connected data, and through vetting and training agents to a standard that makes them 
more likely to be trustworthy. 
 These successes need to be capitalised on when creating effective TNP systems, 
by establishing effective institutional controls that help rather than hinder trust and by 
providing safeguards without making trust entirely obsolete. These systems would 
include effective security on databases and network.  
 Similarly, combating corruption by investing in strong background checking 
and secure recruitment is a priority. The importance of confidence in control 
mechanisms cannot be underestimated, and therefore a key recommendation for raising 
trust in TNP would be ensuring strict, high-security, standardised vetting across all 
agencies and forces involved in cooperation. While this might be difficult to 
implement, it is one measure that could dramatically raise the confidence and trust of 
agents in each other. 
 Other institutional barriers to cooperation include the promotions system, which 
perpetuates competition by placing the most importance on successful conclusion of 
cases rather than the ability to cooperate in order to achieve better results. Therefore, 
one clear recommendation in order to improve cooperation would be to include it in the 
system of performance evaluation and ensure that promotion took it into account, rather 
than giving all credit to the agent/team that “closes” the case. Despite De Cremer and 
Van Knippenberg's warning against incentivising cooperation, in this case it is more a 
case of removing a barrier to cooperation than trying to incentivise it (De Cremer & 
Van Knippenberg, 2002). As Tulchin and Espach (2000) write in the context of 
regional cooperation, few people would challenge the need to cooperate, and the 
benefits of cooperation, but people have different ideas of how to achieve it. 
7.4.2 Ways forward: suggestions for additional areas of research.  The 
current investigation has highlighted other research initiatives that need to be pursued 
in strengthening the data, and evidence-based efforts, concerning TNPC. Research 
endeavours could include devising coherent strategies for resolving the problems of 
multi-agency cooperation. This could include a more holistic approach to TNPC and 
focus on any of the following: consensus building around key policy proposals; 
tightening the links between law enforcement agencies and parliaments; developing 
new legislation to facilitate TNPC strategies; institutional modernisation, and the 
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interfacing of a master data system. This thesis, and Chapter 6 in particular, highlights 
reforming and integrating; technology, training methods, better management tools, and 
greater attention to preparation and sharing to ensure improved cooperation. 
Recommendations for future research could encompass the following: integrated 
technology, training, management, and legal jurisdictions as outlined below. 
 Integrated technology.  As cyber-crimes become more sophisticated, the use of 
counter technology will become increasingly crucial. The funding of necessary 
equipment ought to be prioritised by governments and policy makers. Databases should 
be integrated in order to improve time sensitive information and sharing capabilities. 
Future research could examine such a theoretical transnational IT system that would 
need to be completely secure, both internally and externally. Security clearances could 
be given at various levels. Primarily, governments could meet and agree on the general 
requirements, e.g., a “G20” specifically for TNPC. This could expand to more countries 
if a G20 pilot were successful. Agencies could then be invited to meet and discuss the 
specific needs of each stakeholder. Agencies involved could recommend supervisors, 
technology experts, and logistics managers in order to meet and discuss the criteria, 
security, and the creation of such an interface. Collaborative transnational agreements 
and policies could then be signed in order to ensure accountability and complete 
transparency. 
Integrated training.  A central training centre could be established in order to 
examine integrated training needs. Integrated training could include the above-
mentioned advanced technology training, regular networking meetings, and even an 
international exchange of officers. This would assist in trust-building as it would 
facilitate both face-to-face contact and, as Abrams et al. suggested, a shared goal. This 
last recommendation could aid TNP by providing to agents with increased education 
about local knowledge, mentalities, values, etc. This was supported by Nadelmann’s 
(1993) study of improved cooperation with “one on one cops across borders”. 
Appropriate and funded language courses could also assist in improving cooperation. 
As Glaeser (2000) also pointed out, increased contact tends to increased trust, and the 
combination of increased contact with shared goals could be extremely valuable.  
Integrated and improved management.  Reforming current management 
techniques could foster improved TNPC and improved accountability. Countries and 
oversight committees could set common standards for policing and monitoring their 
implementation. Again, this would involve an integrated management system—one in 
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which an unbiased group of experts (not from the TNP domain) could evaluate a 
reformed management system for the use of a new TNP model. These committees 
could ensure that factors such as trust, respect for local cultures/knowledge, 
accountability, and leadership are not only addressed but become mandatory by 
establishing systems that lead to the display of these characteristics. 
 Efforts, such as the DEA’s RISC and HIDTA, are in need of further policy and 
research support if reforms to TNP legislation are to occur. Until more is known about 
the concept of TNPC and how it may influence the way stakeholders think and feel 
about it, it is very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to know why there are such 
strong obstacles between national and transnational agencies. The studies presented in 
this thesis have only lightly scratched the surface of what seems to be a much deeper 
issue. Therefore, it is important that future research acknowledge the importance of 
investigating the issue of TNPC in a much more rigorous way before drawing 
conclusions about how social and psychological influences may impact TNPC and how 
behaviours may change over time. 
 In order to ensure all these institutional changes, a number of variables are 
important. Both the funding available and the political will to deliver change must be 
present. In the current economic climate, funding for all government activities is being 
cut, and TNP and drug-trafficking reduction can hardly expect to escape the cuts.  
 However, it is also essential that leaders fully support and encourage 
cooperation as a key part of working practice, thereby ensuring that cooperation 
becomes part of the organisation’s strategic priorities rather than merely a bolt-on or a 
practice used in an ad hoc fashion by officers in the field.  
 At the institutional level, having leaders who embed cooperation within the 
policies and everyday practices of the organisation is crucial.  The idea of “leading by 
example” came through strongly in agents responses, echoing the need for leaders to 
create a good environment for cooperation. In line with Jones and George's (1998) 
ideas on values and attitudes, there was a sense that the attitudes of senior management 
toward cooperation needed to be positive if there was to be real progress toward it.  
 Another aspect is that, in recent years, the “War on Drugs” has to some extent 
been eclipsed by the “War on Terror”, an attitude that was evident through several 
agents’ replies. Clarke et al. (2006) discuss national security threats and resulting 
homeland security initiatives. This brings its own challenges in terms of risks, 
vulnerability, trust, etc. This is important in economic, organisational, and intelligence 
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respects, with the focus of new departments like Homeland Security and the efforts of 
the intelligence community all concentrating on terrorism, to the detriment of drugs 
policy efforts. As several agents pointed out, this blinkered approach is short-sighted, 
as the criminal networks and vast revenues generated by drug trafficking eventually 
feed into terrorism itself and should therefore not be considered less important. It seems 
that the lack of funding for TNP and drug-trafficking reduction may continue unless the 
political will emerges to ensure that it remains a priority. Caruson (2007) discusses the 
need for cooperation in terms of homeland security and its necessity in terms of federal, 
regional, and local governments; Buruss (2009) also talked about the pressures that 
exist in terms of homeland security. Though these are undoubtedly important to 
address, equally important is the focus on drug trafficking. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Throughout this research, one of the clearest strands has been the challenge the 
Caribbean posts to effective policing. More importantly, the challenges the region 
provides for the police are inherently transnational. As a result, the Caribbean can 
provide ideal insight into what works and what does not work in transnational policing. 
As the agents involved were keen to point out, the challenges the Caribbean faces are 
daunting: an island geographical nature that plays into the hands of drug smugglers and 
people traffickers; a range of different jurisdictions and cultures across the islands; and 
a prime strategic position between Central/South America and the US. However, as 
several interviewees also suggested, the intense nature of the challenges facing law 
enforcement in the Caribbean have actually forced them to cooperate on a daily basis 
and to a far greater extent than would usually occur in (for instance) mainland US law 
enforcement or indeed in any mainland situation. Due to this, law enforcement 
cooperation in the Caribbean can provide insight into the factors that allow police 
cooperation to thrive as well as those that can hamper it. This has been a model case 
study, allowing the consideration of the major issues within the field and facilitating a 
discussion of the TNPC that can be universalised. Indeed, the examination of HIDTA 
has had the same purpose, and it has been strongly evidence that it should not be 
applied as a model of TNPC on a global scale. To suggest such a system would be 
exceedingly naïve and would ignore the nuances and complexities of TNPC; it would 
also show a highly idealistic perception of the HIDTA. Successfully merging the local, 
national, regional, and global police is an overwhelming and challenging proposal; the 
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data shows that policing worldwide displays considerable variation in terms of 
structure, logic, dynamics, and programs. Described in this study, four distinct 
challenges stand out from the available literature on TNP cooperation: economic 
constraints, legislative constraints, local particularisms and social/psychological 
influences. The counter-argument demonstrated throughout this thesis is not only that 
this is an unhelpful solution but an undesirable one that could actually be a harmful in 
many societies. The study presented here has demonstrated that, indeed, current 
cooperation is largely irrelevant to the sensitivities of many societies and a “one size 
fits all” model is not appropriate, nor should it be acceptable. 
 What has been clear throughout this work is the importance of trust as a social 
and psychological factor that impact on the existence and effectiveness on TNPC. Trust 
is the critical foundation of any sensible and successful relationship. In TNP, it can be 
especially important, since policing involves a great deal of risk-taking on the part of its 
participants. Recognition of these two principles is essential,  allowing TNPC to exist, 
and TNP to flourish. When considering the main findings of this investigation, the 
relevant thematic points drawn out were the barriers and facilitators of TNPC, all of 
which have some relevance to trust: 
Electronic Information Sharing 
A suggestion made by Rocco (1998) suggested that electronic information sharing can 
only be effectively carried out if personal relationships had been established first and if 
trust has been established. This was reflected, as seen, within the primary research.  
Personal Communication, Networking and Relationships/ Co-Location and 
Building Strong Teams 
Rocco (1998); Anderson (1989) and others have considered the importance of personal 
communication in building trust, and we have seen throughout the perceived 
importance of relationships; the idea that an individual has other figures whom they can 
approach for assistance has been seen as vital, and personal communication and 
networking have been viewed as potential facilitators for the trust that is needed to 
create these relationships. As Squires (2009) writes, in the post 9/11 world, cooperation 
and information sharing are particularly important. This author discusses the 
importance of drug interdiction and how these might work as a model for how 
homeland security is dealt with. 
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Cultures of Secrecy and Competition/Corruption 
Luhmann (1979) and Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007) consider in depth the 
relationship between risk and trust. Secrecy, competition and corruption erode trust, 
and increase risk and have been viewed throughout this piece in the literature and the 
primary research as highly detrimental and negative in the context of TNPC.  
Funding/ Training/Leadership and Political Will 
Trusting in the competency of those who an individual or organisation was working 
with was a staple of both the literature (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) and of the 
primary research findings. If an organisation was seen to have good leadership and 
political backing, be well funded, and good training given, they were more likely to be 
trusted to do their job properly and to be free of the risk factors involved in secrecy and 
corruption.  
A variety of suggested implications, and measures that should or could be 
considered for implementation to tackle some of the limitations and barriers to effective 
TNPC, have been considered at length and put forward as a result of this research. It 
has been concluded that universalising the HIDTA program – or any program – would 
not be appropriate. It has been evidenced that social and psychological factors should 
not be underestimated. In particular, trust is the foundation from which a TNPC 
operation must be built in order to begin to break down the barriers and problems that 
we have seen exist. This is an element of TNPC that can – and should – be 
universalised in order for effective cooperation to take place. 
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Appendix A: 
Acronyms 
ACRONYM  DESCRIPTION 
ACCP Association of Caribbean of Police Commissioners 
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers 
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (USA) 
BLSF Blue Lightening Strike Force  
BMPE Black Market Peso Exchange 
CANU Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit 
CARICOM Caribbean Economic Community 
CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Area 
CATOC Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime  
CBP Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
CDI Caribbean Centre for Drug Information (DEA) 
CDPF Commonwealth of Dominican Police Force 
CFATF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CICAD Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission 
CIVPOL UN Civil Police Units  
CND  Dominican National Drug Control Council 
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (USA) 
DEU Drug Enforcement Unit 
DGA Dominican Customs Agency 
DNCD 
DirecciónNacional de Control de Drogas (Natl. Directorate for Drug 
Control) 
DR Dominican Republic 
DTO Drug Trade Organizations 
EPIC Electronic Privacy Information Center  
EU European Union 
EUROPOL European Police Office 
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
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FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit 
FURA FuerzasUnidas de RapidaAccion (The United Forces of Fast Action) 
G20 Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
G8 Group of Eight Industrialized Nations 
GODR Government of Dominican Republic 
HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trade Area Program (USA) 
IA Internal Affairs office (USA) 
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement (USA) 
IDEC International Drug Enforcement Conference 
IDEC International Drug Economic Conference 
INCSR International Narcotics Strategy Control Report 
INSCR International Narcotics Strategy Control Report 
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization 
IPES International Executive Police Symposium 
ISC Investigative Support Centre (FBI led Initiative) 
IMF International Monetary Fund  
IT Information Technology 
LEO  Law Enforcement Online  
MDMA: 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (Ecstasy) 
Mi5 Military Intelligence, Section 5 
Mi6 Military Intelligence, Section 6 (officially Secret Intelligence Service, SIS) 
MLA Anti-Money Laundering Authority 
MLAT Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
MLPA Money Laundering (Prevention) Act 
MOI Major Organizations Investigations  
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement 
NAS National Academy of Sciences 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCB National Central Bureau (Interpol) 
NCIS National Criminal Intelligence Service (UK) 
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NDIC National Drug Intelligence Centre (USA) 
NGO Non-governmental Organizations 
NYPD New York Police Department 
OAS Organization of American States 
OCDEF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces  
ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy 
PR Puerto Rico 
PRPD Puerto Rico Police Department 
RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (USA) 
RIISS Regional Information and Intelligence Sharing System 
RISC Regional Information Sharing Centres (DEA) 
ROCCISS Regional Organized Counter Crime Information Sharing System 
ROCIC Regional Organized Crime Information Center 
RSIS Regional Sharing Information System 
SPSS Self-propelled Semisubmersibles  
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics Team 
TGF TropasGuardasFronteras (Cuban Border Guard) 
TN Transnational 
TNP Transnational Policing 
TNPC Transnational Police Cooperation 
TREVI TREVI Group of European Interior Ministers 
UN United Nations 
UNDCP United Nations International Drug Control Programme 
UNPD United Nations Police Department 
USAID US Agency for International Development  
USCG US Coast Guard 
USPS United States Postal Service 
USVI United States Virgin Islands 
WB World Bank  
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Appendix C: 
Interview Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION IN PUERTO RICO AND THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: APPROACHES AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Name: ______________________________ 
Title: _______________________________ 
Date: _______________________________ 
 
Introduction 
The title of this study is Transnational Police Cooperation in Puerto Rico and The 
Dominican Republic: Approaches and Implications. Its main aim is to find out how 
law enforcement agencies in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic cooperate with 
one another, focusing specifically on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(HIDTA) Program.  
 
Thank you for taking the time today to be interviewed. Each interview will range 
between 45 minutes and 1 hour. Though we are calling it an interview, our discussion 
will be more free-flowing than a regular question and answer session. However, just so 
that we are able to cover all the areas below, I will be using a set of questions as a 
guide. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers and that your personal 
perspective is greatly appreciated. 
 
In a moment I would like to ask you some general questions relating to the DEA its 
methods of operation and its successes and shortcomings. After that I would like to 
understand your views on crime and how crime links between Puerto Rico and The 
Dominican Republic affect joint operations globally. Then I would like to understand 
your perspective on the RISC/HIDTA model of cooperation. And lastly, I have some 
questions regarding what you might understand to be key influences on Transnational 
Police Cooperation. 
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So that I can refer back to what we discuss, I would like your permission to record our 
conversation. However, please be assured that what we discuss will remain between 
you and I, and the recording will not be given to anyone else. For the sake of further 
confidentiality, I will also not be referring to anyone by name, nor will any views be 
identifiable in my report.  
 
Thank you again for your help with this project; I greatly appreciated. In case you have 
any questions, please feel free to email me at m.k.harrigan@lse.ac.uk 
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Appendix D 
Topic Guide 
Section I: The DEA 
1. How would you describe your current role [or contact] with the DEA?  
 
2. What would you say are: 
1. The best things about working for/with the DEA? 
2. The worst things about working for/with the DEA? 
 
3. What is the extent and nature of transnational cooperation between the DEA and 
other police agencies? 
 
4. Who does the DEA cooperate with and what forms has this cooperation taken? 
[Shared training? Shared information? Provision of equipment? Joint operations?] 
 
5. How successful would you say the DEA has been at TNPC?  
 
6. What do you think are the barriers to TNPC? Why would you say these barriers 
occur? And what do you think could be done to overcome these barriers and 
improve cooperation?  
 
7. Is there anything else you think I should have asked, about the DEA, its role or 
methods of cooperation that I have not? 
Section II: TNP and Caribbean Links 
8. What is the extent and nature of transnational crimes in PR and the DR? What types of 
crimes are accorded the highest priority by HIDTA? 
 
9. How are these transnational crimes currently addressed? What kinds of cooperation are 
involved? 
 
10. To what extent is Caribbean police cooperation reactive or pro-active? Is the balance 
right? Or would you like to see it change? If so, how?   
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11. Are cooperation methods in the Caribbean the same or different from those elsewhere? 
If so, how? 
 
12. How is police cooperation outside the region affected by ‘PR-DR linked crime’? For 
example, what’s the affect on other islands in the Caribbean region, or North/South 
America? 
 
13.  In your opinion, what forms of other cooperation are required that do not currently 
exist to specifically address Puerto Rican or DR transnational-linked crimes?  
 
14. How is police cooperation in PR and the DR regulated by national and international 
law? 
 
15. When HIDTA agents collaborate with other agencies or police officers from overseas, 
where does accountability lie? [legal, fiscal, political, administrative or 
managerial?] 
16. Is there anything else you think I should have asked about Caribbean crimes or 
cooperation in the Caribbean that I have not? 
 
Section III:  HIDTA 
 
17. How would you describe your role within/contact with the HIDTA?  
 
18. What do you see as the goals of the HIDTA?  
 
19. How is information shared? What barriers to sharing information have you 
encountered, if any? What has HIDTA done to address these barriers? What 
success have they had? What else can HIDTA do to tackle these barriers? 
 
20. How are HIDTA agents selected, educated and trained? Do you feel anything 
should be done differently and if so, why?  
 
21. What do you feel would be the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the 
HIDTA models on a transnational scale? 
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22. Is there anything else you think I should have asked about HIDTA and have not? 
 
Section IV: Key Influences on TNPC 
 
23. What are the key influences that you feel affect TNP cooperation? [personal, 
social, cultural, regulatory, political]  
 
24. I would like to know what you think could be done to improve cooperation. Let’s 
begin at the individual level; 
1. [Individual] What could be done to motivate agents to cooperate more? Why do 
you think some people cooperate better than others? 
2. [Institutional] What changes in HIDTA and other agencies could be made to 
improve transnational cooperation? 
3. [Wider context] What changes politically or economically do you feel could be 
made to improve transnational cooperation? 
 
25.  How important is trust in cooperation? 
1. What do you feel are the barriers to trust? 
2. What types of things to do you think would improve trust between individuals? 
3. What types of things to do you think would improve trust between 
organizations and agencies?  
26. People have identified certain factors which they think affect cooperation. How 
much are the following features of your organizational culture: on a scale of 1-5 
with 1) being A great deal  2) A lot,  3) A little,  4) Not very much  and  5) Not at 
all. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Motivation      
Trust      
Mistrust      
Betrayal      
Coercion      
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27. Is there anything else you think I should have asked overall and have not? 
 
That brings our interview to a close. Thank you very kindly for taking the time out of 
your very busy schedule today to be interviewed. It is greatly appreciated.  
Leadership      
Integrity      
Power      
Resources      
Competition      
Race/ethnicity      
Gender      
223	  
	  
Appendix E: 
Sample Interview  
Q 
The first question – how would you describe your current role with the DEA? 
A 
Well right now I’m a special agent with the DEA, I’ve been a special agent with DEA 
for five years. 
Q 
What would you say are the best things about working with the DEA? 
A3 
Well pretty much, compared to other agencies, it’s just that we work drugs so we’re a 
very specific agency.  We can do other investigations here, there is a drug nexus, but 
for most of it it’s all drugs, so compared to the FBI, their jurisdiction is so wide that 
you can’t really concentrate on one thing in particular and that’s why probably they’re 
so large compared to us.  We may have, what, something a little over five thousand 
agents in total and the Bureau has got like twenty, something like that, from fifteen to 
twenty, so they have at least three times the agents we have.  So that’s pretty much 
what I enjoy more, that we can actually focus on something, we don’t have to be 
worrying about all kinds of stuff. 
Q 
What would you say are the worst things about working with the DEA? 
A 
Bureaucracy I guess, and being under DOJ, being a smaller agency, I guess the obvious 
problem in my point of view is the fact that we are competing practically with the bad 
guys.  They have all the money in the world to get whatever they want or whatever they 
need and do it the way they want it, we have limited resources and we have to go 
through many steps in order to get approval, in order for investigations, approval for 
funds.  The introduction of undercover agents in order to infiltrate organisations you 
need to have good informants that can actually get you in and as time goes on it is a lot 
harder to actually get good informants.  I mean we probably have the best informants of 
any agency and we have probably the most, but the level of quality, it’s decreasing in 
the sense of as more efforts are put into fighting trafficking the different organisations 
get tighter and tighter, so in order to get into them you have to have somebody basically 
in it, so it depends on what level you’re approaching that organisation and pretty much 
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you can’t go all the way to the top, you have to go from the bottom up, and that process 
of going from the bottom up in that particular organisation is very lengthy in time.  So 
it’s kind of frustrating in one sense, plus every time the bad guys have – it’s funny 
because you would think that they have a research and development department to 
come up with all kinds of ways to traffic and smuggle narcotics, and every time you 
find one method and you counter that method they’re already coming up with three or 
four different methods.  And their methods all circumvent the laws, so very much when 
you discover something you have to create a law to counter that.  They have the money 
to pay for the lawyers, they have the money to pay for the resources, they have not only 
money, but they use force and coercion to get a lot of stuff done. 
Q 
Do you think the bad guys, do you think they co-operate differently than agencies do? 
A 
In what sense? 
Q 
Well just individual co-operation. 
A 
Like what?  If we arrest somebody and we ask them to co-operate?  It’s funny because 
at least in Puerto Rico, my experience in the last five years, we’ve had many people tell 
us, “We don’t tell on other people, we don’t snitch”, and it’s funny because in my 
particular experience I’ve had numerous guys that I’ve tried to interview or interrogate 
and I’ve been very specific telling them, “Listen, we’re really not interested in you, 
who we’re really interested in is who you work for, because right now you’re going, 
like what, ten to life, and whoever you work for is out and he’s not going to do 
anything to get you out because he can’t, and I can’t see why you’re willing to spend 
ten years of your life or more in jail for a guy that, if we get him, he’s going to go to 
jail for at least twenty, and you can pretty much take a lesser sentence.  I’m not saying 
that you are …” 
Q 
Would there be retaliation of any sort if that were the case? 
A 
I guess that, yes, but also there are mechanisms in place to protect them, but it’s funny 
because … 
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Q 
Do you think they’re targets? 
A 
I think yes, it’s just that it’s very hard for an individual to pretty much forget their 
families or their background or where they come from.  Once they get in a program, not 
always but sometimes, you know, your identity changes, you’re relocated somewhere, 
it’s a very limited group of people that you can relocate, other than your immediate 
family, that’s it.  Once you’re relocated you have to start over again work, have no 
contact with your friends or any relatives because by limiting your outside contact, it’s 
how you’re going to protect yourself.  Once you start spreading out, “I’m okay, I’m 
alive, I’m here or there” … 
Q 
And imagine in a place like Puerto Rico with such strong cultural family values, that 
must be … 
A 
It’s really hard.  We’ve had informants call us, “Oh I’ve got a friend against me, blah 
blahblah”, and you try to relocate them and they go like, “Oh yeah, I was living in St. 
Tusef and now I want to live close to St. Tusef”, and I go, “The whole idea is to get you 
out, not to leave you in the area”, and they just think that by moving three blocks away 
from where they were, that’s … 
Q 
Would you really relocate on the island or would you literally relocate them to … 
A 
That depends on the threat.  If it’s a high threat … 
Q 
It’s a very small island. 
A 
Yes, it’s a small island, but it is very hard to find people here.  If you – how can I say – 
if you’re humble or you’re really quiet about what you are or your past, you know, 
you’re discreet, the chances are that you can stay below the radar for a while, and 
actually for a long while.  But if you’re bloating around, saying, “Oh yeah, I used to do 
this, I worked for so and so, and this and that”, I mean the island is only 100 by 35 so 
there’s not that many places you can go to without coming across somebody that knows 
the person that already put the threat on you.  But yes, the programs that are in place 
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will actually relocate individuals outside of Puerto Rico, so it’s one of those things that 
you try to accommodate the person and at the same time you have to do it in a fashion 
that is actually safe for the person. 
Q 
Who does the DEA primarily co-operate with and what forms has this co-operation 
taken?  As in forms, by that I mean sharing of information, sharing training, equipment, 
joint operations. 
A 
There are many different programs and initiatives that the DEA participates with, one 
of them being HIDTA, also OCDEF.  OCDEF stands for Organised Crime Drug 
Enforcement Task Forces.  And locals, in Puerto Rico there is not that many police 
departments, whereas in the States you will have like the constables and like sometimes 
municipal police, the city police, the state police.  Over here you have the Police of 
Puerto Rico and Municipal Police departments, so it’s not that broad in Puerto Rico, 
but we actually are in contact with all the law enforcement agencies in the island.  We 
cover also the Virgin Islands and the Dominican Republic. 
Q 
How successful would you say the DEA has been at trans-national police co-operation? 
A 
I think very successful I have to say.  I don’t think that the DEA by itself can do much, 
you know, there’s no liaison with other law enforcement agencies whether they’re local 
or state or federal or international.  I don’t think that anything will be accomplished 
because, particularly with drugs, you have so many countries that are involved and you 
have different export countries and importation countries, ports of entry, mid points, 
it’s merely that different countries are very involved in that that you as a single agency 
just stick to continental US, you really won’t be able to accomplish anything, at least 
that’s my opinion. 
Q 
What do you think are the barriers to trans-national police co-operation? 
A 
More than anything I would say the legal systems.  Some countries are more liberal and 
they’re not very (inaudible), the local law tends to be more liberal, some other countries 
are more strict.  Some places you’re guilty until proven innocent instead of ours that 
you’re innocent until proven guilty, so in the US the burden to prove your guilt, it’s on 
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us.  There are other countries where you are guilty and you have to prove your 
innocence, so in that sense I guess that’s pretty much what complicates stuff.  You have 
religious beliefs, in which it’s pretty obvious now in our relations with the East, you 
have other countries that think that, you know, they don’t believe in our system, and I 
guess it just goes back and forth on culture, their local laws and pretty much what’s 
going on in the world at that time. You know, when you try to go to a different country 
and people don’t like other people coming telling them what to do and how to do it, so 
it’s a very sore subject when you have to … 
Q 
Yes, you have to be culturally sensitive.  And understandably so, I mean there are 
things that work a certain way in different countries and you have to respect that.  What 
do you think can be done to overcome these barriers, to improve co-operation? 
A 
That is being done right now? 
Q 
No, what do you think could be done better to overcome these barriers? 
A 
It’s a tricky subject.  I guess that first changing the point of view of that particular 
country towards the US is one major aspect that I would look into in the sense of – for 
example, the French are very proud, they don’t seem to like the US that much, and 
when you as a nation go to France to whatever, you know, why go against the trend, I 
mean they already don’t like you, and you don’t understand French because you know 
there’s a lot being said.  But I think the whole thing will hold true for pretty much every 
country that you try to kind of like reach, Russia, they’re communist, we’re democrat, 
and that will be another example of first you need to kind of like let these people know 
that “I’m a friend and not a foe, and I just want to work with you because by helping 
you I’m helping myself”. We have South America, we have countries in South 
America, they are leading producers of cocaine and heroin, and actually that makes a 
lot of money for them, so if you go there and tell them that you are there to get rid of 
the coca plantations in Bolivia they are going to say like, “No, because we farm those 
and the locals use it to kind of inhibit their appetite and that’s what gets them going”.  
Plus you have the narco traffickers also put in their little … I guess that it’s more, I 
would call it being working more an image and actually showing the benefits that co-
operation between countries before anything else, and also you have to be more 
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transparent. I think that right now there’s a bunch of differing interests that the US has 
got for the overt or covert.  The people in the different countries that you go to, they 
know some of them where the information, this information, they have their own idea 
of what’s going on and if you don’t work on that first then it’s pretty much useless.  I 
mean you’ll go there and they’ll look at you and they’ll say like, “Yeah, yeah, yeah, 
yeah, yeah”, and you turn your back and they’ll continue to do what they’ve been 
doing.  So I think that it’s very hard to put your finger at, this is why we should do it, 
there are so many things that you have to work at. 
Q 
Is there anything else that you’d like to add about the DEA or its methods of co-
operation? 
A 
I think we’re still too small, that’s the thing, we need to be a little bigger, and also I 
assume that for us to be a little more receptive we need to be more efficient and 
internally I would say we need to be more efficient in how we get things done, because 
this is a very time sensitive business.  A quick example would be, if we were going to 
do a drugs transaction and you had a bad guy on the phone and he’s telling you, “Yeah, 
I want to see you now at such and such corner”, and you go like, “Well, you know, now 
is not a good time”, because we need a couple of hours to get operational supplies in 
place and people in place and do all this structural thing that we already have in place 
in order to get that transaction done, I don’t think that guy is, in my experience, we 
haven’t got much time.  I mean if I’m ready to do something I just call you and say, 
“I’m ready to do this, we’re going to do this now.  If you’re not ready, you know, I 
have somebody else all ready and waiting”.  So I think that being a little more efficient 
will give us a better perspective. 
Q 
I’m now going to ask you a couple of questions about trans-national policing and 
Caribbean links. What is the extent and nature of trans-national crimes in Puerto Rico 
and the Dominican Republic?  By extent I mean is it generally a huge problem, is it – I 
realise you’re specifically … 
A 
I mean mainly drugs, but we have a big influx of illegal aliens here in the island.  It’s 
only natural they will (inaudible) close to it and they have a bunch of problems 
politically and you have a lot of poverty, and if they just try to get out – I mean we did 
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it, Puerto Ricans did it at one point, they started fleeing to the US, specifically New 
York and the East coast, and they were just running away from the depression that they 
were going through in the island, trying to look for a nicer living.  Dominicans and 
many other South Americans and Latin Americans I would say … 
Q 
So do you have a lot coming from South America? 
A 
We have from South America, we have from Asia, we have … 
 
Q 
From Asia? 
A 
Yes, we have a lot of – not Chinese, but Orientals that, they come through.  You don’t 
see them as much as the Dominicans, but we have Asians coming in, we have people 
from the (inaudible) coming in, we have people coming from Venezuela, Colombia, 
some of them come with legitimate business.  We have a bunch of companies here and 
they tend to bring their people to work also, but we also have a lot of people who have 
no income where they come from and they think that here they’re going to be able to 
get started. 
Q 
The gateway to the US as well. 
A 
Yes, and you can tell if you go to these many deprived areas, where they have a bunch 
of money lending companies there, and you can see them coming back and forth and 
every single penny that they make here they send back to their countries to help family 
members, try to bring people over.  I guess that we get more from the Dominican 
Republic because of the distance between the islands.  I guess that that contributes to 
the crime right here in the sense that, when I say that every criminal here is a foreigner, 
you have a bunch of people here that don’t have jobs and they need money.  I mean 
you’re coming here, if you don’t have money you’re not going to get anything 
accomplished.  You won’t be able to feed yourself, you’re not going to be able to feed 
your family, if you are an addict to whatever drug you’re going to need money to get 
your drugs, I’m going to give you interest for free.  We have prostitution, I mean all 
kinds of stuff, but I guess there are more indirect than direct from (inaudible). 
230	  
	  
Q 
What about weapons smuggling, is that a big thing here? 
A 
Initially weapons and drugs are very very closely related in the sense of … 
Q 
Do you find them in shipments a lot together? 
A 
Yes, but it’s interesting that there are a lot of weapons that are being shipped to Puerto 
Rico or smuggled into Puerto Rico via mail.  I mean they break them apart, they send 
them to different addresses and they have them delivered to these addresses and then 
they put them together and they sell them out.  That happens a lot and that happens 
more than actually having – what do you call these – gun shops, you don’t see or you 
don’t hear of many gun stores being robbed and weapons missing, most of the weapons 
come in the mail and all kinds of means. 
Q 
Where are the weapons coming from, are they coming from Eastern Europe primarily? 
A 
What I see here, weapons are like a race, the bad guys like the AT47s because they’re 
nasty, they do a lot of damage, and they’re noisy, they’re very destructive and they’re 
very effective.  They don’t need much maintenance, it’s a weapon that has been 
designed in the Middle East and in Asia and it’s designed to work full of dirt and no 
maintenance at all.  I mean as the weapons get fancier and fancier they require a lot of 
maintenance so they don’t need that, they just need something that they can just throw 
in their car or bury in the ground for a while and they know where it’s at so if 
something happens they can just go and access it, and this is one of the weapons that 
you can actually just bury and leave it there and it’ll be all rusty and it’ll still be 
shooting.  It’s not a sniper rifle because it is not that accurate, but it’s going to throw a 
lot of lead down the barrel and that’s very much what they want, they just want to spray 
and run. 
Q 
Sure.  On a scale of one to ten, okay, so that’s pretty useless in the island, but when I 
say weapon smuggling, is Puerto Rico used as a transient route for weapon smuggling? 
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A 
I really couldn’t say that.  I guess that ATF would be more able to answer your 
question, because we see the guns coming in and we see the guns being used, but … 
Q 
Do you see guns coming in though with drugs shipments or … 
A 
No, they come separate.  They have guys that, all they do is just get you guns.  In 
undercover operations that we’ve done, we’ve had our undercover buy drugs and ask 
for weapons, and they tell you just in a couple of hours, you know, I’ll get you 
somebody that can get you the rifle that you need.  So that’s pretty much the smuggling 
that we’ve seen.  I don’t know of operations where the guns have come in here and 
from here have been shipped outside, but we get a lot of guns here. 
 
Q 
How do you think trans-national crimes are currently being addressed here in Puerto 
Rico? 
A 
Well we get several operations undercover and we also get initiatives under HIDTA 
initiatives.  The locals are the state police and it’s got FURA, which is a fast reacting 
unit, ISE, formerly Customs and Immigration, they have a lot of assets.  We have joint 
operations with the Coast Guard and it’s pretty much everybody is putting their assets 
into it and it’s all being co-ordinated with … 
Q 
Can you elaborate on that a bit, about the assets? 
A 
Assets, what I mean, assets is personnel, computerised equipment, detection equipment, 
laser, intercepting equipment in the sense of boats, fast boats, aeroplanes, helicopters.  
There’s – I don’t know how to say it – it’s called Stop and (inaudible), it’s like a little 
blimp, and that’s in the south west of the island and it’s tied up through some kind of 
cable and they just have it fly straight up, I don’t know how high in the sky, and it 
actually serves as a radar, it’s got the equipment on it and they just set it high and it 
covers a specific area.  I know of a couple of systems, and the Air National Guard also 
has some equipment in the north of the island that they can actually scope certain areas, 
and they work closely with the airport, FAA, and also ISE and the Coast Guard because 
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the capability of their radar equipment is pretty good. I mean they have three-
dimensional imaging and all kinds of stuff, and when they see stuff that they can’t 
identify they can actually just get on the phone and get resources to that area and just 
identify whatever that is and whether it’s for national security or drug interdiction or 
just identify an aircraft in the sky, so therefore they know what’s going on and can 
approach.  So that’s pretty much what I mean by assets. 
Q 
To what extent is Caribbean police co-operation reactive or proactive? 
A 
I think they’re both and Customs are reactive most in the sense that they’re in charge of 
everything that goes on, I mean they have jurisdiction. 
Q 
Do you think the balance is right or would you like to see it change? 
A 
In my point of view I don’t think that the balance is right because … 
Q 
How would you like to see it change then? 
A 
I would like them to have more money to be able to get things done in the sense of, the 
Police in Puerto Rico – and I’m not trying to demean them – they have at least 20,000 
police officers, that’s a lot, and on top of that 20,000 police officers they have all kinds 
of support personnel and they don’t have the money or the budget to provide other 
resources that they need in terms of radio communications, something like just a bullet 
proof vest, all kinds of gear, safety gear, like they’ll be getting more vehicles but they 
… 
Q 
What about computers, are they completely computerised, because I heard that some 
offices don’t even have computers.  Do they not have a database of some sort? 
A 
No.  For example, they just received I don’t know how many units with the sort of 
personal computers, not personal computers but an integrated computer system where 
we can access when we need information.  Wow, that kind of thing.  I’ll think and then 
I’ll tell you, you know, but they have their computers in their cars where they can 
actually access information right there without having to call the central radio operator 
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or whatever and find out if that vehicle that they’re stopping, it’s either reported stolen 
or it’s got any kind of (inaudible) appliance, but the system’s not working, so you have 
just some kind of terminal in your car, I guess it’s some kind of (inaudible) terminal 
that they have in their car but they can’t use it.  It’s just like it’s there taking up space 
inside their car but the system is not working, and it’s because there’s something about 
their radar transmission or it’s something.  Their system needs another thing to be able 
to work so it’s not working.  And you can see that they’re constantly just looking for 
funds to actually get things done.  At FURA, for example, it’s a unit that’s working 
with HIDTA so most of the resources that they have come from HIDTA funds, so the 
boats, the helicopters, the patrol cars, weapons, radios, all kinds of equipment, they’re 
basically paid by HIDTA funds, and if they weren’t getting HIDTA I can be pretty sure 
that they wouldn’t be able to have all those things. 
Q 
The HIDTA budget though has pretty much remained the same over a decade almost, 
so how has … 
A 
Yes.  I don’t think it’s going to increase, I think it’s actually going to decrease. 
Q 
Really? 
A 
Yes.   
Q 
So how is the funding made up, because obviously there’s been increases in personnel 
and increases, you know, with helicopters to buy and … 
A 
I really don’t know how the budget works with HIDTA.  I know that the HIDTA 
initiative is really broad because, for example, DEA has resources assigned to HIDTA 
as well as the FBI, ISC, ATF which is the equivalent of the FBI in Puerto Rico, or 
would be equivalent to FBI in Puerto Rico, but how their budgets are set I don’t know.  
Congress actually assign a big chunk of money, that big chunk of money gets spread 
out, but what I’ve heard is that that big chunk of money, that HIDTA initiative, which 
has been for a while, it’s been around for a while, so I think that it already reached the 
point where its usefulness is just pretty much that’s it, and the Government is starting to 
bring newer initiatives in order to address the different problems that they have to 
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address.  So to be able to determine where the money is coming from and how it is 
being assigned, I haven’t got a clue.  I know that, for example, FURA, what they have 
is pretty much set, I don’t see them getting any newer equipment or anything like that, 
if it’s coming I’m not aware. 
Q 
Are co-operation methods here in the Caribbean the same or different from those 
elsewhere, and if so how?  The co-operation methods here in the Caribbean, are they 
different from, say, the States or anywhere else? 
A 
I would probably have to say yes. 
Q 
How do you think they’re different? 
A 
Because of different cultures and different laws. 
Q 
Is there anything specifically unique that sticks out in your mind for the Caribbean in 
co-operation? 
A 
Let’s see.  Actually I would have to say that the resources are being used – Puerto Rico 
and the Caribbean being little islands that are spread out in a big chunk of water, the 
resources and the way that you address these problems are different to how you address 
problems in the border, for example, where you put up a wall, put in a bunch of 
sentries.  And your threats are different in the sense of the US being a huge continent, 
their borders on the east and west is just water, and north you have Canada, so the deal 
with Canada, that requires you to have certain mechanisms in place, and then south of 
the US all you have is Mexico.  So Mexico and the threat that Mexico will pose have to 
be addressed differently too, so I don’t think that if you go to the borders of Canada and 
the US you’re going to find a big wall of concrete and steel.  There might be a bunch of 
sentries that you have all across the border and … 
Q 
Sure, I’m from Canada and I literally lived on the border. 
A 
So on the border, what you’re doing there is you’re just stood in what used to be 
immigration and the border patrol I should say.  That’s pretty much what you have on 
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the border, it’s just border patrol, so across the border, you’re (inaudible) and nobody 
crosses that line and that’s about that.  It’s just the liaison, relationship between the 
governments.  In the Caribbean you have the governments don’t have, you get the 
British Virgin Islands, you get the US Virgin Islands, you have a bunch of, the lesser 
Antilles and all of them have different governments, they’re governed by different 
countries too, you have Netherlands, you have Great Britain, we have French little 
colonies.  It’s usual closer to South America they deal with the Colombian 
Government, the (inaudible), so just being in the Caribbean and having all this around 
you, I guess that’s what actually established the difference. 
Q 
Sure, it’s extremely unique actually. 
A 
So we actually have to deal with everybody. 
Q 
And when you do deal with everybody, how is police co-operation outside the region 
affected by trans-national crimes, from here that travel to there?  Not so much south 
because we saw that the route is going north, but how, for instance, are Miami and New 
York, how is the co-operation between agencies? 
A 
I have to say that it will have to be fairly restrained in the sense that we have to rely on 
each other to get the job done. 
Q 
But the crimes that travel there, how does that affect the co-operation? 
A 
I guess that is just makes them, that’s the way we have to be in the sense of this is your 
chunk of land and you have to take care of it whether you are (Inaudible) Dade or 
Florida State Police.  I guess the way that they’re affected is by the population that they 
have, for example, Florida, it’s a densely populated state, specifically by Latin 
Americans, and again you have to go back to culture.  You had a big influx of Cuban 
immigrants at one time, you have a bunch of Puerto Ricans taking over Kissimmee or 
Orlando and other areas of Florida, you have a bunch of South Americans coming in 
and that all pretty much just changes your style in the sense of, “How am I going to 
deal with all these individuals”, and how culturally you have to approach it.  So I guess 
that that pretty much brings everybody together in that instance.  Your law enforcement 
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personnel also is diverse in the sense of – if you go to Miami most of the police officers 
are Cuban descendants, and as you go higher in the state it’s when you start to see more 
Anglos in the police department. So I think that they will affect similarly in the sense of 
we work here and we get immigrants and the immigrants who misbehave, you pretty 
much have the same thing there.  The immigrants that are coming there are coming 
under the same conditions as they’re coming here, it’s just that they were able to make 
it over there instead of here.  So I guess that their style and pretty much their co-
operation has to be hand in hand in that sense, I just feel more culturally than anything 
else, because the governments are going to be saying that’s right.  That’s why I’m 
going to say it first. 
Q 
In your opinion, what forms of other co-operation are required that do not currently 
exist here in Puerto Rico, which specifically address Puerto Rican and Dominican 
crime? 
A 
I guess that you mean more in the intelligence community, in my point of view, in the 
sense of … 
Q 
More centralisation? 
A 
At least more co-ordination in the sense of right now the international crimes are not, 
you can’t say that it’s – for example, if we talk about drugs I can say, “Yes, it’s drug 
driven”, but the problem is you don’t have specific groups doing the trafficking.  You 
have the Colombians producing, you have Venezuelans transporting, you have people 
in Panama doing all the money laundering and dealing with the black market there, you 
have the Middle East using the drug money to support the international terrorism 
operations there, so in every agency, for whatever reason, everybody has got an 
intelligence unit, and if we had somewhere where all that could mingle and actually 
exchange information I think that it would help a little better to understand more 
effectively how things are going and why they’re going that way.  It’s easier to see an 
actual country with their intelligence community, but it’s a lot harder to have the 
intelligence community from the US, the intelligence community from Britain, Spain, 
More so from Israel, because even though the intelligence gathered might be different 
in the sense of, “Well okay, I’m NSA, I intercept every frigging communication that 
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comes into the US or goes out of the US”.  “Okay, and why are you here?”  Just 
because you have Peters that can actually say like, “Key on the President  (inaudible), 
assassination in” – okay, but if you could put that ear to work, “I’m going to take eight 
kilos to X point in the US”, and you can actually make a phone call and say like, “Hey 
listen, a little ear over here has overheard that there’s this amount of drugs that are 
going to be transferred from point A to point B”.  We don’t have a mechanism where 
you have the CIA, NSA, FBI, DEA talk to each other, other to national security matters 
right now. 
Q 
But is there not surely, at this critical point now in the criminal justice world, is that not 
in the works? 
A 
I don’t think it is, I don’t think it has ever been like that.  I worked a little bit for the 
Bureau and it’s just funny because once you add the human variable into the equation, 
then you become paranoid in the sense of the CIA doesn’t want the FBI to overlook 
what they’re doing and the FBI doesn’t want CIA to overlook what they’re doing.  So 
when you go to a foreign country and you work in the Embassy - and this is another 
example - the Embassy has got two tiers, it’s got the overt, which everybody sees and 
it’s at the Embassy and they’re there to protect the nationals in that country.  It also has 
a covert entity that is working and it’s gathering the information whether for 
technology, counter espionage, how to infiltrate personnel there, what’s going on in the 
Government, what’s the impression about our Government, etc. etc.  So you get to the 
Embassy, you say hi to people that you don’t know if they’re working for the CIA or 
not. I mean everybody there works for the Department or the State, so it’s one of these, 
and if we could actually integrate all this – for example, the CIA doesn’t have a CIA 
Director, it’s got a Director of Intelligence, and in that sense all the intelligence that has 
been gathered by that country should go to him.  It doesn’t happen like that.  I mean, 
you know, you’ve got intelligence, the military, and then you’ve got CIA and as I say, 
you’ve got FBI, and a few other agencies that are not in the website. And if we could 
have here, for example, if here in Puerto Rico they had an intelligence unit, we have 
our intelligence unit, National Guard, actually US Army, Air Force, blah blahblah, they 
all have their intelligence units and they all focused on something in particular, but for 
us to know that there is a boat leaving the Dominican Republic and it’s going in X 
direction, you know, we don’t have a way to convey that information.  And if we – as I 
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say, this is my personal opinion, I guess it’s because I worked for the Bureau a little bit 
– that if you could look for a way that you can actually congregate all these heads 
together and, you know, you don’t have to say like, “So and so told me this and that 
and that”, it’s, “If I were you I would be looking in that direction”.  Then they just look 
in that direction and oh, wow, there’s something happening.  I guess that we would be 
again more effective in our jobs whether it’s for drug interdiction or for counter 
terrorism for that matter.  I don’t know, I think that there are too many attitudes, too 
many heads working at the same time, they’re working (inaudible) and they’re not 
paying attention to things that might be relevant to so and so.  And I guess we do that in 
our work career, I’m being evaluated for this that I’m doing and if I just happen to 
come across something that is useful for somebody else in that same office I may 
overlook look it just because I am so focused on this task in particular that I don’t just 
take a little time to say like, “Hm, somebody might be able to use this”.  So I don’t 
know if that’s a good analogy, but that’s the way I feel. 
Q 
That’s really helpful. How is police co-operation in Puerto Rico and the Dominican 
Republic regulated by national and international law? 
A 
In the sense of how Puerto Rico might co-operate with them and vice versa?  I don’t 
know since I don’t know if there is any kind of treaty or government treaty where you 
can expand your jurisdiction.  I know that we have different treaties, federal, that 
allows us to, for example, part of our investigation here, it’s the bad guys that we’ve 
seen in your country and we want to prosecute that person in the United States, and we 
can go to you and through these legal treaties we can have that person extradited and 
tried in US territory.  I don’t know if the local governments have that, so I don’t know. 
Q 
When DEA agents collaborate with other agencies or police officers from overseas 
where does the accountability lie, like legally, financially, administratively? 
A 
Whose liability is it? 
Q 
Yeah, when you are dealing with a joint operation, say between here and the 
Dominican Republic, where would the accountability lie?  I guess it would depend too 
on who initiates the … 
239	  
	  
A 
Yes, and the liaison, the use that we have of that country, the ASA’s office … 
Q 
A case by case difference? 
A 
Yes, because the ASA’s office and Chief Counsel in DEA Headquarters, they actually 
decide what we can do and what we can not do.  If, for example, the Dominican 
Republic needs our help, we actually have a liaison officer, so in the Embassy in the 
Dominican Republic, for example, inside the Embassy we have people, DEA people, 
DEA special agents and support employees that work there.  If that Government needs 
anything it is channelled through there and if they need more resources and we need to 
provide those resources we will do it.  But that’s all part of Headquarter Chief Counsel, 
DOJ and ASA’s office in order to get everything set all in a legal fashion, so we can’t 
go and just do something and say that we’re just going to be liable for it.  I guess we’re 
pretty much liable for everything, but in terms of liability issues, it’s going to be, I 
guess it’s going to be shared depending on what type of help we’re providing and it’s 
on a case by case basis.  
Q 
Is there anything else you want to add about Caribbean crime or co-operation in the 
Caribbean that I haven’t? 
A 
No.  We’re still trying to find out more methods of … 
Q 
Around the geographical issue, yes. 
A 
Yes, because right now we’re at a point where we’re in the middle of a shift … 
Q 
Yes, a very big one coming up? 
A 
And whether it’s specifically for trafficking, we were used certain routes and certain 
ways of operation and right now that is kind of like the point where we really don’t 
know what’s going on in the sense of we’re still getting a big influx of drugs into the 
island but we just don’t see where it’s coming from.  And it’s not that we really don’t 
know … 
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Q 
But they’ve come up with something crazy, they’re a step ahead at the moment. 
A 
Right now, and this is my personal opinion from what I’ve seen, right now we’re at a 
point where we are seeing stuff, we just don’t see where it’s coming from, and we can’t 
define how, but a loophole has been found again and I see ourselves at that point where 
we’re trying to figure out, okay, there’s a loophole and we’re not seeing it.  We’ve got 
Coast Guard, we’ve got FURA, we’ve got ISE in the waters, we’ve got a bunch of 
immigrants coming in, but the yolas don’t have drugs any more.  Okay, if the yolas 
don’t have drugs any more, where are the drugs coming from?  And we’re starting to 
see more information provided by researchers of information and other means that 
they’re using sail boats, they’re using just regular entertainment boats.  People in 
participating in different sports, international sports, like auto racing, jet-ski 
competitions, offshore boating, and all these individuals have the ability to go outside 
our boundaries and come back in without being searched. 
Q 
Is there no way to detect, say on these jet-skis, is there no way to detect whether they 
are carrying … 
A 
They just have to go out on the jet-ski and … 
Q 
There’s no technology that can … 
A 
No.  You’re thinking about like thermal imaging and stuff like that. 
Q 
Yeah. 
A 
If you are thinking about like thermal imaging and stuff like that actually thermal 
imaging is a technology that has been around for a long time and I don’t see it being 
used here in Puerto Rico. 
Q 
Why is that? 
A 
I don’t know.  Maybe it’s just it’s too expensive technology.  It used to be very 
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expensive, right now it’s not that expensive and the imagers are on small, like a video 
camera. 
Q 
Is it effective? 
A 
I think it is.  Some people have different thoughts about thermal imagers.  Thermal 
imagers don’t go through things so if there’s somebody standing outside that wall with 
a thermal imager I can’t see it well. 
Q 
But isn’t there something specifically, and I’m trying to remember back to a long time 
ago reading about something to do with the jet-skis and the material that they are 
actually made out of, that it is one of the new created systems that that … 
A 
They’re made of fibreglass or something. 
Q 
Yeah. 
A 
It’s very simple with the thermal imager, quite simple.  The thermal imager, actually 
what it does, it just reads temperature.  An object will either absorb, reflect and refract, 
it’s three things that an object can do with temperature.  When you have anything, for 
example, fear, I can look at it with a thermal imager and it’s going to look like that but 
with different shades of white or black, then you know what you have in full 
temperature, or in fact white hot.  So different shades of white and grey as the 
temperature around it changes, and even the actual shape of that, but if you touch it or 
if you change something on it, that material that you use to alter that object, it’s 
different to the actual object, so the temperature it’s going to reflect or absorb, it’s 
different to the temperature that actually the object will reflect or absorb, so if you’re 
looking at it with a thermal imager you can tell that, oh it’s been plastered or it’s been 
altered.  So in the sense of like, for example, for rescues and looking at properties 
where you think that there are certain things that might be buried underground, you can 
look with the thermal imager and the thermal imager is going to show you where the 
ground has been altered. 
Q 
Okay.  Do they use that type of technology at the airport? 
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A 
I haven’t seen it.  But I know that the airports are using X-ray machines to see in the 
luggage and boxes and stuff like that. 
Q 
Is that all, like checking their luggage, is that all that people see, when it goes through 
the X-ray they could just … 
A 
I’m not sure but I think there are other machines behind.  I think that it’s actually a 
huge machine – as you’re getting stopped, before you’re going to get stopped into the 
plane, they all go through the machine.  But I think that they also do it, alright, they do 
it for every flight or they do it at random or they do it to specific flights, and once they 
unload the plane they actually do the same thing, and they also use the dogs, but there’s 
many ways to defeat that.  But I don’t think the thermal imagers are being used for that, 
but this is one problem that I see and that’s why I say that we’re at that point right now 
where we just don’t know what’s going on because they change their strategies and 
their methods. 
Q 
Okay.  How would you describe your role or contact with HIDTA, you’re pretty much 
in HIDTA, so how would you describe your role here? 
A 
I guess it would probably be facilitator and I’m primarily an investigator for HIDTA.  
My main focus here is to pretty much comply with the needs HIDTA have at that 
particular time. 
Q 
What is the main goal of HIDTA? 
A 
HIDTA – I have to say that’s what it stands for, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area.  
HIDTA as an initiative started, I don’t know, maybe a little over ten years ago.  It tries 
to concentrate – for example, Puerto Rico, high intensity area would probably be the 
different (inaudible) we have in progress.  High intensity drug trafficking in the area 
might be considered the entries, different entry points in the area, so your points of 
entry being the ferry and the (inaudible) that goes to the (inaudible), the different 
borders, the beaches, airport, the cruise ships, interaction between other islands that we 
have like (Inaudible) and (Inaudible), St. Thomas, St. Croix are just so close that you 
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get on a boat and in forty-five minutes you can make it over here and pick it up.  So all 
that and joint up, all these agencies together accomplish it, probably define more what 
HIDTA is about. 
Q 
Right, to give timely accurate information to each other in effect.  How is the 
information shared, is there a central database? 
A 
As far as I know we have right here in the ISE, we also have our Intel Unit, and they 
share pretty much share all the information that is gathered.  I don’t know how it’s 
working with ISE and ATF because we don’t share the same building now, but that’s 
pretty much how stuff moves around.  We have our supervisors, they are in direct 
contact with HIDTA management here, and that’s how we go about doing stuff.  
Before we’re going to go out on a surveillance or any kind of operational duty we write 
our operational plan and we have a copy of that plan forwarded to the ISE, and ISE take 
a place with the other agencies that what we’re doing is not related to or that we’re not 
going to work against each other, which has happened in the past where we’ve had an 
informant arrange a deal and we get there and we start looking around and it’s like 
there’s (inaudible) from (inaudible) here.  “Get out of there”, because we were going to 
like hit Customs or we were going to hit ourselves.  There was one time that we were 
actually going to hit another of our groups because their informant was getting paid by 
our informant because we thought he was a drug trafficker, and it was a big mess.  
Nothing happened because we were able to catch it before anything and the informants 
never got to get … 
Q 
And luckily you did recognise the cars and the papers … 
A 
But it was one of those things that if we don’t do a timeliness of the operation, just 
because we were so tight in time at that particular point, the information had come 
through the ISE, but by the time the ISE received it and was ready to compare and go 
like, “Hey, your spy was a spy” we were already there.  So yes, I will have to say that 
ISE would be basically like a point of contact or be a conflicting point in the whole 
operation. 
Q 
What much success has HIDTA had? 
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A 
Oh many. 
Q 
What would you say is something that stands out the most?  Can you think of an 
example? 
A 
It’s hard because everything addresses something specific, it’s just hard to compare in 
the sense of, well this operation was bigger than this operation.  The FBI do different 
money laundering operations and drug busts and stuff like that than ourselves, and most 
of the operations that we do, we do it in concert.  For me it’s really hard to actually 
come up with an actual operation that we can say, “ Phew, that’s been like … 
Q 
Sure.  But I guess it’s just thinking how it’s growing from the beginning.  I mean 
people do co-operate more now probably than they did in the beginning. 
A 
People, in what sense? 
Q 
Different agencies. 
A 
Actually I think that, yeah, internally we’re a lot more, there’s a lot more 
communication now than there used to be at the beginning. 
Q 
Sure, and to think you’re under one roof, it’s a natural tendency to start to trust each 
other. 
A 
Not really. 
Q 
No?  So you still don’t have a lot of trust? 
A 
It’s not trust, it’s just that if an agency regard us just working under the HIDTA 
umbrella, agencies have got their own culture, their own style, their own regulations … 
sorry, I lost track there. 
Q 
Okay, we were just talking about the successes of … 
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A 
Yeah, I think the communication has been like kind of a bit of an achievement in the 
sense of before everything – I mean even though we were in the same building 
everybody was in their locked doors because we’re doing DEA stuff, they’re doing FBI 
stuff, Customs is doing Customs things, ATF were in the building across this parking 
lot here, and everybody was doing their thing.  At one point we actually had somebody 
from the FBI here in our office space and somebody from the DEA in their office 
space, and that was hell just because internally all the agencies have their own policy 
and their own little cultures.  So I think that even though we’re still separated by doors, 
now there’s more communication in the sense of our supervisors have no problem with 
each other and every time we’re going to do something supervisor to supervisor – agent 
to agent we don’t have that much interaction because we’re so into the different cases 
that we have to work on, but if there’s something that we support or we invite support 
with them there’s no conflict. Before it used to be kind of … 
Q 
How are agents selected, how were you selected to come here? 
A 
(Inaudible). 
Q 
Okay.  How about education and training?  Is there a central training for HIDTA, I 
know there used to be an initiative, but it’s no longer, but … 
A 
To become part of the different program? 
Q 
Yeah. 
A 
No. 
Q 
Do you think that would be useful?  Everybody has their own individual work culture, 
organisational culture, do you think it would be better to … 
 
A 
Some kind of integration training or a seminar or something like that? 
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Q 
No, not really that, but I mean something that might actually incorporate so that 
everybody realises that, “Hey, we are working under one roof and we have technically 
the same goals”. 
A 
I don’t think that would help.  What I think is that there has to be, I guess, more … 
Q 
What do you feel? 
A 
Right now my perception is management in the sense of, the management has to be 
aware more of HIDTA goals.  When you come to work to HIDTA you should work 
towards HIDTA goals and not work towards DEA goals or FBI goals. 
Q 
That’s exactly what I was trying to get at. 
A 
And that is something that, I don’t know if we can get away with that at any time soon, 
but I think it’s attainable. 
Q 
Do you think it comes more from a leadership stance than so much more than an 
educational approach? 
A 
Yes, and that’s going to have to come from the agency heads because, like we were 
saying, all agencies have different policies and all of that.  When you get evaluated you 
shouldn’t get evaluated by DEA standards in the sense of you’re a DEA agent, you 
have to comply with these standards of performance, and the Bureau the same way and 
ISE the same way.  If you’re in HIDTA you should have a different evaluation process 
or different performance levels in the sense of, okay, you are part of this program, this 
is the performing level of this program. And if you don’t have management more 
knowledgeable or more aware of what the HIDTA needs and goals are instead of what 
my agency … 
Q 
Would that come from the Executive Board, is that where that would have to come 
from? 
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A 
Actually I think that the people on the Executive Board are still being guided by the 
agency heads, for example … 
Q 
You mean like in the States? 
A 
All the way to the States? 
Q 
No, who would be the ones to help you with, maybe to instigate that kind of … 
A 
Oh probably, if you asked me I would like to see Major Carter come down with some 
kind of communication where he’d say, “People assigned to HIDTA are to comply with 
this, and still you’re going to be governed by your agency policy and all of that, but 
your main focus is HIDTA and HIDTA goals and missions, and as long as you do that 
ethically and professionally you shouldn’t have a problem”.   
Q 
So I guess the first step would be to see if they could do it even locally. 
A 
Yeah, I mean locally would be great but that would require an individualist guy … 
Q 
Sure, to be the head of each agency. 
A 
And the initiative to – yeah, the ISE would do it, the FBI, DEA … 
Q 
Yes, they all could get together and sit down and talk to each other.  But do you still 
think it’s going in the right direction? 
A 
I think it is.  We’re still governed basically by our agencies but it’s, I hope it’s not too 
late, but it’s starting to look like now we are more integrated into one HIDTA, and I 
think at the beginning we didn’t have that much guidance. 
Q 
What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of implementing HIDTA or 
the context of HIDTA on a trans-national scale?  For instance, could you have within 
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this building a small division which was international, linked with other international 
offices like say, London, and then you could have exchange … 
A 
If we could have anything that looked like Interpol, that would be great. 
Q 
This is, you know, a little theory I have had, it sounds like a very simple thing to do, 
much more complicated of course, but why not have something like HIDTA where you 
have an international division, you know, it doesn’t really have to be that huge, but at 
the beginning, to startregionally , because once you have something, like you said, over 
time the doors became unlocked, bonds were starting to form somewhat, and you have 
to start there because proximity is everything.  So if you would have even an 
international exchange of agents, you know, where you learn different techniques, you 
learn different … 
A 
Well that’s the whole thing really.  At one point I think it’s all about egos than anything 
else.  Like if you have some kind of body where you have different agencies or 
different governments coming into it, there’s always that competition thing and I guess 
… 
Q 
Sure, even under one roof you might still have that, but at least it’s not fragmented. 
A 
Yes, but again you’re dealing with a bunch of type A personalities, so it’s really hard to 
get them in the same place and actually have one leader and have followers.  
Everybody’s going to try and say, “Well I’m DEA so if it’s drugs I’m the only resource 
here that can actually deal with it”.  And it shouldn’t be that way. 
Q 
But in theory do you agree that it might be? 
A 
In theory, again I repeat, if we can have anything like Interpol here, I tell you it would 
be great, it would be great.  Especially here in the Caribbean, it is something that we 
deal a lot with other governments all over the Caribbean, you have to.  We’re getting all 
this stuff in here, we’re shipping everything out, so it’s the only way to go I would say. 
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Q 
Then just a couple of questions about the key influences or factors on trans-national 
police co-operation.  What are the key influences that you feel affect trans-national co-
operation, i.e. personal, socially, cultural, politically? 
A 
I’d say politically and right now it’s like the key.  It is because of how I see things are 
being done and politically everybody has got their own agenda and that’s pretty much 
what I see as mood stuff.  This is going to sound kind of nasty, but the US Government 
will spend a lot of attention in the foreign relations and all of that, and all of a sudden 
they had the incident, the September 11 incident, and then the focus shifted from 
getting all this foreign relationship to oh, what’s happening here.  Now I have to put all 
my efforts into creating an agency, another agency that will shelter all these other 
agencies in order to revamp the efforts against international terrorism, because I think 
that the US Government never thought that somebody is going to have the time and is 
going to put the effort and the money into flying aeroplanes into the different places 
that they did.  I mean that’s something that I would have never thought of.  And it 
happened in the Second World War when we had Pearl Harbour and I guess that you 
need to have a major event, a major incident, in order to shift your focus, and that’s 
why I see that pretty much happens with everything. 
Q 
Yes, we’re at an interesting time right now aren’t we? 
A 
Yeah.  We’re bombarded by drugs and, okay, we’re putting our efforts in drugs.  We 
got bombed by international terrorists, okay, now are efforts are on international 
terrorism, and then they go like, “Oh anything”, and these guys are being financed by 
… 
Q 
Okay.  I’d like to know what you think could be done to improve co-operation at 
different levels.  So individual level, what could be done to motivate agents to co-
operate more? 
A 
Between agents? 
Q 
Mm. 
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A 
I guess it’ll go back again to management and what I was saying about the egos.  You 
have internally agents who compete against themselves and I guess that you can see 
that in the military and law enforcement.  Agencies compete against themselves, DEA 
is always trying to prove that they’re better than FBI, FBI is the lead agency and 
they’re the main police body in the nation and so, you know, “No, we’re better than 
you are and you can’t come over and tell us what to do”, and it goes back and forth 
between agencies.  I think if we could get away with that attitude and instead of trying 
to place the different agencies in some kind of hurricane. 
Q 
Why do you think though that some individuals co-operate more than others? 
A 
Because they don’t hear that crap about all that stuff.  For example, I worked with the 
Bureau, I work with DEA, I worked for the local government and we all do what we 
need to do and … 
Q 
Sure.  It’s also part of it. 
A 
Yes.  Just because you have a specific name doesn’t mean that you’re the authority on 
it. 
Q 
It’s a certain personality that’s attracted to the industry, okay. How about institutional 
level, what changes in the DEA or HIDTA and other agencies could be made to 
improve trans-national co-operation? 
A 
Well it’s going to sound a little bad.  We have, and this is going to have to be kind of 
like with the Government, there’s a lot of, the head of the agencies, for example, the 
Administrator at DEA is a national appointing and so is the Director of the FBI and so 
forth.  When you have a government with specific style and they put in personnel that 
have nothing to do with law enforcement, for example, the head of an agency, a law 
enforcement agency, you get certain contradictions in style and actually in what they 
do.  It’s not necessarily true for every instance, I think that our administrator is the 
person to be there.  I don’t think they should be in there too long before something 
more important comes along and she’ll be offered it and she’ll take it, but right now I 
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think that we’re at a point where the heads of the different agencies are more geared 
towards their agency than geared towards what the government is about.  But I see it a 
lot, like for example in Puerto Rico. Once the government changes or the 
administration changes all the agencies’ heads, they change, and because they’re 
appointed that doesn’t mean they are the best person for the job. 
Q 
Sure, and that rotation … 
A 
It’s horrible because everything starts to open out and the days come when the vision of 
this individual is not based on the vision of that agency.  For example, DEA was 
created in 1973 as a – how can I say – at the Senate to try to centralise drug 
investigations, and that reason of being should stay loyal or should stay true for the rest 
of the days of that agency and it shouldn’t change when each administrator like comes 
along, and that should hold true for every agency.  So I think that that’s pretty much 
how – if we have to change something or … 
Q 
It kind of goes on to the next one, which is I want to ask about the wider context and 
what changes politically or economically you think. 
A 
I think that’s the way I feel in the sense of it all trickles down, for whatever reason that 
I just can’t explain, but if you can arrange everything at the top and keep that true, then 
everything down kind of like falls in place. 
Q 
The next question – how important is trust in co-operation?  Is it very important. 
A 
Utmost. 
Q 
What do you feel are the barriers to trust? 
A 
Well again individual interests and people’s agenda.  I can say for myself, I’m a person 
that I need to trust you entirely in order to deal with you and if I see you do something 
that I don’t like, the chances are I’m not going to rely on you again.  It’s like when you 
go to church to confession, if you go to confess to a priest and all of a sudden the town 
knows that you were frolicking, I’m not going to confess again. 
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Q 
No, but it’s true, it has to start somewhere.  No matter how bad the past has been, you 
have to start somewhere. 
A 
And the problem is it’s going to be in the individual to say, “You know what, I’m not 
going to zoom into that, I’m going to start here, right here, from now on, and I’m going 
to wait, I’m going to hope you’re not going to do anything to break that trust”.  So we 
leave ourselves and certainly in backgrounds, so we already have a background but it’s 
kind of, “I’m not going to be all open at the beginning”.  You stop to see how things 
evolve, then you kind of like open up. 
Q 
What do you think can be done to improve trust between individuals and organisations? 
A 
I think that that’s pretty much it.  Since most of our trust is based on previous 
behaviour, you just need to kind of start being a good boy from day one and say, 
“Okay, we’re going to start working together and all that”, and then ensure that my pact 
with you is in a manner that it’s going to build the trust, but it’s going to have to be like 
that individual’s going like, “You know what, people before me did this in this 
fashion”, i.e. that’s not my style, this is the way I’m going to do it, and then you do it 
that way.  You don’t tell people that you’re going to do something and then just go 
behind their backs and do something differently because that’s not, you know, we’re 
going to keep … 
Q 
Okay.  Can I quickly ask you, I’m just going to say a list of things, this is the very last 
question.  People have identified certain factors which they think affect trans-national 
co-operation and I just want to ask you how much of the following are features of your 
organisation, or organisational culture I should say. On a scale of one to five, one being 
a great deal, two a lot, three a little, four not very much and five not at all.  Okay.  How 
would you rate motivation?  These are all in terms of co-operation issues. 
A 
Motivation.  In HIDTA or … 
Q 
Yes. 
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A 
HIDTA per se. 
Q 
HIDTA per se.  How would you rate motivation as a factor affecting co-operation? 
A 
In general I think it would probably be in between a two and a three in the sense of one 
being good and five being better. 
Q 
Yes, exactly.   
A 
Well, I can’t take two and a half, right?  I’ll go for a three then. 
Q 
Okay, three.  How about trust? 
A 
Three again. 
Q 
Mistrust. 
A 
How much of it?   
Q 
Try and be as honest as you can. 
A 
Yeah, I think that will be a two.  And how, the level of … 
Q 
Two is higher then, okay. 
A 
So a two is good or … 
Q 
Two is a lot, yeah. 
A 
I said that we have a lot of trust between us? 
Q 
Mistrust. 
A 
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Mistrust, I think there’s a lot of mistrust, three. 
Q 
Betrayal. 
A 
That would be about two. 
Q 
Okay, so there is past behaviour showing mistrust.  Coercion, I do you a favour, you do 
me a favour. 
A 
That would be three. 
Q 
Leadership, how does that affect co-operation? 
A 
That’s primal.  Leadership, yeah, I’ll put that on a one.  
Q 
You think that it’s good here though? 
A 
I don’t think that it’s – yeah, let’s balance it, I’ll go to three in the sense of for me, 
leadership, it’s primal, it’s very important.  If that exists, I don’t think that that exists 
that much, I think that there’s still room for somebody … 
Q 
For improvement, okay, that’s really important.  Again it isn’t in terms of what’s 
happening now. 
A 
Yeah, I’m not evaluating anybody in particular.  I would say that here it’s needed. 
Q 
How about integrity? 
A 
How good is integrity for co-operation? 
Q 
In relation to what’s happening here, yes.  Do you think people here are … 
A 
Have a lot of integrity?  Yeah, it’s either two or four.  What would be the good thing? 
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Q 
Two would be a lot of integrity. 
A 
Okay, yes, two.  I think that even though we may have differences, I think that with 
certain things people are still, we still have integrity here. 
Q 
Okay.  Power and competition, I shouldn’t say competition, but power and egos. 
A 
If we have them or not? 
Q 
Do you think they affect co-operation a lot? 
A 
Yes, a lot.  That would be a two or a one. 
Q 
How about resources? 
A 
We have resources that affect us a lot.  Two or one, give it a one, and I may expand 
that.  The resources that DEA has available from HIDTA are not necessarily the same 
or as effective as the resources that the FBI may have available from HIDTA, and that’s 
why I have had to say that that’s a major factor. 
Q 
Okay.  How about competition?  High?  Okay.  What about race and ethnicity, how 
does that affect co-operation, nothing? 
A 
No, there’s no, in that respect.  In the US compared to maybe other parts, and not 
necessarily used in other countries.  In Puerto Rico I know that if you have been here a 
long time you probably know that you can be white, you can be yellow, you can be 
black, it doesn’t matter.  I mean as long as you are not misbehaving or doing something 
you’re not going to hear, you know, if you’re doing something wrong people are going 
to say like, “Look at this arsehole doing something wrong”.  They’re not going to say, 
“Look at this black guy doing something wrong”, or “This frigging Dominican”, or 
something like that.  It’s very veryvery seldom you can go out and see something like 
that, so I don’t think that ethnicity would have a big bearing on co-operation. 
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Q 
How about gender? 
A 
I don’t think so. Maybe a woman will probably feel like it will have a bearing on but 
it’s because also law enforcement is very … 
Q 
Male dominated, yeah. 
A 
So it’s not because of prejudice or anything but for some reason … 
Q 
Actually that was my last question.  Thanks so very much for taking time out of your 
busy schedule to be interviewed. I truly appreciate it. 
 
End of Interview 
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Appendix F: Coding Framework 
GLOBAL 
THEMES ORGANIZING THEMES BASIC THEMES (CODES) 
Working within 
the DEA  Advantages of DEA: Professional 
    Organised, funded and well-equipped 
    Access 
    Job satisfaction 
  Disadvantages: Egos 
    Personal sacrifices 
    Bureaucracy, laws and policies 
    Secrets and competition 
  
TNPC between DEA and 
other agencies: Locals 
    Joint operations 
    Shared training 
    Shared information 
    Provision of equipment 
  DEA Success: Very satisfactory 
  Barriers to TNP: Language 
    Political will 
    Bad governance and corruption 
    Different legal systems 
    Cultural insensitivities 
    Competition and turf wars 
    Defined roles 
    Gender 
  Why barriers occur: Different legal systems 
    Anti-US government and political will 
    Bad governance and corruption 
  Overcoming barriers: Governance and accountability 
    More education/training 
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    Anti-corruption strategies 
    Changing attitudes and perceptions 
    Networking and communication 
TNP in PR and 
DR Nature of crimes: Drug crime 
   Drug crime related to violence 
   Weapons 
   Entering the country 
   Carrying weapons 
   Illegal aliens 
   Human trafficking 
   Terrorism 
   Corruption 
   Causes of crime 
   Interlinked crimes 
   DR 
   >As a "threat" 
   Cooperation with 
   PR position within the Caribbean 
   >As a "gateway to the US" 
  Desired Cooperation: Gather more intelligence 
    Better surveillance 
    Undercover agents/operations 
    Better communication 
    Better cooperation with other islands 
    More resources 
    Combine resources 
    Agency cooperation 
    Improve leadership 
    Avoid personality clashes 
  Reactive versus Proactive: Reactive vs. proactive: 
    Reactive, seen as negative 
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    Proactive, seen as positive 
  Reactive Factors: Lack of political will 
    Lack of resources/equipment 
    Need more undercover ops/informants 
    Personality 
  Types of changes needed: More/better resources 
    Better technology 
    Leadership 
    Political will 
    Corruption 
    Organisational change 
    
Individual specialized programs and 
units 
  
Different methods of the 
Caribbean: Islands – geography 
    Physical barrier to cooperation 
    Easier for traffickers 
    Many cultures 
    Different legal systems 
    Being a set of islands and difficulties 
involved encourages cooperation     
    Island attitudes ('slack') 
    Nepotism/corruption 
    Agency territorialism 
    Political will 
    Lack of resources and sharing 
  
Outside the region - effect of 
PR/DR crime: 
Cooperation and awareness of the 
problem 
    
"Not our problem" and "Passing 
through" 
    Shared problem 
    Violent crime 
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    Tourism 
    
Mainland US "not interested", "don't 
understand" 
    
PR as 'outside' the main US nation/seen 
as marginal 
    South America 
    Problems with political systems 
  Changes needed: Training 
    Resources/sharing more resources 
    
Improved communication/shared 
information 
    Increased political will 
    
Being more proactive/tackle criminal 
networks 
    Improved extradition 
    Tackling illegal immigration 
    Need more effort on the other side/DR 
    Corruption 
    Change is already happening 
  
Working within national and 
international laws: 
Working within other country's legal 
systems: 
    Difficulties 
    Involved with politics 
    Need to 'get around' laws 
    
Easier to do certain things (e.g. wire 
taps) 
    Extradition is working well 
    Working within US law: 
    
Abiding by US laws/guidelines while 
overseas 
    US laws too strict/unhelpful 
    International laws/treaties are too 
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outdated, need reform: 
    Weighted towards suspect's rights 
    
Frustrated with/seem distanced from 
international law 
  Accountability: Legal jurisdiction 
    Lies with the DEA/US federal govt 
    Lies with the country you’re in 
    Depends on the case 
    Financial – who is paying for it? 
    Lead by the US 
    Lead by the host country 
    Shared 
    Human rights 
    Difficulty of knowing what other 
countries will do with information 
shared     
    Showing leadership/leading by example 
  Other comments: Scale of the problem 
    
Geographical complexity of the 
Caribbean 
    
Diversity and adaptability of 
transnational criminals 
    Need to keep on improving cooperation 
    Centralise 
    
Improve cooperation with 
Central/South America 
Working within 
HIDTA Roles within HIDTA: (Listed roles – no themes) 
  HIDTA’s goals: To reduce drug trafficking 
    Sharing intelligence 
    Information all in one place–central 
processing–central clearing house     
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    Creating links, networking 
    
Link together the heads of agencies – 
bosses – directors 
    Importance of regularity, and physical 
presence, regular meetings round a table     
    Coordination of aims 
    
Share resources (e.g. agents or 
equipment) 
    Deconfliction – Allows bosses to decide 
who should investigate which cases     
    Creates infrastructure to identify large 
criminal organizations – initiate 
investigations     
    HIDTA brings extra funds 
  Information sharing: Automated systems 
    Disseminating reports through 
ISC/logging info through ISC     
    Range of different information systems 
    Not integrated 
    Security concerns with integration 
    
Coordinating with other 
agencies/passing on cases 
    Face to face 
    Individual agents bring info from and 
pass back to their organisations     
    Proximity important 
    Telephone contact 
    Trust problems 
    Information passed strictly through 
supervisors – strict hierarchy     
   
    History -trust the people they deal with 
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most 
  
History -trust the people they deal with 
most 
    Personality problems 
  Barriers to sharing: Language barriers 
    Security – leaks and corruption 
    Personality clashes/problems 
    Competition 
    Institutional bias towards not 
sharing/structural/trained not to share     
    Trust problems 
    Timeliness – communication too slow 
    Funding 
    No problems 
  
How HIDTA addresses 
barriers: Improve technology/communications 
    
Deconfliction to ensure cases go to the 
right place 
    Improve networking 
    Hold conferences, face to face 
meetings, to build relationships     
    Need more funding/resources 
    
No problems within HIDTA, only with 
people from outside 
    
Deal with personality problems, try to 
go around them 
    
Promotions based on casework, not 
cooperation 
  HIDTA’s success: Successful, best HIDTA in the US 
   
   
    Better communication/trust between 
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departments 
    Good ISC/deconfliction 
  Future improvements: Works well, just needs more resources 
    
Need more funding to support local 
forces 
    Change promotions system to 
encourage cooperation, not competition     
  Recruitment: Selection process 
    
Heads of agencies select agents – not 
HIDTA itself 
    
Individuals are chosen to be assigned to 
HIDTA taskforces 
    Prestigious 
    
Extensive process and background 
checks 
    Importance of training 
    Relationship building 
    Need officers to have the same 
training/avoid conflicting training     
    Additional training needed for local 
officers who get less from their own 
dept.     
    
Limited training – HIDTA training 
resources have been cut 
    Funding for training taken out of 
individual operational budgets     
    Pool resources 
  
Implementing HIDTA 
transnationally: Advantages: 
    It is possible, depends on will 
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Would help reflect the shifting nature of 
drug production/trade 
    Would need good management 
    
Take the same approach to drugs as to 
terrorism 
    Focused on the same mission – But on 
the other hand widening the focus might 
dilute it?     
    Disadvantages: 
    Difficulties in integrating very different 
policing organisations     
    Difficulty of creating shared systems 
but maintaining security     
    Corruption in other countries (eg. DR) 
    Competition between different forces 
    
Difficulty of getting the funding sorted 
out 
    Difficulty of developing a shared legal 
framework (both for sharing 
information and for jurisdiction)     
    Organisational changes – create overall 
director with complete power     
Influences on TNP Key influences: Political 
    Resources 
    International vs. local politics 
    Corruption 
    Personal 
    
Networking especially between 
leaders/managers 
    Commitment (and networking helps 
develop that) – commitment to 
overcoming barriers eg legal     
    Personality 
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    Technology – communication – linked 
to networking because allows better     
    Cultural 
    Language 
    Organisational 
  Individual level of TNPC: Motivation 
    Salary and recognition (and training)  
    Better education 
    Defuse competition.  
    Create a feeling of unity 
    
Friendships rather than just basic 
cooperation 
    Reciprocation and trust  
    Need tact and diplomacy 
    Can’t change personality 
    Cultural differences 
  Institutional level of TNPC: Training unequal; localsvs feds. 
    Language problems 
    
Impetus/leadership from people at the 
top 
    New initiatives and practices 
    Problem of political appointments 
    Cultural problems 
    Staff turnover  
    
Better support for officers from other 
countries 
    Establishing offices abroad 
    Importance of face to face again 
  
Wider context - politically 
and economically: 
Anti-political stance/disillusioned with 
politics 
   
    Problem of political rotation/swings 
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    Appointments system 
    Politicization of the police department 
    Good leadership 
    Better funding 
    Capacity building 
    Language training 
  Importance of trust: Trust is crucial to cooperation 
    Styles of trusting/building up trust 
    Trust gradually, build up trust 
    
Trust implicitly but withdraw if 
anything goes wrong 
    Need face to face contact to build trust 
    Barriers to trust 
    Corruption 
    Background (suspicion or no 
knowledge of their history/associates)     
  
Improving trust between 
individuals: Mistrustful personality can't be changed 
    Reciprocity 
    Building up relationships slowly 
    Better communication 
    Respect 
  
Improving trust between 
organizations: Training together  
    Ongoing, successful cooperation 
    Reduce competition 
    
Better coordination, working towards 
the same goals 
    Verbal and written agreements 
    Better communication 
    Face to face meetings 
    Good leadership 
268	  
	  
    All comes down to the individual level 
  
Orgn. features affecting 
cooperation: Mistrust 
    Leadership 
    Role models  
    Resources 
    Gender 
    
Not really a problem, more about 
personality 
    Have to be 'better than a man'/stronger 
    Women are more determined 
    Helps to be attractive and use that 
    Race and ethnicity 
    PR is a 'mesh', race not important here 
    No, some racism/'favoritism' exists 
    Language barriers 
    
Racism unacceptable within federal 
agencies 
 
  
269	  
	  
Appendix G: Interview Participants 
ORGANIZATION/AGENCY TITLE OF 
INTERVIEWEES/RESPONDENTS 
AFT /NIE -Special Investigative Bureau Supervisor NIE 
CBP Ports/Air & Marine Branches 
Coast Guard Investigative Service Resident Agent In Charge (High Seas & 
Trafficking Ops Initiative) 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Special Agent 
DEA TF/SGT 
DEA FBI Intelligence Analyst 
DEA Intelligence Analyst 
DEA TF/SGT 
DEA - Airport Division Group Supervisor 
DEA - DR Chief DEA Supervisor - DR 
DEA - Miami Public Information Officer/SA 
DEA - NYFD Public Information Officer/SA 
DEA - PRFD PIO/DTC Special Support Unit- 
Caribbean Division 
DEA - PRFD Special Agent - Money Laundering Group 
(TF-4) 
DEA - PRFD Special Agent - Foreign OPS 
DEA - PRFD Assistant SA-In Charge/Foreign OPS 
DEA - PRFD DEA Intelligence Research Specialist 
DEA - PRFD Special Agent- Colombian Military 
DEA - PRFD Special Agent - X Police Michigan (New) 
DEA - PRFD PIO/DTC Special Support Unit- 
Caribbean Division 
DEA - PRFD Special Agent-In Charge/Foreign OPS 
DEA - PRFD Special Agent 
DEA - PRFD Acting PIO 
DEA - PRFD Acting DTC 
DEA - PRFD/ PRPD Task Force Agent- DEA & PRPD 
Department Of Corrections (DOC) FBI Agent  
Department Of Homeland Security-CBP Director Of Field Ops - Caribbean 
Department of Justice (DOJ) -  Chief 
Prosecutors Office 
  
DOJ Office Of Drug Control Director Of Office Of Drug Control 
DOJ Office Of Drug Control Special Agent Of ODC 
DOJ Statistical Analysis Centre Director Of Stats. Centre 
DOJ-ATF PRFD Resident Agent in Charge 
DOJ-SIB INTERPOL DIVISION Special Agent III 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Intelligence Analyst 
FBI-ISC Supervisor Intel/IT - Special Federal 
Officer, X Director of Interpol 
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FURA - Police Department Admin. Director FURA (Air & Marine 
Interdiction) 
FURA – Police Department Senior Officer 
FURA -PRPD Admin. Director FURA ( Air & Marine 
Interdiction)/COBRA - Ctr. for domestic 
awareness 
FURA -PRPD Rescue Team 
FURA -PRPD SWAT Team Agent 
FURA -PRPD PRDP Agent 
Governor's Office Governor's Advisor On Federal Affairs 
HIDTA Executive Officer PR/VI HIDTA 
HIDTA Executive Secretary  
Immigration and Customs Customs Intelligence Research Specialist 
Immigration and Customs Intelligence Research Specialist 
INTEROL  SR. Officer Specialist 
ISC-FBI and INTERPOL Supervisor Intel/IT - Special Agent III 
PR National Guard Communication/Logistics Manager 
(ONDCP) 
PR/USVI HIDTA Director of HIDTA PR/USVI 
S.W.A.T. Director of PR S.W.A.T 
US EMBASSEY - DR Chief Political Officer  
USAF  SSGT. Translator 
USCG US Coast Guard-HIDTA Training 
Initiative 
USCG US Coast Guard 
USCG LT. JG US Coast Guard 
USCG-CGIS Director High Seas and Trafficking Ops 
Initiative 
 
